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GLOBAL HISTORY

CONCEPTUAL HISTORY



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**GLOBAL HISTORY
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Global history is a recent trend in modern historiography. Since the term's emergence in the 1990s and to this day, there has been a debate around it. There is ongoing discussion about the correlation between terms 'global history', 'world history', 'universal history', 'shared history', 'comparative history', 'big history', 'transnational history', 'connected history', 'entangled history' etc. Conventionally, global history has been studied as the history of the states, empires, civilisations, vast areas, hemispheres. Presently, global history has been entering into the reflexive stage, thus actualizing conceptual history as a relevant method for studying global history's subject field and methodological tools. Conceptual history enables us to look at the global history as at the concept and as a historical ideology of the Global Age; it also can help to define 'global history' term's place in a large linguistic family of related concepts, to trace semantic connections between such constructs, as 'backwardness', 'imperial meridian', 'revival – cultural transfer'. In this book, global history is presented by three types of historical writing: transnational history, social theology, *histoire croisée*.

In the globalizing world the perception of global history must encompass national traditions, making it relevant both for the academic community and for the mass consciousness.

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PREFACE

Global history is a modern trend in historical research

The increased attention to world and global history has been a significant feature of the changes that have taken place in the world in the last few decades. This is largely due to both political and socio-cultural transformations of the second half of the 20th – early 21st century. These include the collapse of colonial systems, the end of the Cold War and the departure of the bipolar division, the development of integration processes, on the one hand, and significant intellectual changes that have taken place in this context, on the other one. In other words, the world around us has changed, so our perception and understanding of society is also forced to change.

As Iryna Kolesnyk rightly points out in this work, ‘global history is a recent trend in modern historiography’¹. Since the term’s emergence in the 1990s and to this day, there has been a debate around it. There is ongoing discussion about the correlation between terms ‘global history’, ‘world history’, ‘universal history’, ‘shared history’, ‘human history’, ‘comparative history’, ‘big history’, ‘transnational history’, ‘connected history’, etc. However, the understanding of the definition of ‘global history’ among historians still remains ambiguous and controversial: some research it, propagate it, some are sceptical, while there are those who do not accept it at all.

1 *Колесник Ірина*. Глобальна історія. Історія понять. Київ: НАН України; Інститут історії України, 2019. 348 с.

The appearance of two important scientific journals was a kind of milestone for world and global history. The first of them, which appeared in 1990, was *The Journal of World History*, founded by Jerry Bentley and published at the University of Hawaii; the second was *The Journal of Global History*, founded by William Clarence-Smith in 2006 in Cambridge, which was designed to be an interdisciplinary forum for discussions between representatives of social and natural sciences on global development. The Hawaiian journal, which became the official publication of the World History Association, emphasised in its first issue that over the past two centuries, ‘all historiographical traditions converged either to celebrate or react to the rise of the West’; it now wants to pursue a truly global history based on ‘serious scholarship’². However, it is still not fully understood what the differences between the two journals, as well as between the concepts of ‘world history’ and ‘global history’ should be. Moreover, we are still far from any consensus on what exactly ‘global history’ is and since when we can talk particularly about global history. The term ‘global history’ partly corresponds to ‘world history’ and is very often replaced by it. Thus, global history usually refers to the period of globalization, which has become particularly intense since the last third of the 20th century, while world history is interested in earlier historical periods³. However, as practice shows, differentiating them according to this criterion does not always justify itself.

2 O'Brien, Patrick. Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History // *Journal of Global History*. 2006. 1:1. P. 30.

3 Sachsenmaier, Dominic. Global History and Critiques of Western Perspectives // *Comparative Education*. Vol. 42. No. 3. August 2006. P. 451–470.

The emergence of a new direction of historical research, namely global history, is rightly attributed to the 1980s – early 1990s. It was the concepts of globalization that began to take shape at that time that gave rise to a new impetus in the debate on the nature and methodology of world history. The latter is known to have a long history based on Eurocentrism. However, the novelty of the scientists' approaches prevailed. In historiographical practice, this meant going beyond national borders and the growing tendency to view the West as only one of the many cultural and intellectual areas of the world. The latter is confirmed by the book by professor of the University of Chicago Dipesh Chakrabarty *Provincializing Europe*⁴. The author rightly proves the narrowness of the Western view of historical development. At the same time, the growing cooperation of Western and non-Western scientists, the involvement of the latter to work in major research and training centres in the Western world, as well as the international nature of a number of study projects are phenomena in the same ballpark.

Under the influence of globalization study, historians have sought to move away from Eurocentrism and study history from a global perspective, emphasising the links between peoples and communities through trade, migration, various networks, and international institutions. The concept of 'connections' began to prevail over the previously dominant paradigm of studies – civilisation⁵.

4 *Chakrabarty, Dipesh*. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, NJ, 2000.

5 *Jong J. de*. *World History and Global History: Concepts and Theories World History: A Brief Introduction / Janny de Jong // World and Global History: Research and Teaching*. Pisa : Plus-Pisa University Press, 2011. Pp.2–4.

Topics that had a transnational or transcultural dimension became increasingly popular among world historians. The history of slavery, mobility, migration, diasporas, borderland, mixed identities, etc. were the prevailing research topics.

The impressive economic successes and upsurges of Asian countries in the 1990s gave impetus to studies in the sphere of the global economy. British historians R. Drayton and D. Motadel began to view global history primarily as a ‘change in the explanans of history’ and an approach to the past, based on two models – comparative, i.e. relative, and connective, i.e. connectivity. The principles of the comparative approach are aimed at understanding events in one place by studying and clarifying their similarities and differences from events that have occurred in other parts or regions of the world. The connective approach is designed to find out how much history is formed through the spatial and temporal interaction of individual historical communities. These two approaches, of course, can be used separately or in combination. Although they are not new, like global history as a genre in general, but in the second half of the 20th century, they took on a radically new meaning⁶.

As we know, a new approach to the interpretation of world history, which went beyond the paradigm of civilisation, dates back to the work of William McNeill’s *The Rise of the West*, published in 1963. As a follower of A. Toynbee, W. McNeill took the study of civilisation as a basis, but he also believed that civilisations as phenomena

6 Drayton R., Motadel D. Discussion: the Futures of Global History / Richard Drayton, David Motadel // *Journal of Global History*. 2018. Is. 13. Pp. 1–21.

are open to influence and borrowing. That approach paved the way for the study of intercivilisational relations and an integrated approach to the world. That model of McNeill's study was developed in his subsequent publications, as well as in the works of Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein, Janet Abu-Lughod, and other scholars. Thus, I. Wallerstein, choosing the economy as the starting point for the analysis, presented the world as a whole, consisting of a nucleus, semi-periphery, and periphery. Thus, his theory of 'world-systems' laid down the principles of one of the most appropriate schools of globalism – the interdisciplinary field of globalization study.

Under the influence of globalism, world historians have also begun to borrow the methodology of other sciences, such as economics, sociology, biology, geology, linguistics, and so on. Globalization has significantly changed the way we understand history, primarily because it was no longer possible to study states, peoples, and other communities in isolation from each other.

The next two important factors that influenced the emergence of global history as a form of world history and methodology were, first, the collapse of European empires and the demand of postcolonial nations to have their own place in world history; secondly, the importance of subaltern studies in this period, which was a manifestation of historians' desire to understand the historical process from the standpoint of subordinate groups (women, poor, 'non-white' peoples, representatives of the 'global South').

It was the influence of these factors that led to a 'global turn' in world history methodology, characterised by an integrated approach, the use of interdisciplinary methodology, the abandonment of a civilisational

approach in favour of intercultural interaction and cross-border relationships, and the rejection of Eurocentrism. Although the influence of Eurocentrism was felt all over the world, it was most characteristic of European historians, representatives of the states – former metropolises. Now historians have tried to move away from the view of the past through the prism of the West as the central and dominant lever of world development. This new approach was marked by the use of the terms ‘global history’, ‘new global history’, or ‘study of globality’. In the first years of the 21st century, many influential works on global history have been published, including the books *Globalization in World History*, edited by A. G. Hopkins⁷, *The Great Divergence* by K. Pomeranz,⁸ and *The Birth of the Modern World* by C. Bayly⁹.

The creation of the European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) in 2002 and the holding of the first Congress on World and Global History in Leipzig in 2005 were an illustration of the institutionalisation of the ‘global history’ trend¹⁰. In February 2008, Harvard hosted a special scientific forum of ‘global historians’ under the motto ‘Global History, Globally’. The subject of global history is reflected in the recent International Congresses of Historical Sciences: at the XIX ICHS in Oslo, and at

7 *Globalization in World History* / Ed. A. G. Hopkins. London: Pimlico, 2002. 352 p.

8 *Pomeranz K. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* / Kenneth Pomeranz. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 392 p.

9 *Bayly Ch. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* / Christopher Bayly. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004. 564 p.

10 *World and Global History. First European Congress. Pre-Program.* Leipzig, 2005 43 p.

the XX ICHS in Sydney, where separate sections were devoted to world and global history. The problems of global and transnational history were also the focus of the XXII International Congress of Historical Sciences, which took place on 22–29 August 2015 in China. Monographic studies also began to appear, such as Patrick Manning's book *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*¹¹, devoted to that issue.

Thus, global history is another attempt 'to return on a new theoretical level to an integrative view of history' and a reflection on the essential changes in the conditions of existence of society. At the turn of the millennium, there have been significant transformations in most spheres of social life: there increased dynamism and uncertainty of the external environment, increased the likelihood of new risks and challenges, expanded the geography and dynamics of material, labour, financial, and information flows. The processes of globalization and integration in modern conditions also extend to the political and social, cultural and civilisational aspects of life. All this imperatively requires a search for an adequate scientific model of their understanding. The purpose of the latter is to ensure a holistic worldview and the formation of modern scientific worldview, ideas about the world and the laws of its development characteristic of nature, man, and society.

The application of a new scientific model in practice dictates the integration of knowledge, and the globalization of socio-economic problems necessitates a new synthesis. Therefore, the essence and specificity of global history,

11 *Manning, Patrick. Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past. N.Y., 2003.*

as a new historical study trend, is to reconstruct its epistemological field and identify the prerequisites for interdisciplinary synthesis based on the modification of its theoretical space. At the same time, rather clear is the approach that the specifics of the new model requires further in-depth analysis and generalisations that are tasks for the future.

In recent years, Ukraine's interest in global history has grown significantly, as evidenced by the release of books by I. Kolesnyk¹², Ya. Hrytsak¹³ and publications of domestic scientists: N. Horodnia¹⁴, A. Kyrydon¹⁵, S. Stelmakh,¹⁶ and others and discussion of this issue at many scientific conferences and methodological seminars. However, the definition of the essence of global history, especially its differences from world history, remains relevant in the scientific discourse of Ukraine.

However, this is also typical for other countries, as evidenced, for example, by a study by an international group of scientists in the framework of the Erasmus project CLIOHWORLD2. Thus, European universities are

12 *Колесник Ірина*. Глобальна історія. Історія понять. Київ: НАН України; Інститут історії України, 2019. 348 с.

13 *Грицак Ярослав*. Подолати минуле: глобальна історія України. Київ: Портал. 2021. 432 с.

14 *Городня Н.* Глобальна історія, всесвітня історія і глобалізація // *Європейські історичні студії*. Київ. 2019. № 14. С.58 – 72; Глобальна чи всесвітня історія? Вплив концепції глобалізації на вивчення і викладання історії // *Україна – Європа – Світ*. Тернопіль. 2018. С.168 – 176.

15 *Киридон А.* Глобальна історія як напрям історичних досліджень XXI ст. // *Україна – Європа – Світ*. Тернопіль. 2018. С.177 – 183.

16 *Стельмах С.* Південна Європа через призму транснаціональної і глобальної історії // *Європейські історичні студії*. Київ. 2017. № 8. С. 286 – 291.

mostly inclined to operate with the concepts of national histories, combining them with the ‘world’. In this case, the world is usually viewed through a national prism with an emphasis on former empires, countries of emigration, non-European partners, competitors, enemies. There are different definitions of the terms ‘world’ and ‘global’ history, which in many cases are due to the scientific traditions of different countries, which create the basis for their different understanding and use. Moreover, in some languages, the terms ‘global’ and ‘world’ are difficult, if not impossible, to separate¹⁷.

Therefore, it is necessary to outline the terminological definition and the main characteristics of the new trend of study. According to modern developments, the definition given in the glossary of terms – ‘global history’ – is appropriate. According to this dictionary, ‘global history’ is a modern trend of historical science that emerged in the late 20th century in response to the challenges of the globalization process. Dissatisfaction with the traditional ‘general history’ and the desire of scholars to overcome the limited practice of national-state history were the motivating factors for its emergence¹⁸. Global history presupposes ‘universality in form, globality in scale, and scientificity in methods’.

It is significant that in the international scientific community, discussions and debates continue on the

17 *Jalagin S., Tavera S., Dilley A.* Introduction / Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera, Andrew Dilley // *World and Global History: Research and Teaching*. Pisa : Plus-Pisa University Press, 2011.

18 *Маловичко С. И.* Глобальная история // *Теория и методология исторической науки. Терминологический словарь* / Отв. ред. А. О. Чубарьян. М.: Аквилон, 2014. 576 с. (Образы истории: изд. с 2004 г. / Отв. ред. серии Л. П. Репина). С. 79.

essence of the definition of global history, including the question of how it relates to world history and the history of globalization. Among the most notable works of recent years is the book by German historian Sebastian Conrad ‘*What Is Global History?*’¹⁹, an article by Jeremy Adelman, a professor at Princeton University, entitled ‘What Global History is Today’ and discussed in the *Journal of Global History*²⁰. For example, in his book, Professor of the Free University of Berlin S. Conrad laconically defines the tasks and boundaries of this trend of study, clarifies a range of issues on how global dimensions help to understand local events and processes; what remains outside the analysis and which is limited to the framework of national history; how an emphasis on the interrelationships that permeated the world long before the advent of globalization allows to give a voice to those who lost it during the colonisation and epistemological dominance of the European worldview; as well as what the political and cultural potential of global history is and what the possible dangers of non-reflexive application of this approach are, etc.

German and French historians are recognised to be leaders on the European continent in the sphere of global study, the corresponding institutionalisation of this area is in the UK. These countries have not only established academic traditions but also modern electronic journals, online platforms, research and educational centres, and programmes on global history. A number of relevant and

19 Conrad S. *What Is Global History?* / Sebastian Conrad. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. 303 p.

20 Drayton R., Motadel D. Discussion: the Futures of Global History / Richard Drayton, David Motadel // *Journal of Global History*. 2018. Is. 13. Pp. 1–21.

interesting projects on the development of global history (Global Arts, Global Commodities, Global Textiles, Global Fashion, Global Technology, etc.) have been implemented by the Institute of Historical Research of the University of London and the London School of Economics and Political Science, Cambridge and Oxford Universities.

Global history is usually viewed in two dimensions – as a field of study and as a methodology. This approach is inherent in the views of S. Conrad. On the one hand, he argues that global history is a form of world history, one of its interpretations, the fundamental principles of which include, above all, the rejection of the Eurocentric approach and the interpretation of the past as an integrated whole. On the other hand, in his view, global history is primarily a new research methodology. The arsenal of the latter is the synthesis of a number of methodological approaches such as: comparative history, transnational history, world-system theory, postcolonial research, the school of multiple modernity, and others. The authors of the Princeton textbook on global history *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart*, first published in 2002, also follow such principles. They believe that ‘global history is world history’²¹, which, in their opinion, is a methodological approach to writing and teaching world history and includes the following five principles. Among them, first, world history does not deal with regions and cultures of the world as separate units but puts each of them in a broader geographical context in chronological order and focuses on periods of significant

21 *Tignor R. [et al]. Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the World from the Beginning of the Humankind to the Present / Robert Tignor [et al]. 3rd ed. New York and London: W.W.Norton & Company, 2011. 843 p.*

changes in the organisation and development of mankind; secondly, it is not a history focused only on the West, on the contrary – it maintains a geographical balance and considers the history of the whole world; thirdly, it seeks to explore different societies on their own terms and to determine their impact on other parts of the world; fourthly, it focuses on connections and gaps inside and outside communities; fifthly, it is a discourse of voluminous and large themes and high-level comparisons and generalisations. Thus, global history is called to elucidate the leading forces as drivers of historical processes, to identify key innovations that have changed the world and the lives of people in it. Based on such basic approaches, global history is interpreted as a form of world history with an emphasis on the role of connections, interactions, and mutual influences of events, communities, and regions. Under such conditions, the historian prevents the influence of vulnerable factors of previous approaches and pays attention not only to ‘key’ countries but also to other actors and clarifies the main trends and key factors of human development.

As noted, in 2006, they began to publish the *Journal of Global History* as the main publication of a new trend in historical science. Its inception determined the existence of barely noticeable differences between closely interrelated areas of global and world history. However, no consensus has been reached on the nature of these differences. Moreover, the *Journal of World History*, the official journal of the World History Association, has also positioned itself as a ‘new forum for global history’. Therefore, the differences between global and ‘new’ world history, which under the influence of the ‘global turn’ adopted new methodological principles, could not be identified.

On the other hand, the American historian Bruce Mazlish, one of the pioneers of global history, believes that global and world history have much in common only when they practice macro-historical analysis and study 'big topics', long-term trends, events, and processes that go beyond cultural and national borders, the connections and interactions between communities beyond borders, and the factors that integrate and disintegrate the world throughout history. According to him, global history was a continuation of the version of world history that W. McNeill proposed in 1976 except that the starting point for its study should be modernity²². That approach was also used by F. Braudel, I. Wallerstein, and J. Abu-Lughod. However, the main focus of world history Mazlish considered civilisations. Since empires, 'carriers of the civilisations of the past', existed no longer and were replaced by states-nations, global history created a new conceptual framework for the study of processes that went beyond nation states.

There is a consensus among scholars that the emergence of global history was primarily a reaction to the awareness of global change, under the influence of which different concepts of globalization have been formed. In addition, there is also a view of global history as a history of globalization. That view was held by the American historian B. Mazlish, who in the 1990s was one of the first to explore the differences between global and world history and the links between global history and globalization.

22 *Mazlish B. Comparing Global History to World History / Bruce Mazlish // Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 1998. Vol. 28. №. 3. Pp. 385–395. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/205420>.*

In his view, global history studies the phenomenon of globalization, its factors, and key characteristics from a historical perspective. He takes modernity as his starting point, from where he begins to study the manifestations of this phenomenon in history. This is an interdisciplinary sphere of study that takes into account study in the areas of economics, sociology, demography, etc. In addition, Mazlish viewed global history as a methodological approach whereby processes could be better studied at the global level than at the local, national, or regional levels. B. Mazlish singled out two different approaches to global history as the history of globalization, namely its 'strong' and 'weak' interpretations. Representatives of the 'strong' interpretation consider globalization to be a relatively recent phenomenon (not earlier than the middle of the 20th century) and a new epoch in the development of mankind (the 'global epoch'). Representatives of the 'weak' interpretation consider globalization is a historical process that began in antiquity and has since undergone various transformations. Thus, from the second half of the 20th century, we can only talk about a new, modern stage of globalization. B. Mazlish himself belonged to the first group, which also included sociologists U. Beck and A. Giddens. To the second group, we can refer I. Wallerstein, A. G. Hopkins, J. A. Scholte, and A. Korotaiev.

Scientists define the beginning of globalization in the past in different ways, emphasising its various aspects. Not all historians share the concept of global history as the history of globalization. This is primarily due to the existence of its various concepts and the spread of a simplified understanding of globalization as integration. However, globalization does not necessarily lead to

integration or universalisation. It separates as well as unites. The components of globalization processes are often increasing segregation of space, separation, and alienation. In our opinion, when globalization is defined as a process of integration, it should be noted that these are different processes that take place in different areas with different dynamism and efficiency. In our opinion, the definitions of globalization of those scientists who avoid the words 'integration', 'unification', 'universalisation' and emphasise 'interactions' and 'interconnections' that cause 'interinfluences' and 'interdependencies' (in a positive or negative connotation) lead to both integration and disintegration. We see globalization as processes of global change that takes place in different areas with different dynamics and is accompanied by strengthening ties and interactions between different (state and non-state) actors, overcoming possible limitations of national or state borders, regardless of distance, leading to growth of interinfluences and interdependencies between them. Obviously, this is not the only holistic process but different processes that take place in different areas (economic, political, financial, military, cultural, environmental, etc.) with different intensity and not necessarily simultaneously and in parallel. Therefore, a distinction should be made between direct and indirect influences. These processes are not linear, they are likely to be marked both by rises and recessions.

At the present stage, the history of states, empires, civilisations, significant areas, earth's hemispheres, and even humanity is studied within the framework of global history. Nowadays, global history enters a reflexive stage, when the conceptual history becomes a relevant method

of determining its subject field and methodological tools. The latter makes it possible to look at global history as a concept and historical ideology of an increasingly globalized era; and also allows to define its place as a category-referent in a wide semantic spectrum. In this regard, quite appropriate is the approach of the author I. Kolesnyk to present global history in this book in three types of historiography: transnational history, social theology, *histoire croisée*. The author's perception and interpretation of global history, taking into account national traditions and relevant schools, are also proper. All these are very relevant for the academic environment of historians, philosophers, sociologists, and for the mass consciousness and global thinking in general.

Therefore, given the relevance and significance of the study conducted by Iryna Kolesnyk, and in order to bring this important work to a wider interested foreign scientific audience, it is logical to translate it into English and print this book.

*Valerii Smolii – Doctor of Historical Sciences,
Professor, Academician of the National Academy
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FOREWORD

The words 'global', 'globalization', 'globality' have become firmly entrenched in our lives and lexicons over the last two decades. We can often hear from ordinary people about their global problems, from officials – about the global problems of the country, the media write about the global challenges facing humanity... So these words quite naturally became 'ours' – both in mass political discourse and in the academic sphere.

For modern historical science, the concept of 'global history' has become the key to this series of terms. However, its understanding among historians still remains ambiguous and debatable: some research it, propagate it, some are sceptical, while there are those who do not accept it at all. The paradox of the situation is that the term 'global history' is both new and old because it has such predecessors as 'human', 'world', 'universal', 'shared' history. It is also associated with a number of 'young' terms: 'big', 'histoire croisée', 'entangled', 'new comparative' history, a 'cultural transfer', and so on.

As we can see, all these terms form a considerable linguistic family around global history, and each of its members has its own long or short historiographical genealogy. It is noteworthy that since the emergence of the term 'global history' in the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition of the 1990s, there has been a heated debate about it that continues to this day. The vast array of literature on global history formed during that period is virtually impossible to comprehend, especially given the fact that

the scale of research is often confused with the common notion of global history as the human past. How then can one navigate in these flows of information, various opinions, stereotypes, contradictory assessments that have accumulated around global history in recent times?

In a situation where the concept of 'global history' is constantly supplemented, clarified, and correlated with a whole family of related terms, a reliable means of navigation is the conceptual history. It is a special discipline that allows not only to determine the meaning, circumstances, prerequisites for the emergence of a concept or its 'academic career' but to reveal the semantic connections of this concept with other lexical structures. It is known that the more complex the event is, the more meanings it has; the more talented a work of art (a painting, book, piece of music, play, film) is, the more interpretations it gets. From the point of view of the conceptual history, global history has a great meaningful potential and different dimensions.

Global history as a concept is the product of a new wave of globalization of the late 20th – early 21st century and is perceived by some historians as a successor to such well-known concepts as 'human', 'world', 'shared' history. Indeed, this concept emerged after the Cold War as a result of significant changes in the social sciences, but it is not a 'new' human or world history. In a broad sense, global history is a historical ideology of the globalized world because it gives a new historical picture and tools of comprehension, creates alternative cognitive models. Global history as an ideology replaces the known paradigms: positivism, methodology, Marxism, postmodernism, refusing to absolutise the concepts of 'class', 'nation', 'civilization', 'nation state' as established units of historical analysis.

In a narrow sense, global history should be considered as a kind of modern historiography of the era of globalization, in which we can distinguish three types: transnational history, social theology, *histoire croisée*. Each of them has its own specifics. Proving and analysing it is the purpose of the author of this work. And, returning to the concept content, it should be noted that global history is not so much a scale as a vector of research. While transnational history, which focuses on flows, large-scale cross-border, transcontinental processes (such as the history of goods, technologies, diseases, ideas), transcends territorial and political boundaries, *histoire croisée* is largely focused on networks, migration, interaction, and communication between groups, peoples, states, cultures and serves as an alternative to national history. Social theology, which emerged in the age of globalization as a result of the state atheism crisis and the rise of religiosity in the world, combines transcendent forces with the human factor. As a type of global history, it reveals the theological meanings of socio-political reality: revolutions, nationalism, religious extremism, communist or liberal ideologies, xenophobia are perceived as social sins, punishable by natural, environmental disasters, the death of states and civilizations.

Currently, the profession of historian is globalizing. A whole environment of global historians has been formed, within which a change of generations has already taken place. These specialists certainly face many problems. Experts acknowledge that today, global history is studied more theoretically than empirically, with studies mostly Anglocentric. This situation highlights the problem of communication between historians, academic cultures,

and historiographies. The questions of language, linguistic behaviour of the historian, and translations are next in line. The fact is that in the assessments of global history and its derivatives, such as ‘transnational’, ‘histoire croisée’, a ‘cultural transfer’, ‘border history’, ‘new comparative history’, modern criticism has already fixed a dividing line between representatives of the Anglo-Saxon area and European researchers. Leadership in Europe in the field of global research is recognised by German and French historians, who have not only a strong academic tradition but also modern e-journals, online platforms, research and educational centres and programmes on global, worldwide history. Other academic cultures or national historiographies, particularly in Ukraine, are at different distances to understand the mysteries of global history.

In the conditions of competition of various cognition models, global history actualises many problems. The relationship between global history and modernity is of interest because it is believed that the former is related to the latter and arises in response to the challenge of large forms of history. However, later, global studies were extended to the 19th century, and now – to earlier periods of the Middle Ages and early modern times.

The question of the relationship between global history and the nation state as a universal unit of historical analysis has been and remains controversial. In fact, global history does not deny the role of the nation state, but sees it as an alternative approach to history.

The relationship of global history with supertheories, philosophical concepts and schemes remains complex. In general, according to experts, global history is characterised

if not by denial, then scepticism about historical laws; in this regard, it prefers only middle-level theories.

Another problem is global history and the crisis of Eurocentrism. In practice, this means refusing to impose the patterns of European history and historical writing on the cultures and countries of the non-Western area and at the same time recognising the equivalence of the histories of all peoples and their historiographies.

One of the most difficult ones is the problem of metanarrative, national and local narratives in global history. To this day, the question is: is a metanarrative possible in global history? And if so, which one? As is well known, nation-centred writing has a long tradition from antiquity, the Middle Ages, early modern times, and further in both the East and West. The intrigue is that the classical national narrative created by European intellectuals during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries must be replaced by the modern metanarrative as an intellectual artifact of the globalization era. This means that for the national metanarrative of the new generation, one should take into account the whole globe, and not confine to the clearly defined boundaries of a particular community or state.

CHAPTER 1.

Global History. Methodology

Global History as a Concept

Genealogy of the Conceptual History

History of Concepts in the Information Society

Conceptual History as a Method

Historical Context of Global History

Linguistic Context of Global History

Search for Identities

Intellectual Product in the Global Age

Modern Historian in the Globalization's 'Labyrinths'

Everything has its history, and nearly
everything has a global history as well

Patrick O'Brien

Global History as a Concept

The term 'global history' has recently become increasingly popular in academia and public discourse. It belongs to the large language family mentioned by Jerry Bentley in his article 'The Task of World History' in the Oxford Dictionary (2011). This family includes concepts that have ancient academic genealogies and those that are only defined by their special identity. Thus, concepts with known genealogy include 'world', 'universal', 'general', 'human' history; relatively young, alternative concepts include 'comparative' history, 'global' history, 'big' history, 'transnational' history, 'connected' history, 'entangled' history, 'shared history', etc.¹

At the same time, the concept of 'global history' occupies a special place in the mentioned linguistic family. According to Christopher Bayly, the term 'global history' originated in the 1990s. It has been proposed and disseminated by economists and activists in discussions around globalization².

However, not everyone has agreed to recognise the concept of 'global history', having some doubts and

1 Bentley Jerry H., The Task of World History, in: The Oxford Handbook of World History, ed. by Jerry H. Bentley. Режим доступа: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

2 Bayly Christopher A. et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in: American Historical Review, 111 (2006), p. 1443.

prejudices against it. Thus, in 2006, C. Bayly stated that some historians did not perceive 'global history' and believe that the only way to create a 'real history' is possible at the level of local or family history, the history of 'experience'. The researcher suggests that global history as a broader concept will be able to avoid a thankless fate by surviving the experience of the 1950s and 1980s, when area studies, family history, and local history 'replaced each other as the new Holy Grail'³.

The battles over the term began from the beginning of its existence. Opinions of researchers differed radically on the content of the concept itself. Most historians have tended to equate global history with world, human one. Thus, one of the leaders of the global historians' movement J. Bentley stated, 'Responding to the increasing level of interest in world history, by the 1990s professional historians had elaborated a rich tradition of global historical analysis'⁴. Unlike Bentley, Wolf Schäfer sees global history as an alternative to traditional world history because after the Cold War, world history was transformed into a global one⁵.

Instead, C. Bayly understands global history as transnational, *'The distinctions between world, global, and transnational history have never adequately been*

3 Ibid.

4 *Бентли Дж.* Образы всемирной истории в научных исследованиях XX в. // *Время мира.* Вып. 1. 1998. С. 45. Bentley Jerry H., *Shapes of World History in Twentieth-Century Scholarship* Washington, DC, 1996.

5 *Schäfer Wolf,* Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age, *Globality Studies Journal: Global History, Society, Civilization*, 2010, Iss. 22. Перим доступу: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age>

explained. World history, as I understood it, emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, when old general courses on “Western Civ” in U.S. universities began to seem a little ethnocentric’. In his view, global history should be defined as transnational after 1914, ‘To designate “global history” as “transnational history” would not be very useful before 1914’⁶.

Some historians have linked global history to such its forms as ‘histoire croisée’, ‘entangled’, or ‘comparative’ history⁷. ‘Global history has become a term used to describe the subject area of “transnational history” which is understood as history that goes beyond any national concepts’⁸.

From the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries, there emerged extensive literature on global history. However, many issues remain unresolved, theoretically confusing. In short, there is an ambiguous scientific situation around global history because most historians either do not perceive or are sceptical about it.

Despite the fact that at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries, a whole community of global historians was formed, there still was no unity between them. There is another group of experts, even among my

6 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1443.

7 Репина Л. П. Новые исследовательские стратегии в российской и мировой историографии. Москва, 2008. С. 21; Ионов И. Н. Глобальная история как форма конструирования и репрезентации пришлого // История и историки в пространстве мировой и национальной культуры. Челябинск, 2011. С. 40–41.

8 Тоштендаль Р. Профессионализм историков становится глобальным? // Историческое сознание и историческая ситуация на рубеже XX–XXI вв. Москва: ИВИ РАН, 2012. С. 109.

colleagues, who have been working in the framework of the 'new global history' for a long time but without any reflections and not even guessing about it. Lack of self-reflection on one's own experience, great confusion in terms and their definitions indicate that the process of conceptualising the concept of 'new global history' starts and gradually enters the structure of consciousness of the modern historian which means a radical update of research tools.

The paradox of the scientific situation around global history is that, on the one hand, there is uncertainty, vagueness, non-specificity of the concept, and on the other – its obvious appeal to supporters and even sceptical historians. This situation is explained by the fact that global historical research arises earlier than the term itself. Specialists became interested in the problems of global history in the 1960s and 1970s, and the term is known to have originated in the 1990s. This 'gap', I think, can be explained by the pace of globalization which started gaining momentum in the late twentieth century.

According to researchers, all the intellectual circumstances of the emergence of modern global history were based on the processes of globalization. In connection with its acceleration in the last quarter of the twentieth century, O'Brien believes, not only global forms of history are actualised but also past, ancient historical processes are considered from the standpoint of globalization⁹. Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla also emphasises that the reasons

9 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, 1, P. 34.

for the interest in global history are the process of globalization and its acceleration in recent decades. It is due to this that the view of the past from the perspective of globalization is actualised. It also changes the vision of modernity which is perceived as an interaction and network of connections between different parts of the world, which is why the latter is perceived as entangled or intertwined histories, *'The globalisation process itself, and its acceleration in recent decades, has not only obliged us to seek out the precedents, roots, stages and forms of this globalisation. [...] Globalisation has also brought about a strengthening of the history of interconnections between different parts of the planet, drawing the interest of historians towards "interconnected histories" and "entangled histories" [...]'*¹⁰.

It is noteworthy that global research, according to modern experts G. Iggers and E. Wang, lags behind globalization¹¹. That fact was pointed out by Randall Collins¹². Indeed, a whole cohort of global historians has emerged in recent decades, but there is still no ideological consensus among them on global history. The volume of literature on the subject is growing every year, information flows are increasing exponentially, and the level of synthesis of this knowledge, as stated by the representative of the British tradition of global research

10 Yun Casalilla Bartolomé, «Localism», *Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe*, in: *Historisk Tidskrift* (Sweden) 127 (2007), p. 659.

11 *Иггерс Г., Ван Э.* (при участии С. Мукерджи). *Глобальная история современной историографии* / Пер. с англ. О. В. Воробьевой; науч. ред. М. Кукарцева. Москва, 2012. С. 21.

12 *Collins Randall*, *Weberian socialist theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Patrick O'Brien, 'did not move beyond Voltaire and Weber's sociology'¹³.

Sebastian Conrad summarises the complex and uncertain scientific situation with global history in his study 'What is Global History?'¹⁴. A large number of approaches to global history, 'from comparative, transnational, world, "big" history to postcolonial research and the history of globalization,' the author states, 'currently compete for scholarly attention.' One cannot but agree that 'in fact, it has proven difficult to rigidly define what makes global history specific and unique' because even a superficial look at the current literature immediately reveals that historians do not simply use the term 'global history' but hijack it, for a variety of different purposes, 'interchangeably with other terms.' And the widespread use of the term displays both the attractiveness and the elusiveness of the concept, rather than its methodological rigidity¹⁵. According to the researcher, 'global history is both a subject of study and a certain scientific approach to history: both process and perspective, object and methodology'¹⁶.

The essence of the current scientific situation around global history is the search for its identity: it is the direction, approach, methodology, historical discipline. What is

13 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 15.

14 Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история? / Пер. с англ. А. Степанова; науч. ред. и предисл. А. Семенов. Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2018; Conrad Sebastian, *What is Global History?* Princeton University Press, 2016.

15 Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история? С. 22.

16 Там же. С. 28. Див.: Репина Л. П. Историческая наука на рубеже XX–XXI вв. Социальная теория и историографическая практика. Москва: Крут, 2011. С. 548.

the meaning of the concept ‘global history’? What place does it occupy in the family of related terms mentioned by J. Bentley? (2011). According to the latter, it is world history, as a key concept, that is connected in one way or another with such alternative approaches as ‘comparative’, ‘global’, ‘big’, ‘transnational’, ‘connected’, ‘entangled’, ‘shared’ history¹⁷.

To clarify the situation around global history, it should be recognised that the central position in the linguistic family of established and new terms is occupied by the concept of ‘global history’. It is an intellectual product of the globalization era and remains a referent for determining the place in this family of all related concepts and their interaction with each other.

It is clear that global history has been the subject of reflection by more than one generation of global historians. We have reason to state that we are currently at the stage of receiving new ideas and approaches, when the search for meanings and definitions of the concept of ‘global history’ is underway. An important tool for solving such a confusing intellectual situation is the conceptual history.

Genealogy of the Conceptual History

The history of concepts, or conceptual history, has its own academic genealogy. According to R. Koselleck, ‘conceptual histories’ have existed since the 18th century and occupied a permanent place in ‘histories of languages and historical lexicography’. As we know,

17 Bentley Jerry H., The Task of World History, The Oxford Handbook of World History, ed. by Jerry H. Bentley. Режим доступа: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

the term ‘conceptual history’ was invented by G. W. F. Hegel.

From the beginning, the conceptual history was based on the hermeneutic tradition – from the time of the Reformation, and later romanticism. The real foundation of the conceptual history is hermeneutics as ‘clarifying’ or finding out the meaning of the concept of ‘hermeneutics’ is at the same time its history. Hermeneutic theory was born as a result of and under the influence of religious and theological controversy of the Reformation. It was in those conditions that the need arose to hold off the attacks of the clergy on M. Luther’s supporters and Lutheranism. Luther himself, as well as Melanchthon and Flacius, were at the origins of hermeneutics. The term ‘hermeneutics’ was introduced in the 17th century by Strasbourg theologian Johann Dannhauer.

E. Schleiermacher conceptualised hermeneutics as a theory of understanding. W. Dilthey used it to methodologically substantiate the ‘sciences of the spirit’. H.-G. Gadamer became the founder of philosophical hermeneutics (‘philosophising imbued with understanding’). From his point of view, hermeneutics is a theory and practice of (re)interpretation of texts. Moreover, understanding is universal, and the issue of understanding is relevant for those sciences for which methods of strict verification are unacceptable. Thus, Gadamer perceived understanding as a hermeneutic circle (hermeneutic rule) which was borrowed from ancient rhetoric in the age of Enlightenment and later passed to the hermeneutics of modern times, ‘The movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to part and back to the whole’. The purpose of understanding is to expand the concentric

circles of a certain content in question. To understand means the ability to realise something, and at the same time – the ability to distinguish one’s opinion from others, while understanding what the other meant. By the way, Gadamer perceived understanding and interpretation as synonyms of one action or mental procedure.

So H.-G. Gadamer widely developed specifically philosophical hermeneutics: language and thought in science form concepts, and language is a product and result of experience. The real drama of philosophy and science, the thinker emphasised, was the ‘lack of language’, i.e. the lack of necessary words and concepts. A thought is articulated in words-concepts that live together with an everyday language. The mechanism of concept formation is connected with the process of transformation of ordinary words into new concepts: colloquial words seem to warp under the thought’s pressure. The philosopher saw the task of a professional historian of concepts in the procedure of ‘clarification of concepts’, i.e. in search of their meaning.

The institutionalisation of the conceptual history dates back to the 1930s (W. Schlesinger, O. Brunner, K. Schmidt, J. Trier) when it was directed against two currents that prevailed in the previous decade – ‘history of ideas’ and ‘history of spirit’ which ‘studied concepts for their own sake, outside their specific socio-political context’. For M. Bloch and L. Febvre, the language analysis was ‘an integral component of their socio-historical works’.

The subject of the conceptual history is to establish a connection between concepts, their genealogy, structure, transformation of semantic structures. According to the degree of generalisation, there are basic, abstract, specific

concepts. According to the subject principle, they are divided into economic, political, social, and historical. The latter are classified according to the level of abstraction: general, concrete-historical, and reflexive.

The system of general historical concepts arises in the age of Enlightenment; later, they become an established tool of historical research. This group of concepts includes 'history', 'development', 'state', 'people', 'culture', 'civilization', 'nation', 'democracy', 'class', 'revolution'. On the example of key concepts of history, the transformations of their semantic structures can be traced: initially, the word 'revolution' meant the planets' rotation, 'culture' – a way of cultivating the land, 'class' – a category, a group of homogeneous objects.

There are theoretical concepts that require a higher degree of abstraction, such as the categories of 'time' and 'space'¹⁸. Within the framework of historical science, there function the so-called 'reflexive concepts' which are formed specifically to study the concepts of the 'second degree', such as a 'source', 'fact', 'method', 'criticism', and 'historiography'. There are also 'moving concepts' or concepts with an excessive number of values (R. Koselleck).

Presentation functions in the conceptual history are performed by special terminology: 'construct', 'concept', 'term'. 'Concept' (as defined by H.-G. Gadamer) is a 'language microconstruction'¹⁹. 'Term' is a 'clearly defined word with a limited meaning'; it is in the linguistic form of the term, that the 'concept acts as such'. In ancient Roman mythology, *Term* was the name of the deity – guardian of

18 Козеллек Р. *Минуле майбутне: Про семантику історичного часу*. Київ, 2005. С. 352.

19 Гадмер Г.-Г. *Актуальность прекрасного*. Москва, 1991. С. 71.

borders who was worshipped in the form of a boundary stone. 'Categories' (the word-term belongs to Hegel) are fundamental 'mental definitions' that went beyond a specific subject area. Categories, according to the German philosopher, served as a 'definition of the absolute' rather than specific subjects and subject areas²⁰.

Thus, the concept, notion, term perform functions not only as a unit of language but as a unit of analysis, a tool of cognition. Unlike researchers, who distinguish words-definitions: 'term', 'notion', 'category', 'concept', we consciously use the whole line as synonyms. They undoubtedly have certain semantic and lexical differences, but they all act as units of thought, are born from spoken language, and later, due to cognitive procedures of problematisation, conceptualisation, reflection, they turn from a sensory image to an imaginary, abstract one.

At the same time, opinions on the disciplinary status of the conceptual history differ. Some researchers perceive the conceptual history as a modern trend in historiography, others – as a tool for criticising the social sciences (N. Kopusov), others – as a reaction to the political situation and political debate (the Finnish school). R. Koselleck considered conceptual history to be 'propaedeutics to scientific theory'. H.-G. Gadamer understood 'conceptual history as philosophy'. Some see conceptual history as a 'research support service' or 'metahistory' or a 'method'²¹.

In my opinion, the convincing position is that of Jacques Guilhaumou who sees in conceptual history

20 Там же. С. 34, 71, 124.

21 Див.: *Колесник І. Українська історіографія: концептуальна історія.* Київ, 2013.

the 'linguistic redefinition of intellectual history'²². This means that conceptual history in the modern sense is a reaction to the traditional history of ideas and its successor – intellectual history because it is the product of a 'linguistic turn', the essence of which is contextualism. Modern conceptual history involves determining the meaning of the word-concept in historical and linguistic contexts. If, in contrast to the academic history of ideas (according to A. Lovejoy), intellectual history refers to the political and social context of the origin and functioning of ideas, conceptual history actualises specifically the linguistic context. A line is built: the history of ideas – intellectual history – conceptual history. The marker of the latter is precisely the linguistic context that distinguishes it from the previous forms. This means that in modern historical and conceptual discourse, linguistic methodology becomes decisive. There are known precedents for creating conceptual history (history of concepts) of politics and political thought. It is due to the linguistic turn that the conceptual history turns into a linguistic methodology²³.

Thus, conceptual history brings the researcher to the vicissitudes of the origin and existence of a concept because it studies not one concept but a group of concepts

22 *Гийому Ж.* Лингвистическая история концептуальных сло-воупотреблений // История понятий, история дискурса, история метафор / Под ред. Х. Э. Бёдекера; пер. с нем. Москва, 2010. С. 85.

23 *Буссе Д.* История понятий – история дискурса – лингвистическая эпистемология. Философские замечания по поводу теоретических и методологических основ исторической семантики в связи с философией личности // Персональность. Язык философии в русско-немецком диалоге. Москва, 2007. С. 309.

in their relationship. The set of concepts from a specific problem, field, science, or academic discipline allows one to reproduce their structure, genealogy, current hermeneutic situation²⁴. For example, the 'conceptual

- 24 Найвідомішою формою існування концептуальної історії (історії понять) є численні словникові проекти, у тому числі «Основні історичні поняття: Історичний словник соціополітичної мови в Німеччині», «Довідник основних політичних понять у Франції 1680–1821 рр.», «Словник соціально-політичних слововживань французької мови в 1770–1815 рр.». Поряд із найпоширенішим словниковим підходом формується новий тренд – корпусна лінгвістика, предметом якої є розробка, упорядкування та використання текстових (лінгвістичних) корпусів, тобто сукупності текстів, згрупованих за певним принципом, розмічених за відповідним стандартом і забезпечених спеціальною пошуковою системою. «Корпус першого порядку» зазвичай об'єднує тексти за ознакою мови, автора, часу створення тощо. Так, у французькому проекті «Нерівність/і. Лексичне дослідження та дискурсивні варіації (18 – 20 ст.)» (*Inégalité/s. Usages Lexicaux et variations discursives (18-ième – 20-ième siècles)*, ed. par P. Fiala, Paris, 1999), підготовленому за редакцією П'єра Фіала (P. Fiala) описується корпус текстів (архівних, періодичних видань, відомих авторів XVIII–XX ст., а також сучасних продуктів медіакommунікації), необхідних для вивчення терміна «нерівність» у дискурсивних конфігураціях. Саме цей проект Ж. Гійому називає «концептуальною історією політики». Це видання стало результатом роботи лабораторії політичної лексикології Вищої нормальної школи Сен-Клу, охоплює період XVIII–XX ст., і використовує банк даних Національного інституту французької мови та архіву текстів самої лабораторії. На відміну від німецької традиції французькі автори надають перевагу «мовній історії понять» як «галузі історії понять, що пережила «лінгвістичний поворот»». За словами Ж. Гійому, проект ґрунтується на методах лексичного й дискурсивного аналізу корпусу політичних текстів, котрі в різний спосіб подають значення політичної лексики від часів Французької революції й до сьогодні. Таким чином, у фокусі уваги концептуальної історії перебувають «мовні практики» та «мовні умови» виникнення понять. Нещодавно в Україні вийшов друком французький словниковий проект концептуальної історії «Європейський словник філософій: Лексикон неперекладностей» за редакцією Барбари Кассен (Barbara Cassin). Це перша спроба, за словами редакторки, зібрати неперекладності – слова, терміни, словосполучення, вислови, граматичні звороти, – що створюють проблеми при перекладі іншими мовами. Укладачі виходили з

history of politics', according to J. Guilhaumou, means that politics is perceived through a system of concepts, the history of their origin, development, reception. In short, any science, problem, or field of knowledge can be perceived through the analysis of the use and meanings of those concepts that form the relevant field, to reproduce the processes of related concepts, their analytical and semantic connections, place in the hierarchy of meanings.

History of Concepts in the Information Society

In the age of information and network society, conceptual history as a discipline and method is gaining considerable importance. According to M. Castells, the information society is a flexible structure of information and communication flows. This is a period when there are huge arrays of information, there is a need for means of its processing, the communication problems are actualised, i.e. the language of science and certain historian's behaviour. This is a direct consequence of the linguistic turn that has affected all modern socio-humanitaristics. It is no coincidence that A. Toynbee said that the language history was a synopsis of the society history.

In an era of global crises, the sciences are radically renewed, and so is the language of science. This means that

того, що кожна мова одне й те саме поняття відтворює по-різному. У просторі уваги авторів перебувають цілі «мережі слів та значень», що «є мережами філософських говірок, для яких відомі дата створення, автори та конкретні твори, де вони вживаються». Харківські історики підготували «Історіографічний словник» (Харків, 2004) як навчальний посібник. Упорядники його ставили за мету розкрити значення, історію та еволюцію основних понять історіографії як спеціальної дисципліни.

new knowledge produces new ideas-concepts, reactualises known concepts, or resemanticises old ones, filling them with new meanings. The fact that new ideas give birth to new words and concepts causes dissatisfaction among those who use traditional vocabulary in science. Therefore, such misunderstandings can be eliminated only in the process of communication, i.e. discussion and clarification of words-concepts, due to which ambiguities disappear, and unfamiliar words and terms become available. Science produces its language, language tools that capture the process and result of research, providing communication in the sciences society. The language of science differs from colloquial language because the usual everyday words under the pressure of thought are transformed into terms and categories of scientific speech. The process of creating concepts is the breaking of semantic structures and the formation of new meanings.

The language of science is an open system that is replenished, updated with new concepts; there is an internal filtering of random, fashionable, temporary words that have not taken root in scientific use. It is flexible and dynamic, closely related to social and cultural changes in society and in the business environment. The main problem is the antagonism between conventional constancy and revolutionary changes in the language of scientific communication. It is known that in times of global change, crises, social upheavals, science is experiencing a real 'revolution of concepts'. Thus, in the 20th century, there was a 'language revolution' in philosophy (L. Wittgenstein, E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, neo-positivism) which meant a completely different understanding of language, which not only reflects but creates the reality in which man lives.

The language of science is quite mobile and flexible, it is constantly updated and replenished, filtering foreign words, clichés, outdated lexical constructions, fashionable words that have not taken root in science. Such dynamics of language is closely connected with global social and cultural changes in society, indirectly or directly. Therefore, the ambiguity of words, concepts, scientific terms, and categories requires additional arrangements for their use in the practices of historians.

Another feature of language as a system of communication is the tendency to its individualisation and linguistic means of self-presentation of the scholar-historian. Hence the historian's hermeneutic sensitivity, their taste for new words-terms, the application of isomorphic concepts and lexical constructions. A real scientist has their own language (in the sense of style, recognition, own conceptual tools, richness of lexical baggage, openness to the new, ability to explicate and use norms-concepts, clarity of statements).

The specificity of the researcher's language also determines their language behaviour which is closely related to language culture. First, it means a variety of vocabulary, flexibility, imagery, accessibility of speech, explanation of the concepts used by the specialist. Secondly, the use of the concept as an analytical tool involves reference to its genealogy, semantic connections with other lexical elements. Third, the rule of the historian's language behaviour should be cleaning his own lexicon of unnecessary borrowings, foreign phrases, words, terms, as well as avoiding excessive vulgarities, descriptive, inaccurate or outdated own speech equivalents, operating local facts as well-known (defects that Yu. Shevelyov once pointed out).

Language is not only a sign system, a means of communication but also a tool of cognition. Knowledge of language and non-linguistic information creates a 'language personality' (V. Maslova). Conceptual history shapes the historian's linguistic behaviour. The historian as a 'linguistic personality' is in a special disposition. They must know the language of the age they are studying and the age in which they live. Receiving new information, the historian correlates it with the existing base and creates new meanings. By the way, the language of the historian, their working lexicon usually bear the imprint of the information they work with (the nature of the era under study, its cultural landscape, the specifics of the language of sources and texts, terms, concepts). The creation of meanings is due to the procedures of categorisation, what is perceived by the researcher in the form of colloquial language, everyday words, terms, concepts, categories, concepts.

The task of the historian as a linguistic personality is to adjust the system of scientific language with professional knowledge. As noted by H. G. Gadamer, the culture of the historian's linguistic behaviour is directly related to 'clarification of the concepts, terms, categories with which they operate. Clarification of concepts from the historian's own speech is important not only for scientific communication, selection of information in an interdisciplinary space, but given that they must understand that the new/old, known/unknown, borrowed/invented concept is not just a word but a way organisation of information, a tool of cognition. One or another concept, historical concept, theoretical category appear not as a unit of language but as a certain model

of organisation and study of facts, events, phenomena. For example, 'world history' is an analytical structure, a means of organising specific material. Usually, replacing this concept with the concept of 'global history' changes the meaning, significance, and consequences of events that reflect these concepts.

In a situation of increasing information flows, the functions of science and history become more complicated. First, science is a means of organising the information that comes to the historian's disposal, that is, performs the function of categorisation of knowledge, conceptualisation of new words-concepts as operational units of knowledge. The researcher, receiving new information, correlates it with the one they have, and in this way, new meanings, concepts, and terms are born. Secondly, in the context of globalization, history borrows concepts from different fields of knowledge, near and far, promoting the science integration. The exchange of concepts, terms, constructs leads to effective exchange, the formation of interdisciplinary space as a source of storage, enrichment, transfer of concepts. Third, science performs the function of standardisation and regularising of the language of science, forming a hierarchy of common concepts and terms; and in times of crisis, it reactualises old, forgotten, or rejected by their contemporaries concepts, ideas, and theories, which in new conditions become relevant and meaningful. In this way, the procedures of resemanticisation of concepts are carried out when the old, usual terms-concepts are filled with new meaning, acquire other lexical forms. Constructs, concepts, terms undoubtedly retain 'ancestral memory' of their sources, origins either from the field of history, sociology, philosophy, cultural

anthropology, science studies, psychology, linguistics. Fourth, it is historiography that acts as a consumer and processor of concepts from various fields of knowledge which leads to the destruction of outdated impenetrable disciplinary boundaries between individual sciences and disciplines. Borrowing special concepts and terms, their rethinking and verification on other material creates new lexical constructions, leads to resemanticisation of established concepts, the emergence of new meanings. Fifth, national historiographies also perform an important function of transferring general concepts of varying degrees of abstraction from one cultural field to another, adapting them in the process of borrowing and use on a specific historical and national basis. Thus, the system of scientific concepts is transformed as a result of radical changes in society itself, the structures of science (applied and fundamental), and the linguistic apparatus of science.

At the same time, in the context of globalization of science and the historian's profession, such components of conceptual history as reading and translation acquire special significance. As a result of the Internet revolution, English is increasingly becoming the language of intercultural, interdisciplinary communication. As you know, the traditional (hermeneutic) paradigm of reading involved reducing the content of the text to its design. The enlightenment vision meant that the text taught or entertained the reader, and that is why it should be read. The positivist paradigm of reading, popular since the middle of the 19th century, was aimed at interpreting the text, that is, clarifying the conditions necessary for understanding its content; it perceived the text as a product of the national environment where it was created.

The modern paradigm of reading recognises the existence of a gap between the past/present, my / someone else's, me/you, so it does not identify the reader with the author of the text (an act of divination). The purpose of reading is not to fully immerse oneself in the author's epoch but to eliminate this gap-distance between the author's and reader's experience for the reader can 'try on' the author's experience, but can't shift completely to the author's situation. So the meaning of reading, as it is understood today, is not in the reconstruction of the author's idea but in the construction of a new meaning. Hence the multiplicity of meanings, plurality in the perception of the text, the fundamental impossibility of reducing the text to a single meaning/idea.

In general, according to H. G. Gadamer, the secret of reading was building a great bridge between the languages of the author and the reader. Reading a poetic or scientific text in one's native language is like translating from a foreign language. Reading is the transformation of inviolable signs into a stream of thoughts and images. Reading, like translation, requires a transformation of meanings that borders on creativity as in Gadamer's formula: 'every reader is half a translator'. And it should be added that each reader and translator are co-authors of the original text. Reading is an interpretation, and interpretation is an 'articulated representation of reading'.

H. G. Gadamer viewed translation as an aspect of reading culture. Reading and translation create a new integrity of the text, thus generating other meanings, knowledge, and images. Translation from a foreign language also means the creation of new meanings because translation is 'transposition' and 'transferring'. The translator is

personally more than an interpreter, they are like a bridge between two languages²⁵. Reading and translation surely transform an author's or translator's text into a reader's work. Gadamer emphasised, 'The reader transforms the content of the text read into their speech,' not noticing how much personal things they put in reading.

In his day, G. Shpet saw the special state of the historian in the fact that they unite both the reader and the author in one person. After all, the historian 'must be able to understand – here is a method of research, and must convey what they understand – here is a method of formulation'²⁶. In both cases – a research or description of the results of this research – the historian's tool is the word-concept. The historian's aim is to translate concepts from the texts they study into modern language and to clarify the concepts they use in their own works. National historiography is the most modern conceptual space within which the historian must find a balance between traditions and innovations, the norms of scientific speech and their own style and language behaviour. In a globalizing society, it is important to maintain a balance between the language of intercultural interaction (English) and national languages which are a marker of identity and a bearer of cultural traditions.

The current state of the conceptual history is connected with the procedures of categorisation of a huge information resource, as well as direct borrowings from the arsenal of natural and socio-humanitarian sciences.

25 *Гадамер Г.-Г.* Герменевтика і поетика. Київ, 2001. С. 150–151, 146–147.

26 *Шпет Г. Г.* История как предмет логики // Историко-философский ежегодник: 1988. Москва, 1988. С. 317.

On this basis, there is a resemanticisation of established lexical expressions, speech constructions, concepts. It is this approach to the conceptual history that determines its status as a methodology for the study of any subject area, field of knowledge, scientific discipline.

Conceptual History as a Method

It is no coincidence that the ‘linguistic turn’ concurred with a new wave of globalization from the second half of the 20th century which formed a favourable ground for the transformation of the conceptual history into a new linguistic methodology. In the modern conceptual history, as we know, two directions coexist: the German tradition *Begriffsgeschichte* and the Cambridge school.

Representatives of the classical *Begriffsgeschichte* believe that social concepts reflect the history of society, while the history of political concepts – the history of socio-political thought. In the 1950s, Werner Conze initiated combining the problems of social history and conceptual history. This means that history is described with the help of appropriate concepts since they accumulate long-term experience.

It is significant that social and conceptual history have different temporalities, i.e. ‘the speed of change, and are based on different structures that are reproduced’²⁷. In the German tradition, social history appears in the concepts by which history is interpreted. The German conceptual history – *Begriffsgeschichte* – is characterised by a direct

27 Козеллек Р. Социальная история и история понятий // Исторические понятия и политические идеи в России XVI–XX в. Санкт-Петербург, 2006. С. 34–37, 52.

connection with history; the conceptual history is the subject of interest of historians, hence its definition of 'historiographical history of concepts' (G. E. Baedeker). Changing of socio-political concepts, according to R. Koselleck, occurs at a 'crucial time'. It is noteworthy that the researcher captures a certain algorithm for the concept formation: a noun in the plural; which turns into the singular; then turns into 'collective unified concepts'; subsequently, political concepts are filled with social expectations; finally, there are concepts that are 'moving', i.e. those that are aimed at the future.

Moreover, R. Koselleck distinguishes between words and concepts because they have different essences. The word contains a meaning that is nurtured by context. A word becomes a concept when meaningful connections fit into one word, that is, according to R. Koselleck, concepts are words filled with meaningful connections. In contrast to the word-term, the concept is always ambiguous and carries meaningful completeness. If the words' meaning is precisely defined, then the concepts are only interpreted. If meaningful connections are a social experience, then the criterion for defining the concept is the richness of its inherent meanings. In short, for the German tradition *Begriffsgeschichte*, conceptual history is a means of cognition of socio-political phenomena, events, and relations that have acquired a linguistic design.

The Cambridge School of the Conceptual History is perceived as one of the variants of the 'linguistic turn'. The Anglo-Saxon tradition is characterised by the modernisation of the traditional history of ideas in the field of theorising. J. Austin, J. Searle are the authors of

the theory of linguistic acts related to historical reality. The Cambridge school is characterised by a focus on the philosophy of language, linguistic and philosophical issues. Thus, the author of the speech act theory J. Austin distinguishes its three levels: speech (locative act); action, i.e. informing, criticism, warning (illocutionary act); achievement of a certain goal, result (perlocutionary act). Intentionality (connection with a specific purpose) and conventionality (establishment of certain rules, agreements) remain signs of a speech act. Human consciousness is always intentional, i.e. purposeful, and the speech act is a product of being through words²⁸.

The Cambridge direction is particularly interested in the conceptual history in linguistic contexts or the use of language in historical contexts which given a communicative character. The scientific achievements of the Anglo-Saxon school were supplemented by the theories of the 'language field' of Q. Skinner and the 'political languages' of J. Pocock. The first, as is well known, was influenced by L. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, on which, by the way, J. Austin and J. Searle based their theories. The meaning of linguistic contextualism is that texts exist not by themselves, not alone, but in connection with semantic structures. The speech act theory focuses on semantic connections and their functions. The constructions of a 'conceptual field' and 'lexical field' have different semantic content.

The German and Anglo-Saxon schools, as arbiters of 'intellectual fashion', exist, of course, quite

28 *Остин Дж. Л.* Перформативы – констативы // *Философия языка.* Москва, 2004. С. 23–34.

autonomously; the differences between them are due to different research objectives, experience, and traditions of predecessors. The German version of the conceptual history is focused mainly on the study of social processes with the help of concepts that reflect these processes, while the Anglo-Saxon one is actualises the study of various discourses.

The institutionalisation of the conceptual history as a field of research is associated with the formation of a professional environment of historians of concepts and various vocabulary practices – the publication of political, social, philosophical glossaries of various formats and levels. The leader among historians of concepts is the History of Political and Social Concepts Group (HPSCG). It was founded in 1998 at the Finnish Institute in London and included representatives of the German, English, French, Dutch, and Finnish traditions in the field of studying the conceptual history. Under the auspices of the HPSCG, thematic international scientific conferences are held annually at various universities in Europe and Asia.

There are also other national versions of conceptual history – French (Jacques Guilhaumou), Dutch (Pim den Boer), Finnish (Henrich Stenius), Korean (Yong-sun Ha, Chaesung Chun), Russian (N. Koposov, O. Kharkordin, G. Zvereva, V. Dubina). The Russian version of conceptual history is based on a strong intellectual tradition of the works of G. Shpet and M. Bakhtin. V. Dubina thinks it needs both Koselleck and Skinner²⁹. According to

29 Дубина В. Из Билефельда в Кембридж и обратно: пути утверждения «истории понятий» в России: Послесловие // История понятий, история дискурса, история метафор. Москва, 2010. С. 298–319.

N. Koposov, in Russia, the preference is given to English-language works which are more common and accessible³⁰. Recently, the conceptual history has become intellectually attractive among Ukrainian historians as well³¹.

Thus, the methodological basis of our study are the principles and approaches of modern conceptual history. The contextualism principles and the language field theory are fundamental.

The key to the modern conceptual history is the principle of contextualisation which involves the placement of any concept, word, text in historical and linguistic contexts. The historical context is the social and cultural circumstances, political experience, the spiritual landscape of the era, the state of ideologies, science, and a particular field of study, from the point of view of which the meaning of this concept is considered. There are even concentric circles of historical contexts in which any concept, idea, or text arises and exists.

The linguistic context means that the conceptual history does not study individual concepts, but their groups, and reveals semantic structures: close or opposite meanings, synonyms, similar and evaluative concepts. Awareness of the meaning and significance of the concept directs the researcher to understand the vicissitudes of the origin, existence, play of meanings of this concept. In short, the conceptual history is not the history of individual concepts: it studies the relationship of concepts with historical reality

30 *Копосов Н. Е. История понятий вчера и сегодня // Исторические понятия и политические идеи в России XVI–XX в. С. 9–32.*

31 *Колесник І. Українська історіографія: концептуальна історія. Київ, 2013; Попова Т. Н. Дисциплінарний образ науки: підходи і поняття. Одеса, 2019.*

and among themselves. As R. Koselleck emphasised, the concept combines language and the extralingual world. It is the semantic connections between the elements of vocabulary that are involved in the processes of creation and transfer of concepts.

An important tool of cognition is the language field theory which contains linguistic and conceptual fields. Therefore, the task of the historian of concepts is to maintain a balance in the study of historical and linguistic contexts.

At the same time, the conceptual history as a method involves the constitution and legitimation of concepts in scientific consciousness and historiographical practices, taking into account national cultural traditions, understanding the mechanisms of reading as a text/reader interaction, perception of reading as co-authorship (an author/reader). The problem of translations of scientific texts, special literature is important because the risks and troubles in this case are due to ignorance of the latest concepts and categories (analytical structures), the inability to keep up with the pace of their emergence, semantic transformations, as well as discussion culture flaws and 'discursive wars'. Usually, researchers use concepts non-reflexively, without talking about their meaning, history of origin, possible connotations. If the concept is used as an analytical structure, the specialist should turn to its 'clarification', in particular, its intellectual genealogy. The conceptual history as a method requires the study of concepts in dynamics and interaction (diachronically and synchronously).

Any discipline, subject area surely is an established system of concepts, within which they are all interconnected

and flow into each other. The conceptual history as a method requires the study of a set of these concepts from the standpoint of their dynamics and interaction because the concepts serve as a tool of cognition. The use of the concept as an analytical tool involves its explication by the author, rather than mechanical borrowing from the general categorical-terminological arsenal.

The conceptual history as a new methodology gives an understanding of what a concept and its structure are, i.e. its core and periphery (V. Maslova)³². The concept core means the dictionary definition of the lexeme in explanatory, foreign, encyclopaedic, translation dictionaries. For example: revolution – ‘1. A revolution in the life of societies which leads to the elimination of outdated social order and the establishment of a new, progressive one. 2. A revolution in any field that leads to a radical transformation, the improvement of something’ (Great Explanatory Dictionary of the Modern Ukrainian Language, 2004). The concept periphery contains non-verbal knowledge, i.e. numerous connotations, associations regarding the core lexeme and the researcher’s subjective experience. In this example, the concept of ‘revolution’ accumulates different meanings and contexts. Depending on the purpose, tasks, and experience of the researcher, it can be an industrial, social, political, scientific revolution. The construct, concept, term perform important cognitive functions not as a unit of language but a unit of analysis, a tool of cognition. The set of constructs reflects the logic of the development of thought, subject area, science.

32 *Маслова В. А. Когнитивная лингвистика: учеб. пособие. 3-е изд., перераб. и доп. Минск, 2008.*

In general, the set of concepts (linguistic family) of any subject area, including global history, allows us to reproduce their genealogy, structure, transformations, and interaction. The concept of 'global history', which is key and reference, has meaningful connections not only with such close concepts as 'universal', 'shared', 'human' but with a group of seemingly 'remote' concepts, such as a 'cultural transfer', 'backwardness', an 'imperial meridian', 'modernisation', etc.

Historical Context of Global History

The historical context of the concept of 'global history' is related to its predecessor – the concept of 'world history' which is one of the oldest related terms in the family. 'World history' had a number of synonyms, such as a 'spirit of the peoples', 'universal history', 'cosmopolitanism', 'complete', 'shared', 'human' history, and so on. It owes its origin to the Great Geographical Discovery, the travels of early modern times, the development of the New World, the formation of colonies, the revival of intercultural ties between continents and hemispheres. In the later stages, the content, of course, was changed, clarified, supplemented, but the 'world' was often perceived as a continuation of imperial and economic history.

The history of the origin and spread of this concept in the new classical science is traced in detail in the monograph of Georg Iggers and Edward Wang (2012). The authors distinguish three phases in the formation of world history. The first one covers the 17th–18th centuries – the period after the Great Geographical Discoveries, during which the interest in the New World, the newly discovered lands was

constantly growing. As a result, the first universal histories appear, while the 'godfather' of global secular historians is rightly considered to be Voltaire with his work *Spirit of the Peoples*. Followers of the French thinker, according to British historian Patrick O'Brien, were characterised by 'a departure from the providential narratives and their clerical predecessors'³³.

The second phase falls on the 19th century. During that period, the European continent was in the process of creating nation-states and world colonial empires as a result of economic, technological, cultural superiority of Europe over other countries and peoples of the world. Stereotypes of European thinking and standards of historiography as a means of ideological influence and political pressure were imposed everywhere. It is noteworthy that in the 19th century in Europe, interest in 'non-Western' countries faded. During that period, there took place the finalisation of Eurocentrism which asserted the absolute dominance of that part of the world, while the cult of nation-states (like the developed countries of Europe) imposed on other countries European canons of thinking, including historiography.

It was in the 19th century, according to G. Iggers and E. Wang, that 'new nationalism' was created which its authors understood not only as a commitment to the nation-state but as 'a colossal trust in archival sources'. The latter made it difficult to move beyond national borders, and especially beyond Europe and America³⁴.

33 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, 1, p. 10.

34 Иггерс Г., Ван Э. Глобальная история современной историографии. С. 29–30.

According to the authors, the professionalisation of historical research in the 19th century testified to the departure from world and regional history and the focus on the phenomena of the nation and nationalism. This orientation of European science to the nation-state is explained by its dependence on archival sources, and therefore, any attempt to create broad interethnic or transcultural history was perceived as a 'violation of the criterion of rigorous scientificity'. However, the changes in the political worldview that took place in the 19th century, at the centre of which was the idea of the West's supremacy, served as a justification for colonial and imperial expansion, 'and the source of Western civilisation itself was considered a nation state'³⁵.

Thus, during that period, history served not only as a means of forming a national identity in stateless peoples but also as a tool for creating a nation-state through imagination and historical myths. It is thought that nations that did not exist as such 'constructed themselves through history, often using imaginary, fictional pictures of their past to justify their present'³⁶.

The third phase fell on the second half of the 20th century and according to researchers, is connected with the 'revival of world history'. Those changes took place after the Cold War and as a result of the world community transformation³⁷. From the second half of the 20th century, interest in the countries of the 'non-Western' world was radically restored and spread. At that stage,

35 Там же. С. 421.

36 Там же. С. 24.

37 Там же. С. 421.

there was a change in the priorities of global thinking, due to the crisis of Eurocentrism, the recognition by modern intellectuals of the equivalence of other cultures, traditions, and styles of historical writing³⁸. According to G. Iggers and E. Wang, in the third phase of world history from the second half of the 20th century, special attention was paid to the 'non-Western world and social and cultural aspects'³⁹. There is an expansion of the field of historical research which the authors associate with transnational and intercultural issues, as well as shifting the emphasis from the history of elites to the 'history from below'. The latter embraces the daily life of the 'broad masses of the people' who were outside of history, and now have attracted special attention. Plus studies on the role and status of women in history⁴⁰.

From the end of the 20 – beginning of the 21st century, the situation with world history began to change. Under the influence of globalization, its forms and content were transformed. The term 'global history' has emerged which competes with traditional 'world history'. The vast amount of literature around global history is becoming increasingly popular. However, most historians do not accept or are sceptical about it, and a number of issues in global history remain theoretically unresolved, controversial.

The expansion of the term 'global history' was facilitated by certain circumstances. At the origins of the 'new global history' were historian William McNeill

38 Там же. С. 21–28.

39 Там же. С. 30.

40 Там же. С. 35.

and anthropologist Eric Wolf. The study of the first one⁴¹ proposed a virtually new model of creating world history: 'A key factor in world history is the contacts between people of different communities and cultural traditions which involves the exchange of ideas and practical experiences.' He later studied the effects of infections and infectious diseases on various societies and cultures⁴². Biological and environmental factors have been virtually ignored by historians, but thanks to the studies of W. McNeill, that topic has become an important area of study⁴³. E. Wolf's contribution to the reformatting of views on world or global history with his idea of 'plural societies' born of complex connections and interactions is also significant⁴⁴.

Postmodernists also began to attack the prerogatives of world or human history. I. Ionov points to the connection of global history with postmodernism. Thus, J. Derrida denied the very idea of a single, shared, or world history, and spoke of histories that were different in their types, rhythms, and modes. G. Deleuze, like E. Wolfe, opposed the reduction of all the diversity of interactions in history to such dichotomies as 'barbarism – civilisation, West – East, traditional – modern, core – periphery, metropolis – colony'⁴⁵.

41 *Мак-Нил У.* Восхождение Запада: История человеческого сообщества. Киев: Ника-Центр; Москва: Старклайт, 2004; McNeill W. H., *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963.

42 *McNeill W. H.*, *Plagues and Peoples*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1976.

43 *Див.: Изгерс Г., Ван Э.* Глобальная история современной историографии. С. 421–422.

44 *Wolf E.* *Europe and People without History*, Berkley, 1982.

45 *Ионов И. Н.* Глобальная история как форма конструирования и репрезентации прошлого. С. 38.

Representatives of two generations of anti-colonial criticism have made an important contribution to the process of conceptualising modern global history. If the representative of the first generation E. Said knocked out the first bricks from the seemingly unshakable construction of Eurocentrism, opposing the dominance of the West in all spheres of society, the representatives of the second (D. Chakrabarty and others) founded a whole line of subaltern studies, creating conditions for equalisation in the rights of all types of historical writing. It is in postcolonial criticism, as I. Ionov notes, that 'there is more interest in formation, clashing, hybridity, and mesticity'⁴⁶.

It is quite logical that modern global history is not a simple continuation or new outfit of traditional world history because in the new historical conditions, it acquires new forms and content. Modern global history means a large scale of thinking, based on a new understanding of time and space. It is based on the interconnection and interaction of territories, cultures, communities, and groups, and projects a global approach to the past.

Linguistic Context of Global History

The concept of 'global history' has many meanings and semantic nuances, dynamics and structural connections which can be traced through the 'language field' theory. It uses such analytical structures as a 'conceptual field', a 'lexical field'. In particular, the second one contains various linguistic means, lexical formulas for conveying a

46 Там же. С. 41.

single meaning for all. The first one, on the other hand, is usually represented by a series of meanings concentrated in a single word-concept. The interaction of a 'lexical' and 'conceptual' fields serves as a mechanism for creating and conveying concepts⁴⁷.

The lexical field of global history is represented by a wide range of concepts, including both known, common ('world', 'universal', 'shared', 'human') and a set of relatively new concepts, such as 'comparative history', 'big history', 'transnational history', 'connected history', 'entangled history', 'shared history', etc.

The relationship of global history with traditional, old concepts is ambiguous. Some historians simply identify it with world history, use in a single line: 'global', 'human', 'world', 'universal', 'shared' history. From the second half of the 20th century, under the influence of globalization, the forms and contents of global history have changed. Moreover, one began to perceive from the standpoint of globalization not only the present but also the recent and distant past. The representative of the British school of global historians P. O'Brien even says that world history aspires to the Renaissance⁴⁸.

Simultaneously with the concept of 'global history', the concept of 'transnational history' is gaining popularity. The term 'transnational' originated in the United States

47 Про взаємодію «лексичного» та «поняттєвого» полів на прикладі поняття «Просвітництво» див.: Риккен У. О соотношении сравнительной истории понятий и сравнительной лексикологии // История понятий, история дискурса, история метафор. С. 66–81.

48 *O'Brien Patrick*, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, 1, p. 36.

in 1916, and the concept of ‘transnational history’, ‘transnational turn’ – in the 1990s. There is now a whole line of terms: ‘transnational history’, ‘transnational research’, the concept of ‘transnational’, ‘transnational approach’⁴⁹.

An important place in the lexical field of global history is occupied by the concept of ‘histoire croisée’. It is found in different versions: French *histoire croisée*, English entangled history, and connected history⁵⁰. The concept of ‘connected history’ was proposed by the American-Indian researcher Sanjay Subrahmanyam⁵¹.

The lexicon of global history also includes such concepts as ‘new comparative history’ and a ‘cultural transfer’. Historical comparison has always been considered a theoretical unit of analysis. A new understanding of the procedures of historical analysis is being formed which is reflected in the concept of ‘new comparative history’⁵². The category of a ‘cultural transfer’ is relatively new, has spread

49 Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история? С. 67–71.

50 The Making of the Modern World: Connected Histories, Divergent Paths (1500 to the Present), ed. by Robert W. Strayer. N. Y., 1989; Unravelling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness, ed. by Yelka Ehuda, Franfurkt et al., 2002; Burson Jeffrey D., Entangled History and the Concept of Enlightenment, Contributions to the History of Concepts, 8 (2): 1–24. Режим доступа: <https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/history-facpubs/4/>; Sönke Bauck, Maier Thomas, Entangled History, InterAmerican Wiki: Terms – Concepts – Critical Perspectives. Режим доступа: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

51 *Subrahmanyam Sanjay*, Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia, *Modern Asian Studies*, 1997, 31 (3), p. 735–762; *Curthoys A., Lake M.*, Connected Worlds, History in Transnational Perspective, Canberra, 2005.

52 *Welskopp Thomas*, Comparative History, in: European History Online (EGO), publish. by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/welskoppt-2010-en>

since the late 20th century, and went from understanding it as a transcultural history to defining a cultural transfer in terms of intercultural exchange and mediation of texts, discourses, media, and cultural practices⁵³. This series of concepts includes ‘borderland history’ – a concept focused on the study of the history of mutual exchanges between European communities of migrants and indigenous population⁵⁴.

Since the 1990s, old concepts have been resemanticised in the lexical field of global history. Thus, the ‘Renaissance’ which is now proposed to be defined as a cultural transfer of ideas, people, technology, also correlates with global history.

Of particular interest is a group of ‘young’ concepts in the lexical field of global history. It includes the proposed by J. Bentley concept-formula ‘global historical analysis’. An example of innovative construction of terms in this lexical field is the concept of ‘big history’⁵⁵. Ewa Domańska in the article ‘History in the Anthropocene’ quotes the theorists of ‘big history’ who believe that the history of the world is ‘helpful in cooperation in the interests of the planet’, that it tells about human connections both in the past and in ‘human-independent systems of the Earth’. In the geological epoch of the Anthropocene, one should

53 *Schmale Wolfgang*, A Transcultural History of Europe – Perspectives from the History of Migration, in: *Ibid.* <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010a-en>; *Idem.*, Cultural Transfer, in: *Ibid.*, Mainz 2012-12-05. URL: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2012-en>

54 *Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas*, Entangled History, 2015. Режим доступу: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

55 *Christian D.*, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History, Berkeley, 2004; Domańska Ewa, Historia w epoce antropocenu w: Boucheron P., Gradwohl P. Spotkanie ze światem II. Dialog polsko-francuski, tłum. E. Brzozowska, Warszawa, 2015, s. 177–189.

remember people and the ‘rest of nature’, for the history of the world is both biophysical and human, ‘and the factors of change are both physical and social ones’. Thus, ‘a new global history requires thinking on a planetary scale, with a focus on the planet itself. [...] Global change requires new patriotism, loyalty not to the country but to the whole Earth’⁵⁶.

‘Big history’, according to E. Domańska’s logic, ‘sketches the acceptance of the scale not only global but, above all, planetary (as well as space) because anthropogenic changes include the ones that are caused by man on other planets (space debris, cultural landscape of the outer space). In this perspective, the problem of human heritage is not limited to what exists on Earth but also extends to what is in space’. Molecular and microbiotic perspectives change the scale of human perception, the human factor, which according to the ideas of the Anthropocene is perceived not just as a species but ‘as one of the species that lives on Earth, but also as a carbon-based life form’. In this context, one cannot but agree with E. Domańska’s thoughts that ‘human essence is the being not only cultural but also biological; not individual, but – as biologists say – a genomic chimera, a holobiont (complex organism) that inhabits other life forms (symbionts)’⁵⁷.

In short, ‘big history’ is a product of the Anthropocene era and multiplies the scale of thinking, covering the human, natural, and planetary dimensions. By the way, a look at natural and social and cultural processes in the

56 *Domańska Ewa*, *Historia w epoce antropocenu*, s. 182–183.

57 *Ibid.*, s. 183.

geological dimension, I think, evokes the ideas of Buffon and other French educators, encyclopedists, which even creates the effect of 'new Enlightenment', 'planetary cosmopolitanism'. So this term ('big history') is relatively young, but in its content and functional purpose meets the challenges of the time and naturally fits into the family of related terms.

As we can see, the lexical field of the concept of 'global history' is quite diverse, mobile, the resource of which is replenished due to the acceleration of globalization processes. Along with the usual concepts, there emerge new terms, lexical elements, there is a rethinking (resemanticisation) of known and common concepts.

Conceptual field (concentrates around one concept) of global history captures many meanings and options and now remains ambiguous. Most often, 'global' is understood as a transnational history which is aimed at studying modernity, large-scale globalization processes. Some historians have tended to interpret global history as transcultural or *histoire croisée*. Global history has sometimes been compared to international history, the history of international relations, or country studies. The debate over the subject and methods of global history, which began since its emergence, continues to this day.

'Global history', we assume, belongs to the family of 'moving concepts' (*Bewegungsbegriffe*) which, according to R. Koselleck, have 'excess meanings'. They do not move by themselves, but due to their various uses. Future-oriented 'moving concepts' are multi-meaningful and are in a state of improvement and 'reset'. In general, the crucial role in the creation of concepts is

played by semantic connections between the elements of vocabulary.

In our view, 'global history' as a concept contains many contexts and has an ambivalent nature. In a broad sense, it acts as a social construct, a historical ideology of a globalizing world. It arose in the late 20th century and differs significantly from previous historiographical canons and traditions. The complex dynamics of forming the language field of the concept of 'global history' with its lexical and conceptual structures will be considered in more detail below. The concept of 'global history' crystallised in a specific conceptual space in the context of accelerated globalization, moving from a simple term to an imaginary structure with a wide range of meanings and meanings. However, today, it can be stated that this concept needs fundamental conventions, i.e. agreements, clarifications, and interpretations.

In general, on the basis of the language field theory, it is possible to determine the identities of 'global history' as a key concept in the family of related terms and a series of related common and new concepts.

Search for Identities

In the debate over global history, the position that remained consistent was that of the representative of the older generation of global historians J. Bentley, who understood world history as global. In his opinion, the image of world history was created by different groups of intellectuals: philosophers, sociologists, historians. He connected the merits of sociologists (A. G. Frank, I. Wallerstein) with the theory of modernisation, the key

concepts of which were tradition and modernity, as well as theories of dependence, world-system analysis⁵⁸.

However, in the 1960s, intellectual initiative gradually passed to historians. Over the past two decades, interest in comparative and cross-cultural analysis has grown which has led to the formation of world history as a prominent area of historical discipline. J. Bentley states that since the 1990s, historians create a tradition of global historical analysis which has developed in three directions: interest in the phenomenon of diffusion (interpenetration) of technologies and their impact on society; research of large-scale structures (patterns of economic and social history with emphasis on trade, economic integration of large areas); study of the environment, environmental problems on a large, global scale. In short, J. Bentley identifies global history with world one and introduces the concept of 'global historical analysis'⁵⁹.

J. Bentley's co-thinker Patrick Manning identifies two approaches to world history⁶⁰. The first, traditional, focuses on the study of civilisations, nations, social history. The second, new and promising, which P. Manning calls a 'scientific and cultural' direction in global history, implies the involvement of 'non-archival sources' and methods from such fields of knowledge as 'evolutionary biology, ecology, paleontology, archaeology, and chemistry, as well as Linguistics and Literary Studies'⁶¹.

58 *Бентли Дж.* Образы всемирной истории в научных исследованиях XX в. С. 43.

59 Там же. С. 45–46.

60 *Manning Patrick, ed.,* Slave trades, 1500–1800: globalization of forced labour, Aldershot: Variorum, 1996; *Idem.* Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past, New York, 2003.

61 *Див.: Изгерс Г., Ван Э.* Глобальная история современной историографии. С. 423.

Patrick O'Brien, a representative of the British School of global historians, also singles out two areas of global history that correspond to prospects 'focused on the trend of globalization of politics, economics, and culture'. The first direction, represented by the works of W. McNeill, is the 'traditional and convincing way of writing global history' which is a 'model of connections (accession)'. According to McNeill's recommendations, the goal is to '*study these connections through the prism of political boundaries, spatial units, and geographical boundaries which will allow historians to avoid the indulgence of cultures, time boundaries, and national supremacy embedded today in most prevalent styles of historiography, as well as postmodern distrust of all kinds of metanarratives*'.

However, connections and 'interactions' cannot be simply or at all 'good' because the spread of plague, disease, and parasites, destructive raids of nomads, wars, robberies or imperial expansion, forced imposing of religions, destruction of indigenous cultures and societies by strangers, etc. – all this is perceived as 'episodes of "connections" in global history'. O'Brien sees McNeill's contribution in defining different types of relationships, '*the contacts that are studied over long periods of maturation in transformation. Taxonomic phenomena related to such relationships include trade, investments, wars, religion, migration, the dissemination of useful knowledge, the exchange of botanical species, and the spread of diseases. Particular attention is paid to the importance of transport and types of communication which provided, facilitated, and reduced the cost of contacts across rivers, seas, oceans, and later in the air*'.

P. O'Brien connects the second approach to global history with the geographical expansion of 'objects of study beyond confessional, regional, and national borders, as well as continents, oceans, and individual cultures'. Thus, this approach, as seen by the researcher, means the use of the comparative method, the history of the environment and natural history, human interaction with nature: *'Attention to the environment helps to combine history with geography, at least because the diversity of environmental conditions is often the main reason for a convincing explanation of the nature of differences in ways and standards of living both inside and outside the West'*. At the same time, 'the resurgent interest in the evolution of human-nature interactions attracts biologists, geologists, botanists, climatologists, paleontologists, and epidemiologists to history'. According to O'Brien, the recent deprivation of spatial parameters and chronologies of national histories creates innovative perspectives for 'the interpretation of local, regional, and national histories, as well as for the study of other geographical and spatial units'⁶².

Finally, G. Iggers and E. Wang talk about two directions in global history: 1) world-economy and theories of modernisation; 2) presented by W. McNeill. They give an extensive description of these two areas: *'In the 1980s, and especially after 1990, world history moved in two different directions. One of them [...] was set earlier, in the 1970s and 1980s, by such representatives of the social sciences as Andre Gunder Frank, Eric*

62 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 6.

Wolf, and Immanuel Wallerstein, and also economists and sociologists who were interested in the influence of Western capitalism in modern times on the rest of the world. Like modernisation theorists, they viewed the development of the capitalist economy and the world market, which began in the 16th century, as central to understanding social order in the modern world [...]. After 1990, both theories of world systems based on Marxism and anti-Marxist theories of modernisation lost their popularity, but, as our review of global histories shows, they survived, albeit in a different form. Another direction which was less interested in economic and political factors, less focused directly on Europe, and which sought to address earlier periods of history, was presented by McNeill⁶³.

It is quite obvious that in historiographical debates around global history there compete quite different interpretations, specifications, definitions of such key constructs as 'global', 'world', 'human' history, etc. The position of Uppsala University professor Rolf Torstendahl seems to be the most convincing and constructive in this debate. He emphasises that global history today is not perceived as the history of the world or the history of all mankind. According to him, global history is associated with such concepts as 'histoire croisée' and 'transnational' history.

The fact is that the proponents of the term 'global history' oppose its identification with the concept of 'transnational' or 'supranational' history since the latter

63 Иггерс Г., Ван Э. Глобальная история современной историографии. С. 422–423.

is based on national history. Torstendahl understands transnational history as history that 'goes beyond national (state) history and provides an opportunity to comprehend such aspects of the past that were usually overshadowed by national issues'.

Torstendahl's thesis that transnational history is a (different) kind of global history seems quite correct. This type of global research 'is based on the optimal norm which emphasises the fruitfulness and importance of going beyond national or state borders and ignoring the sources of state character'. This approach, the researcher believes, is easier to implement in the history of economics and business history than in all other types of history. Undoubtedly, the emphasis on global perspectives is important given the further fragmentation of the historical discipline (history of mentality, culture, economics, politics) which became apparent at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries⁶⁴.

Global history is an intellectual projection of the information-network society, so in the modern scientific consciousness, there compete two approaches-views on global history: communication and information ones. The first one represents global history from the perspective of communications, i.e. a variety of forms of global interaction; its founder is W. McNeill. This means that global history reproduces images of the interaction of societies, cultures, civilisations, territories. The second approach defines global history in terms of information

64 *Тоштендаль Р.* Профессионализм историков становится глобальным? // Историческое познание и историографическая ситуация на рубеже XX–XXI вв. Москва: ИВИ РАН, 2012. С. 100–101.

flows as an interdisciplinary space (of natural sciences and humanities), within which one studies taxonomic processes of great/long duration beyond national, regional, and cultural boundaries in the modern world and projections of the past.

Analysing the scientific situation around global history, i.e. the approaches of global historians to the subject and means of research in this area, we can offer our vision of the problem. There is no doubt that the concept of 'global history' / 'modern global history' has a polysemantic nature and a wide range of analysis. Its semantics and origins create a wide field for interpretation: some historians seek the subject and object of global history, others identify it as a method, methodology, others perceive global history as a new scientific and cultural direction or scientific discipline in the system of historical science that shaped in 1990–2000s.

Global history as a concept should be considered in historical and linguistic contexts. This means determining the historical background of its origin, cultural and intellectual circumstances of formation, changes in nature and meaning. Global history does not act as a lexical figure, but an analytical structure which is considered in close connection with related concepts, which allows us to trace their genealogies and semantic chains.

Thus, in a broad sense, global history acts as a social construct, historical ideology of a globalizing world. It emerges in the late 20th century and differs significantly from previous historiographical canons and traditions, positivism, Marxism, postmodernism, multiculturalism, and other '-isms'.

In the narrow sense, 'global history' / 'modern global history' appears as a type of historiography⁶⁵. R. Torstendahl, as we remember, calls two types – transnational history and *histoire croisée*. However, such type of global history as social theology should also be taken into account. In general, global history as a type of historiography is represented by three varieties: transnational history, social theology, *histoire croisée*.

Intellectual Product in the Global Age

Most global historians believe that global history is a product of the age of globalization. However, the authors of the *Global History of Modern Historiography* G. Iggers and E. Wang warn against identifying global history with the concepts of 'globalization', 'history of globalization'. According to them, 'global history, which refers to different historical periods, is certainly not identical to the history of globalization'⁶⁶.

65 Ідея типології глобальної історії не нова. П. О'Браєн говорить про стилі та жанри глобальної історії. С. Конрад – про класи й типи. На думку останнього, в «умовах панування еkleктизму, теоретичної невизначеності корисно було б евристично розмежувати різні реакції та виклики «глобального»». Ці реакції розпадаються на тип і класи: глобальна історія як «історія всього», як історія зв'язків, як історія, заснована на понятті «інтеграції». Перший підхід до глобальної історії урівнює її з «історією всього». Другий тип у розумінні глобальної історії ставить у фокусі уваги «обмін та зв'язки», що долає попередні стереотипи, котрі «зупинялися на кордонах національної держави, імперії та цивілізації» Ці дві версії глобальної історії, стверджує С. Конрад, «застосовні до будь-якого місця й часу». Утім, саме третій підхід (клас, тип) дослідник вважає «багатообіцяючим» для глобальних істориків. Див.: Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история? С. 23–27.

66 *Иггерс Г., Ван Э.* Глобальная история современной историо-графии. С. 425. Напр., Ентони Гопкінс виокремлює чотири форми глобалізації: архаїчна, протогобалізація, сучасна, постколоніальна гло-

The problems of globalization and the history of globalization are covered in the book *Globalization: A Brief History* by Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson. It is noteworthy that its first section, devoted to the definition of the term ‘globalization’, is quite naturally perceived within the German tradition of the conceptual history – *Begriffsgeschichte*, and the concept ‘globalization’ is seen as a modern analytical structure. In contrast to a number of concepts such as ‘industrialization’, ‘urbanization’, ‘bureaucratization’, ‘democratization’, ‘secularization’, and the metaconcept of ‘modernization’, which manifest themselves in national and regional contexts, the concept of ‘globalization’, according to the authors, ‘conceptualises the links between peoples, nations, and civilisations’⁶⁷.

At the end of the 20th century, when the processes of globalization became dramatic and dominant, the debate revolved around the term. Synonyms of ‘globalization’ have appeared, such as a ‘global age’ or ‘second modernity’⁶⁸. The discussion on globalization also included such fundamental analogues as the concept of ‘globality’ by Martin Albrow and the idea of a ‘network society’ by Manuel Castells. According to Albrow, it is globality that transforms the current era which is different from the previous one. At the same time, globality has different dimensions: these are environmental problems

балізація. Див.: Hopkins Anthony G., *The History of Globalization – and the Globalization of History?* in: Idem., ed., *Globalization in World History*, London, 2002, p. 11–46.

67 *Osterhammel Jürgen, Petersson Niels P.*, *Globalization: A Short History*, transl. by Dona Geyer, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 4–5.

68 *Ibid*, p. 5.

that underlie the global ecological system; the dangers of global destruction posed by weapons of mass destruction; systems of communications and markets that cover the entire globe. Finally, 'globality becomes reflexive', that is more and more people relate their actions and views with the knowledge of the global⁶⁹.

M. Castells describes globalization as a network society, i.e. an unprecedented social form. It is computer technology that has made it possible to form flexible social relations regardless of territories. In the information age, economics and politics are organised not in a hierarchical, bureaucratic way but in the form of poorly structured horizontal networks. Thus, the grounds for exercising power and allocating resources change, power is manifested not in a command or obedience but is based on a network that is organised each time for a specific purpose. Alternatively, instead of the dichotomy of 'repression'/'exploitation', 'top'/'bottom', 'centre'/'periphery', the defining principle is belonging / inclusion in networks (or exclusion from them). The main fault line in the 'new world of Castells' divides everyone into those who are in the network and those who are excluded from it.

By the way, J. Osterhammel himself is not inclined to perceive globalization as a prophecy or a 'mystified force' but rather it has a descriptive character, i.e. appears as a 'generalising concept of a number of specific processes of transformation'⁷⁰.

The essence of the concept of 'globalization', according to J. Osterhammel and N. Petersson, is determined by such

69 Ibid, p. 8-9.

70 Ibid, p. 9-10.

factors as *spread*, *concentration*, and *acceleration* of world relations. If globalization enthusiasts see it as the beginning of a new era of growth and prosperity, opponents see it as the global dominance of big business, Western nations to the detriment of democracy, labour rights, poor countries, and the global ecosystem.

Important features of globalization are the attitude to the nation state, culture, and the idea of compressing space-time. Thus, the consensus between supporters and critics of globalization is the assumption that it undermines the importance of the nation-state and at the same time, establishes a balance between states and markets in favour of the latter. These are multinational corporations. According to the authors, one of the central themes of modern humanitaristics was the idea of erosion of national and external sovereignty of the state, its monopoly on power and ability to govern.

Another aspect of globalization is culture. Cultural globalization, driven by communication technology and the global marketing of Western cultural industries, was perceived, first, 'as a process of homogenisation, as the global reign (dominance) of American mass culture through traditional diversity'. Protests against globalization have given new impetus to the protection of local uniqueness, individuality, and identity. At the same time, the concept of 'glocalization' (Roland Robertson) emerges to emphasise global trends that always affect local societies and require special 'absorption'. It is noteworthy that due to globalization, cultural change is often interpreted as 'hybridity' which means the creative adaptation of new cultural elements to existing ones. At the same time, the media, international travel, and global demand for certain

consumer goods are perceived ‘as the most important mechanisms of “glocalization”⁷¹.

The third feature that characterises the phenomenon of globalization is the compression of space and time. Many authors, according to J. Osterhammel, describe globalization as a fundamental change in the categories of time and space; there is even the concept of ‘space-time compression’: ‘In light of the ease and frequency with which people, goods, and, especially, information overcome considerable distances, many authors have described globalization as a fundamental change in the categories of time and space. Geographer David Garvey calls it “space-time compression”⁷². The most important reason for this phenomenon is the speed of communication which created a ‘virtual’ unity and prerequisites for global social relations, global networks, and systems in which the effective distance was less than the geographical distance.

Another aspect of space-time compression has to do with the idea of deterritorialization or superterritoriality. Currently, location, distance, borders do not play a role in many social relations because many researchers perceive globalization not as an interaction between nationally divided societies but as a tendency to destroy territoriality, as a ‘retreat of the state in favour of self-regulatory market power’⁷³.

Following David Held, J. Osterhammel believes that globalization is an open process that significantly

71 Ibid, p. 6–7.

72 Ibid, p. 8.

73 Ibid.

transforms (rather than eradicates) such institutions of human existence as the state, church, and the family. At the same time, globalization opposes fragmentation. As well as ‘transformists’ J. N. Rosen and J. Clark, he sees globalization as a ‘phenomenon of recent history’, based on long-standing spatially broad processes of political, economic, cultural interaction.

However, the historian states, there are not only sceptics but also militant opponents of the idea of globalization. The latter (as well as, by the way, the ‘apostles of globalization’) believe that they are witnessing a fundamental transformation of the modern socio-political world. Sceptics call this an exaggeration and see globalization as an ‘ideological cover for American economic control strategies’, a ‘propaganda method of business elites and technocrats’⁷⁴.

J. J. Osterhammel draws attention to the importance of terminology in the spirit of the classical school of the conceptual history. Anyone who identifies globalization ‘as a functioning world market, free world trade, unimpeded capital exchange, migration movements, multinational corporations, the international division of labour, the world monetary system, will be able to find globalization in the second half of the 19th century’. Others may perceive it as a ‘real-time’ global network or the beginning of a new era, or even reject globalization as the ‘latest “masternarrative” of sociology’. Therefore, the first thing historians need to do, according to J. Osterhammel, is to ‘create their own concept of globalization, without pedantry and excessive uncertainty, which should act as a spotlight, illuminating

74 Ibid, p. 10–11.

the past without casting shadows of predetermined conclusions on what we'll find⁷⁵.

As we can see, the concept of globalization proposed by German historians has linguistic and historical aspects. The concept of 'globalization' is fully correlated with the categories of 'second modernity', a 'global era', a 'network society', 'globality'. Historically, globalization highlights the present (attitude to the state, culture, compression of space-time) and is projected on the recent past.

Therefore, global history as a product of globalization has as its methodological basis the Internet revolution, and the philosophical basis – planetary thinking – a marker of the Anthropocene era. The latter is considered as a 'new geological era' (from the Greek *anthropos* – man; *koinos* – new), or the 'age of man'. The idea was popularised by the Nobel Prize winner (1995) chemist Paul Crutzen in his article published in 2002 in the journal *Nature*. The term 'anthropocene' was first used by the American botanist and ecologist Eugene Stoermer. The Anthropocene is described as 'the youngest epoch of the Quaternary period which came after the Holocene'. The idea's author Crutzen marks as the beginning (of course, symbolic) of a new era 1784 – the invention of the steam engine by James Watt, i.e. the start of the industrial revolution⁷⁶.

75 Ibid, p. 11.

76 *Crutzen P. J.*, *Geology of Mankind*, *Nature*, 2012, nr 3, p. 23. Пор. також: *Birkenmajer K.*, *Antropocen – nowa epoka geologiczna?*, *Przegląd Geologiczny*, 2012, nr 11, s. 587–588. Утім розміщення початку епохи домінації людини у XVIII ст., вважає Ева Доманська, проблематичне. Так, Ян Заласевич стверджує, що, говорячи про початок нової геологічної ери, треба вказати на зміни у скельних породах, а їх можна знайти лише після 1945 р. – вони пов'язані з присутністю радіоактивних елементів після ядерних вибухів. Див.: *Zalasiewicz J., Williams M. et al.* *Are We Living in the Anthropocene?*,

Factors in the separation of the Anthropocene era are considered to be changes in the composition of the atmosphere since the industrial revolution due to increased combustion of fossil resources and the release of carbon dioxide; as well as the consequences of human activities, such as the violation of biodiversity and the resulting state of soils, extinction of living species, etc. According to E. Domańska, the combination of geological and historical times is 'one of the most interesting effects of a multidisciplinary discussion on the topic of the Anthropocene' which the researcher identifies as a geological epoch and discourse. The Anthropocene era, characterised by 'human domination', is essentially *'one of the symptoms of the end of the anthropocentric paradigm. Therefore, the adjective 'anthropocenic' does not mean 'anthropocentric'. If we consider anthropogenic climate change, natural disasters, species extinction, the Anthropocene also becomes a critical discourse on the ideology of human exclusivity, the mechanistic vision of the world, and the instrumental interpretation of nature as a means to meet human needs. Therefore, discussions around the Anthropocene help to build environmental awareness of the negative effects of the dominance of the human species on Earth. In this sense, the Anthropocene is a discourse that contradicts both globalization and modernisation'*⁷⁷.

Historical reflections in the conceptual framework of the Anthropocene can lead to the coming 'restructuring of history', efforts to 'restitute its rank', 'expand research

GSA Today, 2008, nr 2, p. 7. Див. також: Domańska Ewa, Historia w epoce antropocenu, s. 179.

77 Domańska Ewa, Historia w epoce antropocenu, s. 180–181.

fields and create new subdisciplines'. For example, biohumanistics and the 'third culture' (= the result of a dialogue of different cultures) inspire such new subdisciplines as multidisciplinary history, neurohistory, climate history, ecological, and zoohistory. It is also a matter of changing the 'metalanguage' and theory because thanks to the dialogue with the natural sciences, the concepts of the theory of 'autopoiesis, anthropogenic change, systems theory, modelling, fractals, etc.' penetrate the humanistics and social sciences⁷⁸.

Thus, global history as a product of the globalization era is closely linked to the present, while illuminating the recent and distant past, as well as serving as a bridge to the future.

Modern Historian in the Globalization's 'Labyrinths'

Today, historians have an urgent problem: how to navigate in the intellectual 'labyrinth' of the globalization era. For me personally, Patrick O'Brien's two theses became the starting point in understanding global history: each thing has its own history, and the global history at that; for thousands of years, humanity has experienced global influences that mingled with local elements in all dimensions. O'Brien sees the ideal of global history in creating space for such histories that 'seek to abstract from national, regional, ethnic, and religious traditions'. Such histories could be involved in the creation of metanarratives that may, at the same time, deepen our understanding of diversity and raise awareness of the man's condition, who for millennia has

78 Ibid. s. 181–182.

been influenced by global influences mixed with local elements in all available dimensions⁷⁹.

So we can say that now, 'global history' is at the stage of reception of new ideas and approaches. There is a search for its meanings.

Since the 1990s, the discourse of globalization has included the globalization of science and the profession of historian. Historical science, like jurisprudence, has a universal nature, so it is more prone to globalization than other disciplines. Historians of all times have shown interest in the norms and rules of other historiographies. Usually, the struggle between historians was 'for political, national, or ethnic reasons'. Different professional identities and traditions of professional culture were certainly formed in different regions of the planet⁸⁰. Thus, the traditions of historiography in China or India differed significantly from the norms of European historical writing, while the peoples of Africa in general for a long time were denied the right to their own history. Therefore, history has always remained politicised and colonised. Today, history is being decolonised, while globalization is making it less politicised. Given the recognition of the equivalence of all forms of historical writing and historiographical traditions, original professional identities are formed in different parts of the world, and their interaction takes place⁸¹.

79 *O'Brien Patrick*, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 38.

80 *Torstendahl R.* Профессионализм историков становится глобальным? С. 93–94.

81 *O'Brien Patrick*, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 38.

The institutionalisation of global history has several vectors. The environment of global historians is beginning to take shape. In 1982, the World History Association emerged as a branch of the American Historical Association. Corporate interests are supported and guided by joint organisational activities and intellectual initiatives, scientific communications. Now there is the emergence of formal and informal associations of global historians, and generations change (W. McNeill, J. Bentley, C. Bayly, P. Manning, P. O'Brien are representatives of the older and middle generations). The map of global researches is also indicative. International research centres for the study of global history are emerging in Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, and North America.

An important vector of institutionalisation of global history is its entry into the media space through the creation of periodicals and continuing publications on global issues. Their presence in the modern Anglo-Saxon area testifies to the 'turn to global history' in world science. In 1990, the World History Association, together with The University of Hawaii Press, launched the *Journal of World History*. It was edited by Jerry Bentley, around whom an international team of authors was formed. In early 2019, a competition was announced for the position of the journal head. The editorial policy in general remained unchanged, only certain clarifications and additions were made, *'The 29-year-old Journal of World History, founded by Jerry Bentley, publishes research on historical issues for any period that require the study of evidence on a global, comparative, intercultural, or transnational scale. The periodical is devoted to the study of phenomena that go beyond individual states, regions, or cultures, such as*

*large-scale population movement, long-distance trade, intercultural technology transfer, dissemination of ideas. The journal is associated with historiographical, theoretical, and methodological approaches to world history. The journal encourages research on a micro to macro scale, including big, deep history, histoire croisée, border history, diaspora history, and other approaches. Along with special articles, the results of original research, the Journal of World History publishes materials on thematic forums and book reviews. The periodical is managed by an editorial board and an advisory board which include scientists from around the world*⁸².

In 2006, *Journal of Global History*, based on the London School of Economics and Political Science, was launched. In a programme article in the first issue of the new edition, one of its founders and ideologues, Patrick O'Brien, formulated quite ambitious goals, *'The launch of this periodical is undoubtedly very timely. And it will succeed because the articles will be selected to help historians who are willing to take the epistemological and professional risk of writing metanarratives for global history, become creators of advanced fundamental concepts, theories, [...] and represent the past to stimulate an intercultural dialogue which is certainly useful for the future of all mankind*⁸³.

As part of a combination of regional and global studies, the *Globality Studies Journal: Global History, Society, Civilization* is published, founded by the Centre for Global History and Stony Brook University (2006). The

82 Режим доступа: <https://research.uni-leipzig.de/~eniugh/journal-of-world-history-seeks-new-editor-in-chief/>

83 Ibid, p. 39.

periodical is headed by Wolf Schaefer, and the editorial policy is focused on the interdisciplinary study of world history, globalized society, world civilisations, and local cultures.

Since 2008, they publish the journal *New Global Studies* (editor-founder is Bruce Mazlish, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), dedicated to a comprehensive study of global processes in the past and present. It postulates that global self-awareness has now gone beyond science and is spreading in everyday life, psyche, imagination, human consciousness as a result of space, computer, media technology, mass communication, the spread of multinational corporations, reactions to environmental change.

Among the priorities of the journal are interdisciplinary and global approaches. Unlike others, this periodical focuses on the 20th–21st centuries. The journal focuses on theoretical and empirical analysis of topics such as transnational dimensions of culture and cultural synthesis, models and local consequences of economic globalization, elitist and popular perceptions of global change, global institutions and organisations, public, private, global media and the emergence of ‘global society’, degradation and environmental protection, etc⁸⁴.

The globalization of the history-science and the profession of historian is due to the Internet revolution. Web resources, thematic platforms, and electronic journals are widely used to discuss the problems of global history. Thus, the Internet platform European Network in Universal and Global History, ENIUGH)

84 Режим доступа: <https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ngs?lang=en>

was created as an information resource for European historians dealing with the problems of world and global history. It aims to 'stimulate and promote research and teaching by creating communications and exchanges for scholars working in the field of world and global history in Europe'. The main tools for achieving these goals are the regular holding of European Congresses on World and Global History (the first took place in 2005); publication of articles in such periodicals as *Comparative, Connections*; bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of educational programmes, as well as promoting cooperation between research centres in Europe and beyond the continent⁸⁵.

It is significant that in Germany, there are many research programmes, electronic projects, Internet platforms, online dictionaries on the profile of global history. For example, European History Online (Europäische Geschichte Online) is an English-language academic website where articles on the history of Europe from 1450 to 1950 are published in accordance with the principle of open access. It was created by the Leibniz Institute of European History (Mainz) in cooperation with the Centre for Digital Humanities (Trier) and the Bavarian State Library (Munich). The editorial board consists of the directors of the institute, as well as 25 European historians. The project is funded by the Rhineland-Palatinate Land Government and the German Research Foundation⁸⁶.

On this site, in the section *Theories and Methods: Methodological and Theoretical Approaches to a*

85 Режим доступа: <https://research.uni-leipzig.de/~eniugh/>

86 Режим доступа: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/ego>

Transcultural History of Europe, it is stated that ‘world’, ‘new global’, ‘connected’, ‘shared’, ‘entangled’, ‘histoire croisée’ history, a ‘cultural transfer’ are transcultural perspectives and approaches under different names, the discussions around which have been going on for a quarter of a century. Such basic perspectives and approaches to the transcultural history of Europe as a ‘cultural transfer’, ‘transnational’, ‘comparative’ history, ‘postcolonial studies’ are complemented by the problems of European history and historiography⁸⁷.

Of particular interest is the online dictionary of the Centre for InterAmerican Studies (CIAS) at the University of Bielefeld – *InterAmerican Wiki: Terms – Concepts – Critical Perspectives*. It discusses key terms, constructs, as well as theoretical and methodological approaches from an interdisciplinary perspective. The aim of the project is to generate knowledge of interest to researchers, students, public figures, taking into account the social, cultural, environmental, political, economic peculiarities and conflicts in North and South Americas, as well as multilayered processes of integration, transnationalisation⁸⁸.

The deepening controversy between academic and public history eventually became a sign of the globalization of science and the profession of historian. Global history is definitely the subject of discussion by academic historians. The results of academic science are the preparation of works on global history, the production and implementation of new terms, debates (including on the Internet, in printed

87 Режим доступа: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods>

88 Режим доступа: <https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/aboutus.html>

academic publications) around the proposed concepts and approaches. The academic status of global history is evidenced by the publication of specialised editions, such as the *Encyclopedia of Globalization* edited by Roland Robertson and Jan Aart Scholte (2007)⁸⁹, the *Oxford Handbook of World History*, edited by Jerry Bentley (2011)⁹⁰.

At the same time, the globalization of the historian's profession against the background of the Internet revolution actualises the position of public history which reduces the achievements and progress of academic science to mass political discourse. Global history is also becoming a subject of public history; among others, it refers to the book by famous historians, a son and a father John and William McNeills, *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*. The past appears here as human networks of interaction, exchange, cooperation, and competition. These networks – small and large, stable or mobile – provided the movement of ideas, goods, money between cultures, societies, and nations. The authors show that human networks are a key component of world history and the basis of analysis. Renouncing ecological and cultural determinism, they reproduce the main patterns of world history in a vivid and concise form⁹¹.

89 *Encyclopedia of globalization*, ed. by Roland Robertson and Jan Aart Scholte, New York and London: Routledge, 2007.

90 *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. by Jerry H. Bentley. Access mode: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

91 *John Robert McNeill and William Hardy McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*, 1st ed., New York: W. W. Norton, 2003. Access mode: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/530104.The_Human_Web

A community of global historians is being formed. This process, according to researchers, is closely linked to the modern education system. P. O'Brien's view that the weight of historical and sociological education is growing in a globalizing world seems constructive. It is education that can help people understand 'the natural, human, and cultural diversity of their time'⁹². It is noteworthy that from the second half of the 20th century, there began the expansion of the Western university system into national education systems, especially in developing economies⁹³. Many universities now teach courses and train specialists in global history. The problem of textbooks (the author of the most popular one is J. Bentley) is rather acute⁹⁴.

In the context of globalizing the profession of historian, the problems of language and communication become especially important. The point is that the theoretical aspects of global history remain in the Anglo-Saxon scientific field, and all over the world histories are written in national languages for local audiences. Thus, G. Iggers and E. Wang state that 'international communication is still in the power of the Anglo-American world and, with the exception of the English-speaking school in India, theoretical issues outside the West are practically not covered at the global level. Compared to the social

92 *O'Brien Patrick*, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 38.

93 *Schäfer Wolf*, *Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age*, *Globality Studies Journal*, 31 December 2010. Access mode: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age/>

94 *Bentley Jerry H., Ziegler Herbert F.* *Traditions and Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000); second edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003).

sciences, history for the most part continues to be written in national languages and for the national audience⁹⁵.

The institutionalisation of global history poses the following challenges to researchers. Global historians should remember their origins, their national roots; combine in their profession traditions with relevant ideas and methods; respond to challenges by creating new tools and categories for reconstructing the past. Thus, P. O'Brien wrote in a programme article published in the *Journal of Global History*, *Of course, historians who dare to join the writing of global history should not forget about their background, origins, relevance of the categories and theories they use to reconstruct the past, and respond to the challenges of inventing fresh thesauri, categories, theories to attract not only new evidence but alternative perspectives of the past*⁹⁶. W. Schäfer, as a supporter of 'alternative horizontal historiography', believes that the problem of global history today requires large-scale research horizontally⁹⁷.

The task of Ukrainian historians is to receive the latest global ideas and approaches, to join the community of global historians, and develop empirical global research. The prerequisite for this will be awareness of their own experience in the fields of global history and a combination of modern approaches with national traditions of historiography. An important option is a dynamic response to the challenges of new terms, ideas-constructs, theories,

95 Iggers G., Wang E. Глобальная история современной историографии. С. 394.

96 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 37.

97 Schäfer Wolf, *Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age*. Access mode: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age/>

their verification on the materials of the recent and distant past of Ukraine. A serious challenge for domestic historians is the problem of the relationship between national and local narratives in global history. Thus, the prospects and at the same time the risks of writing metanarratives in global history are due to the fact that they are written in national languages and for a national audience. The dialogue of national historiographies is an effective tool of cognition and communication in the situation of globalization of science and the profession of historian.

CHAPTER 2.

Global History as an Ideology of the Globalizing World

Critique of Historical Theory

Is there an Alternative to National History?

Essentialist Approach: Pro et Contra

The Crisis of Eurocentrism

Empirical Turn

Critique of Historical Theory

Global history as a historical ideology of the globalization era has its own characteristics. As an ideology, it undoubtedly differs significantly from previous historical paradigms (Hegelianism, the first and second positivism, Marxism). The problem is related to the determination of the specifics, benefits, and risks of global history as a new historical ideology.

Modern global history as an ideology, in contrast to the established canons of historical writing, does not recognize the general laws of history. It is known that postmodernists in the second half of the 20th century spoke about the rejection of the universal historical theory. According to them, there is not a single history but many histories, different in type, rhythm, and mode. Postmodern intellectuals proclaimed the fragmentary nature of history, its spontaneity, opposing such common dichotomies as barbarism/civilisation, traditional/modern, core/periphery, metropolis/colony, etc.¹

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, historians also spoke about the inadequacy of total chronologies of historical events, the need to study the processes that are being restored (such as war, colonisation), or established intercultural structures. Specialists focused on global history are not at all inclined to search for universal 'laws' or teleological meaning in the development of human history because their interests are focused on the processes

1 *Ионов И. Н.* Глобальная история как форма конструирования и репрезентации прошлого // *История и историки в пространстве национальной и мировой культуры XVIII–XXI веков: сборник статей* / под ред. Н. Алеврас и др. Челябинск: Энциклопедия, 2011. С. 38.

that are being restored and the dynamics of intercultural interaction.²

Historians of global historiography G. Iggers and E. Wang also stated the fact of non-recognition of historical theory by global history: 'Global history does not presuppose the existence of a clear theory of historical development, a free narrative; it rejects the latter altogether as part of the legacy of Western imperialism'³.

Thus, rejecting the idea of the universal historical laws dominance serves as a means of understanding the relationship between the development of advanced European countries and 'peoples without history'⁴. If historians have traditionally perceived the past as the history of states, nations, formations, cultures, civilisations, today the present and its projections of the past are interpreted quite differently. Usually, world history and its local-national variants were perceived vertically (stage development, evolution, progress, etc.), but the alternative approaches offered by global history actualise the idea of horizontal history. The latter presupposes numerous and branched social projections and reveals the 'logic of history' in the plural as 'a set of situational, accidental, circumstantial colonialisms, modernisations, industrial revolutions'⁵.

2 Адамс М. Из Предисловия составителя серии очерков по глобальной и сравнительной истории // *Время мира*. Вып. 1. 1998. С. 28.

3 Иггерс Г., Ван Э. (при участии С. Мукерджи). *Глобальная история современной историографии* / Пер. с англ. О. Воробье-вой, науч. ред. М. Кукарцева. Москва, 2012. С. 425.

4 Wolf E., *Europe and People without History*, Berkley, 1982.

5 Ионов И. Н. *Глобальная история как форма конструирования и репрезентации прошлого*. С. 38.

The idea of the history plurality is known as the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ of the American-Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt⁶ who is considered its ‘chief architect’. This concept was formulated on the basis of the anti-postmodernist project of ‘Western modernity’, or ‘European project of modernity’ by Jürgen Habermas (1980)⁷.

According to S. Eisenstadt, the idea of multiple modernities suggests that ‘the best way to understand the modern world, explain the history of modernity is to consider it as the history of continuous creation and reproduction of multiple cultural programmes’. According to a German-American researcher Wolf Schäfer, editor of the *Journal of Global Studies: Global History, Societies, and Civilisations*, Eisenstadt’s historical, political, and cultural project of the plurality of modernities destroys the ‘imperious concept of “Western civilisation” as exemplary for the whole world⁸.

At the same time, S. Eisenstadt, according to W. Schäfer, remains connected with the traditional world context and terminology. Often referring to modernity, he speaks of the ‘axial period’ of Karl Jaspers. Moreover, Eisenstadt perceives the idea of multiple modernities as ‘new axial civilisation’ and calls it the ‘civilisation of modernity’⁹.

6 *Eisenstadt S. N.*, Multiple Modernities, *Daedalus*, 2000, Vol. 129, No. 1. P. 1–29.

7 See: *Schäfer Wolf*, Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age, *Globality Studies Journal*, 31 December 2010. Режим доступа: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age/>

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

At the same time, W. Schäfer clarifies that the ‘axial civilisation of modernity’ of S. Eisenstadt is by no means ‘global technoscientific civilization’, i.e. a construct proposed by Schäfer himself. It would be more appropriate and simpler not to call Eisenstadt’s ‘multiple modernities’ ‘civilization’ but rather to speak of the ‘new global culture of modernity’. Schäfer sees the Eisenstadt’s merit in the fact that his concept of ‘multiple modernities’ can give regional studies the cultural understanding of modernity which correlates well with Fletcher–Frank’s horizontally integrative methodology¹⁰.

Patrick O’Brien, a representative of the British school of global historians, also supported the idea of ‘multiple modernities’. Unlike W. Schäfer, who considered that idea from the standpoint of civilisation, O’Brien associated it with the problem of metanarrative. According to the latter, the principle of multiple modernities, promoted by their own traditions, is productive for the construction of metanarratives in global history¹¹.

Eisenstadt tested the thesis of plurality in other areas as well. As a modernisation analyst, he formulated the idea of multiple modernisations. At the same time, he did not equate modernisation with Westernisation as different countries went their own way. The researcher also believed that revolutions were an important element of modernisation¹².

10 Ibid.

11 *O’Brien Patrick*, Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, No. 1, p. 32.

12 *Эйзенштадт Ш.* Конструктивные элементы великих революций: Культура, социальная структура, история и человеческая деятельность // THESIS: Теория и история экономических и социальных

Thus, global history as a new type of ideology involves the creation of a completely new world in the plurality. Modern global history is intertwined with many histories (Dipesh Chakrabarty). This does not mean that historians ignore historical theories, but there are theories of different levels of generalisation. Therefore, universal theories of history are in the zone of criticism, while middle-range theories are relevant for metanarratives, national, and local narratives for global history.

Is there an Alternative to National History?

An important point of the global history ideology is a cautious or sceptical attitude to the cult of the nation state which radically equates in the space of world history all peoples, ethnic groups, and countries, including ‘peoples without history’. During the 19th–20th centuries, the cult of the nation state dominated the scientific programme of Eurocentrism and had aggressive influence on the historical consciousness of ‘stateless’ peoples in Europe itself. It was they who sought to ‘adapt’ their past to the European model, that is, to construct local narratives in a nation-centric way.

The problem of nationalist or ‘nation-centric’ history deserves special discussion. It is traditionally believed that nation-centred histories are a phenomenon of the New Age. However, P. O’Brien reminds of their genealogy from more distant times and eras: for two thousand years, there have been traditions based on the recognition and

институтов и систем. 1993. Т. 1. Вып. 2; *Его же*. Революция и преобразование обществ: Сравнительное изучение цивилизаций. Москва: Аспект-Пресс, 1999; *Его же*. Срывы модернизации // Неприкосновенный запас. 2010. № 6.

affirmation of 'spiritual, moral, and cultural supremacy of Egyptian, Hellenistic, Byzantine, Islamic, Confucian, Indian, African, and other civilisations'¹³.

Of course, the nation-centric tradition, according to the researcher, existed in early modern times, after the Reformation: Anglo-, Franco, Spanish-, and other centric histories dominated the historiography of European nations because claims to 'cultural, moral superiority were inherent in any nationalism and were not a monopoly of the West'¹⁴.

Indeed, nationalism and nationalist historiography are not a purely European phenomenon or a monopoly of Western countries. It is believed that a sense of nationalism is natural for any historiography. However, in modern times, when there was a formation of the modern type of science and thinking, as well as the standardisation of scientific research, nationalism emerged as a theory. It is no coincidence that the century before last is considered the 'century of nationalism'.

In the 19th century, the situation with nationalisms and nation-centric historiography has changed significantly. If in the age of Enlightenment, the idea of universalism, 'Enlightenment cosmopolitanism' dominated¹⁵, then in the 19th century, its place was taken by the ideas of localism, regional exclusivity, and self-worth of certain territorial units. Objectively, this was due to the rise of Europe,

13 *O'Brien Patrick*, Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, No. 1, p. 32.

14 *Ibid*, p. 33.

15 *Мазлиш Б.* Глобальное и локальное: понятия и проблемы // *Социс.* 2006. № 5. С. 24.

the establishment of its political, cultural, technological dominance. In those conditions, nationalism became the ideological basis of the policy of colonialism and imperial expansionism.

During the 19th century, there was a process of professionalisation of the science of history. According to historians of global historiography, it took place *'under the enormous influence of archival sources which made it difficult to go beyond national borders and, moreover, beyond those of Europe and America'*. Such dependence on official sources and state archives focused professional science 'on the study of the phenomena of the nation and nation state'. The concentration of official science on national history – the history of the state and on state archives testified to the formation of 'new nationalism'¹⁶. Its essence was a purely Western idea of 'the rule of the nation state'¹⁷.

Thus, it was the Rankean type of science that fit perfectly into the Eurocentrism ideology, proclaiming the nation state as the source of the development of the Western world. Whole generations of historians have remained in the comfort zone, without going beyond national and local archives, and many of them were explicitly or implicitly employees of nation states (P. O'Brien).

So, *'professionalisation of historical research in the 19th century'*, G. Iggers and E. Wang summarise, *'witnessed the departure from world and regional history and the focus on the phenomena of the nation and the nation state. This was partly due to the growing dependence of professional science on archival sources; attempts to create a broader interethnic*

16 Iggers Г., Ван Э. Глобальная история современной историо-графии. С. 29.

17 Там же. С. 34.

or even transcultural history were seen as a violation of the criterion of rigorous scientificity. However, much more important was the change in the political worldview that took place in the 19th century, according to which the supremacy of the West was seen as a justification for colonial and imperial expansion, and the source of Western civilisation and progress was considered a nation state¹⁸.

From the second half of the 20th century, nationalist historiography has entered a new phase. In Europe after the Cold War and under the influence of new ideas, multiple ‘turns’ (cultural, linguistic, historical, spatial, etc.)¹⁹, nationalist historiography began to lose its position. Today, according to researchers of global historiography, it retains its influence only in East Asia and Eastern Europe where it ‘prospered back to communism’²⁰. At this stage, nationalist history was anti-colonial in nature, that is, by criticising the principles and schemes of dominant imperial historiography, it reproduced them symmetrically. The example of the post-Soviet countries shows that the state remains at the centre of national historiographies as the main analytical unit and structural element of the national narrative.

At the end of the 20th century, Post-Soviet, including Ukrainian, historiographies returned to their own academic traditions of historiography, creating on the basis of previous schemes and concepts their metanarratives, which really had an anti-colonial character. This means

18 Там же. С. 421.

19 Попова Т. Н. Дисциплинарный образ науки: подходы и понятия. Одесса, 2019.

20 Иггерс Г., Ван Э. Глобальная история современной историографии. С. 411.

that the first national narratives of the post-Soviet historiography, in particular the Ukrainian one, based on M. Hrushevskyi's 'usual scheme', were practically a projection of the Russian nationalist (imperial) type of historical writing with its basic idea of the 'nation state'. Thus, it can be stated that Ukrainian historiography (pre-Soviet, post-Soviet) felt the impulses of 'new nationalism' which is associated with the formation of dependence on sources from national and local archives and the search for the origins of Ukrainian statehood of the traditional (Western European) model.

At the same time in the second half of the 20th – early 21st century, in the post-Soviet space, another trend in the development of nationalist historiography gained importance: an important challenge was initiated by the postcolonial critique of the 1970s and 1980s ('Orientalism' by E. Said, Subaltern Studies). We should also take into account the fact that along with postcolonialism, an important factor that influenced the historiography of the late 20th century was the 'rise of Islam and the decline of Marxism'. Thus, from the standpoint of postcolonial criticism, G. Iggers and E. Wang summarise, 'the national-state narrative in historiography' was 'masculine-oriented and masculine-controlled' which proves its 'connection with Western colonialism and imperialism'²¹.

Postcolonial critique, in contrast to traditional nationalist historiography, proposed its own approach to national histories which meant the 'subalternisation' of historical thinking and writing. The Subaltern Studies

21 Там же. С. 405.

project envisaged going beyond nationalist historiography, i.e. abandoning such a basic unit of analysis as the 'state': *'In India, the legacy of the Subaltern Studies initiative has meant recognising the need to go beyond universal explanatory structures such as the nation state. It was recognised that nationalist histories developed as anti-colonial histories'*²². The main subject of the "Subaltern Studies" is the history of oppressed, dependent, or vulnerable groups, such as ethnic, religious, sexual minorities, slaves, children, women, and others oppressed.

Radical changes in the public consciousness and academic sphere have led to a different attitude to nationalism and theories of nationalism as a phenomenon of Eurocentrism. It is a matter of revising rigid definitions, unifying the nation concept, as well as defining the self-worth of different cultures and certain social groups. It is noteworthy that in American historiography, the very nation concept has been questioned: state programmes (standards, 1995) on national and world history in the United States, as noted by G. Iggers and E. Wang, abandoned the unified understanding of the nation concept, emphasising the diversity of cultures and the role of women and minorities in history, creating opportunities for global intercultural research²³.

Given the current scientific situation, it can be stated that the central point of the Ukrainism's nationalist programme now remains the idea of an independent state which has gone from szlachta autonomy, bourgeois

22 Там же. С. 413.

23 Там же. С. 412. Підготовлені 1995 р. в Лос-Анджелесі на замовлення Національного центру з викладання історії у школах при Каліфорнійському університеті Лос-Анджелеса.

federalism, democratic independence, quasi-statehood of Soviet times to a sovereign country.

Of course, in a globalizing world, the functions of science are changing. The desire of historians to go beyond nationalist history reflects the global trend 'to go beyond the national paradigm and gain a new vision of the past. Undoubtedly, this attempt reflects a general trend for historians around the world'²⁴. We have an optimistic forecast: there exist all the grounds for such an approach to history.

However, today, nationalist historiography in Ukraine is needed by present-day Ukrainian elites because it serves as a means of maintaining the national and political prestige of our country in a globalized world. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian nationalist historiography faces new challenges and seeks change: it must lengthen, expand the chronological boundaries of Ukrainian history in antiquity, present a historically sound spatial-territorial exposition of the national past, focus on a balanced description of Ukraine's relations with neighbouring countries and peoples.

Globalization creates a variety of temporalities and spaces that produce new images of national history. So, in contrast to the historical science of the 19th–20th centuries, global history as a new historical ideology does not absolutise the nation state as a unit of historical research, but at the same time, does not deny the possibility of creating metanarratives, national, and local narratives for global history.

24 Там же. С. 418.

Essentialist Approach: Pro et Contra

The fundamental difference between global history and previous ideologies is the rejection of the essentialist understanding of history. The previous period in the history of historiography was characterised by an essentialist approach, in line with which such concepts as 'civilisation', 'formation', 'nation', 'class', etc. were perceived as a historical fact, the existing entities. It is no coincidence that N. Kopusov identified global history with Marxism with clearly negative connotations, *'No other historical school attached so much importance to the idea of global history as Soviet historiography did'*²⁵.

In practice, to this day, civilisations are perceived by historians as certain entities or concrete reality in the form of cultural and historical types, 'great cultures', 'local civilisations', and so on. At the same time, as the Russian researcher I. Ionov notes, there is a 'transformation of the theory and history of civilisations', i.e. it 'loses its previous meaning' as the opposition of one's own / another's, civilised Europeans / backward savages; instead, it's a matter of a dialogue of cultures and civilisations²⁶.

The 'civilization' concept is known to be a product of intellectuals of the age of Enlightenment²⁷. Since its emergence in the 18th century, that concept tended to the general, universal/global. It is noteworthy that in our time,

25 Копосов Н. Е. Память старого режима: История и политика в России. Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2011. С. 200.

26 Ионоу И. Н. Глобальная история, универсальная этика и основания для оптимизма // Историческое познание и историко-графическая ситуация на рубеже XX–XXI вв. Москва: ИВИ РАН, 2012. С. 80; Его же. Мировая история в глобальном веке: новое историческое сознание. Москва, 2015.

27 Мазлиш Брюс. Глобальное и локальное: понятия и проблемы. С. 24.

it is global historians who recognise that the 'civilization' concept plays an instrumental role in the modern model of historical knowledge for they perceive it not as concrete reality but rather an analytical structure of a high degree of generalisation.

Thus, J. Bentley emphasises the Eurocentric origin of the 'civilization' concept and interprets it as outdated because 'civilization' has 'Western elitist connotations that do not correspond to the multiple large communities in the world'. He considers it appropriate to replace the term 'civilisation' with the concept of 'large-scale complex society' and use it for global historical analysis: philosophers of history (O. Spengler, A. Toynbee, P. Sorokin, F. Northrop, K. Jaspers, A. Kreber, E. Fegelin) developed the concept of 'large-scale complex society, often called civilisation, and made it a legitimate category for global historical analysis'²⁸.

The nature of changes in the attitude of global historians to the 'civilisation' concept is illustrated by the evolution of Wolf Schäfer's views – from the essentialist understanding of civilisation to the perception of it as a unit of global historical analysis. Initially, the researcher (2001) refers to the 'civilisation' concept in the works of Alfred Weber and Robert Merton. In their view, civilisation meant human control over nature and was used in the singular, in contrast to the 'culture' concept which had many social meanings and functioned in the plural. According to W. Schäfer, if 'civilisation' is a term of a 'socio-natural whole', then 'culture' is used to define individual parts of the whole.

28 *Бентли Дж.* Образы всемирной истории в научных исследованиях XX в. // *Время мира: Альманах.* Вып. 1. 1998. С. 31–32.

‘World civilisations’, according to W. Schäfer, have always had spatial limitations, blurred borders. Therefore, he defines the relevant concept, abandoning the opposition of civilisation/culture. Civilisation appears as ‘cultural characteristics of a particular time or place’²⁹.

Thus, W. Schäfer proposes a new definition of civilisation in the context of globalization and technoscience, using the term ‘global civilisation’, which, unlike ‘pre-global civilisations, in his opinion, does not have a ‘fixed territory, and its meaning is the ‘world matrix of technoscientific networks’. It is this essential component that defines the civilisation of our time as a ‘deterritorialised ensemble of networked technoscientific practices in the global dimension’. The most important pattern of modern history, according to W. Schäfer, was ‘the massive clustering of globalization in the late 20th century and the emergence of global technoscientific civilisation’. The Internet is creating important evidence for global civilisation.

W. Schäfer operates with such notions of modern global history as ‘global’ or ‘technoscientific’ civilisation which, by his definition, does not embrace a specific territory, has no centre, but permeates and unites all capitals and territories. The culture of technoscience becomes the ‘general context of all cultures’, and technoscience itself is fuelled by local culture. Thus, the ‘global’, ‘technoscientific’ civilisation surpasses the ‘nation state’ as a unit of historical, political, and sociological analysis.

Along with the constructs of ‘global’, ‘technoscientific’ civilisation, W. Schäfer only mentions the ‘hypothesis

29 *Schäfer Wolf*, Global Civilization and Local Cultures: A Crude Look at the Whole. *International Sociology* 16, No. 3 (2001), p. 301–319.

of the global era' (M. Albrow, 1997), and later unfolds it into a whole 'global era' concept. According to the researcher, he uses the terminological resource of the categories 'civilisation' and 'culture' to return civilisation 'as a useful category for global historical analysis', to give new opportunities to history and global studies in accordance with modern requirements of technoknowledge³⁰.

In short, instead of the traditional concept of 'world civilisations', W. Schäfer proposes the concept of 'global', 'technoscientific civilisation' which does not have a defined territory and a single centre. It is this concept that must displace the nation state as the basic unit of historical analysis.

Of interest is the concept-idea of Wolf Schäfer's global age (2010), which began after the Cold War (1947–1989/1991), and its main features are 'globalisation' and 'multipolar world'. According to the researcher, back in 1995, he proposed to treat the 'global age' in the plural because he considered the 'methodology of horizontally integrative macrohistory' by Fletcher – Frank to be productive. This means that simultaneous events and processes in the world economy are connected and considered at the global level. W. Schäfer considers this approach to be promising for global history and area studies because it (the approach) is intertwined with multiple modernities.

It is obvious that W. Schäfer is a supporter of an alternative methodology of horizontal historiography. He states that most historians are wary of vertical connections (the stability of tradition), but do not perceive horizontal

30 Ibid, p. 133–135.

ones. Therefore, ‘the task of global history requires large-scale area horizontal studies’³¹. Thus, the alternativeness of the ‘methodology of horizontal historiography’ means the perception of history in the plural or in the light of the idea of multiple modernities.

The attitude of global historians to the problem of civilisations from the perspective of global history deserves attention. Thus, the representative of the British school of global historians P. O’Brien believed that the term ‘civilisation’ was artificial, formed by generations of European historians-erudites: they perceived those ‘constructed civilisations’ as ‘supposedly unique and homogeneous’³². It is significant that he did not connect civilisations with certain reality because in his understanding, they were ‘amorphous and transient entities called “civilisations”’³³.

P. O’Brien traces the metamorphoses of the very ‘civilisation’ construct. It was actualised by the First World War of 1914–1918. It reconfigured Europe, as well as the overseas possessions of European states, with the help of a ‘conceptually filled’ but never clearly defined space called ‘civilisation’, the ‘Western civilisation’, or simply the ‘West’. Thus, the latter appears as a ‘heterogeneous, socially and culturally constructed entity’ which is perceived by ‘a community of several competitive nation states’. After the Second World War, that community began to lose its

31 *Schäfer Wolf*, *Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age*. Access mode: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age/>

32 *O’Brien Patrick*, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, 2006, p. 24.

33 *Ibid*, p. 33.

power due to the processes of decolonisation and economic growth of 'others'.

P. O'Brien is quite sceptical about the prospects and possibilities of the 'civilisation' concept. In geopolitical, technological, and economic dimensions, civilisation as a 'constructed entity' cultivates the idea of supremacy, superiority in both history and social sciences, and acts as a kind of arbiter of the characteristics of 'civilisations, nations, cultures, regions, societies, communities in the world dimension to this day'³⁴.

Obviously, 'civilisation' as one of the fundamental ideas-concepts of Eurocentrism, today is perceived rather as an analytical structure or another unit of global historical analysis. 'Civilisation' is no longer identified with a specific historical reality: the tendency to completely abandon this concept is becoming more and more noticeable.

The Crisis of Eurocentrism

An important feature of global history as an ideology of the global age was the crisis of Eurocentrism. In practice, this means abandoning hegemony and imposing on 'others' the European type of historical writing and recognising the equivalence of different historiographical traditions and types of historiography, such as Chinese, Islamic, East Asian, Indian, African, and others. Due to postcolonial criticism, all types of historical writing are considered self-sufficient, self-important, and their use is a safeguard against the recurrence of neocolonialism in global history.

34 Ibid.

Traditional history and sociology, from Smith through Marx to Weber, created images, privileged dictionaries, and 'imposed teleological vision of the past' that was repressive of others, including those who did not oppose Western political, economic, and ideological power. At the same time, according to P. O'Brien, 'Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Muslim historians have resisted that challenge'; they were aware of the fact that Western knowledge could be 'liberating and adapted to local purposes'. Moreover, the researcher was sceptical about the chances of patriotic historians of oppressed nations to abandon the 'centric model' of historical writing. The fact is that without the 'categories, constructs, concepts, explanations, and quantitative analysis' created by European science, it is almost impossible to change the situation, so there is a high probability that 'metanarratives for world (and national) histories will continue to be built along the 'centric' line'³⁵.

It is noteworthy that W. Schäfer, following D. Chakrabarty, considers the creation of glossaries which adapted European terms and concepts for local use a typical and widespread feature of Eurocentric influence. A standard feature of monographs in Asian and area studies, according to D. Chakrabarty, was 'a chapter called a "glossary" which is presented at the end of the book'. It was the glossary that 'reproduced a series of "rough translations" of local terms', often borrowed from the colonisers themselves. These 'colonial translations' were not only approximate (and therefore inaccurate) but they had to correspond to the crude methods of colonial rule.

35 Ibid.

D. Chakrabarty considered it necessary to challenge those 'rough translations' which means a critical and attentive attitude to the translation process itself³⁶.

Positions on the influence of Eurocentrism on the part of supporters of the Anglo-Saxon school are stated by J. Bentley (2011). He is known to identify global history with human, world history, without denying either European or national history. In his opinion, the 'new world history' is a means of overcoming Eurocentrism. It has become a disciplinary platform for resisting the influences of Europe which is no longer perceived as a starting point or a 'universal standard for historical analysis'. World historians, the researcher notes, did not create a single formula or method for Eurocentric approaches, but they did introduce 'less ideological and more transparent historiography through self-reflection, self-correction, and the use of various special methods and approaches'³⁷.

J. Bentley emphasises that modern historians are looking for alternatives to Eurocentric concepts of the global past. He considers the 'local turn' to be one of the alternatives which means that historians focus on the lives and experiences of the marginalised and oppressed, as well

36 *Chakrabarty Dipesh*, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. Reprint, 2008, with a new preface by the author "Provincializing Europe in Global Times" (2007); *Schäfer Wolf*, *Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age*. Режим доступа: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age/>

37 *Jerry H. Bentley*, *The Task of World History*. *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, edited by Jerry H. Bentley. Режим доступа: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

as on the uprisings. Such history is the basis for political and social criticism, as well as identity politics in search of the acceptable past.

The second alternative to the Eurocentric history, according to J. Bentley, is the 'global turn'³⁸, related to the study of local, national, and areal histories 'in a broader transareal, transcultural, and global contexts'. Of course, the global turn is not a problem-free project, 'capable of causing logical, epistemological, moral, and other complications'. The global turn, as understood by J. Bentley, does not deny the importance of the nation state, but only decentralises it because this turn is focused on the network of communications, exchange, and processes of interaction between peoples, nations, societies, and cultural traditions.

World historians have resisted the temptation to reduce all the diversity of historical experience to simple principles. They saw the world as a 'place of radical heterogeneity' and recognised 'the reality of transareal systems that linked the destinies of different heterogeneous peoples'. 'The global turn' means 'both fragmentation and integration at different levels – local, areal, national, continental, hemispherical, oceanic, and global'³⁹.

The global turn, according to J. Bentley, takes the form of the new world history, though it is not a panacea for historical science but a way to understand the world in a broader sense. It is aimed at long-term perspectives, makes large-scale processes clearer, but there is a danger of devaluing chance in history.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

Moreover, J. Bentley considers the global turn ‘an important perspective for modern thinking about the past’. This project states that, together with local communities and states, large-scale, transterritorial, globalizing processes affect societies and the world. As we can see, in the researcher’s arsenal, along with the categories of the global, there are such units of historical analysis as societies and states: ‘All in all, the networks of intercultural interaction, communication, exchange define the contexts of human experience just the way as the multiple local communities and nation states that scholars have traditionally accepted as categories of historical analysis’.

The task of the new global historian is to overcome the notion that ‘European modernity’ is a universal standard for evaluating all societies in the world. And finally, to give up the temptation to perceive ‘the histories of local communities as the only recognisable subjects of history’⁴⁰.

In the ideology of Eurocentrism, the idea of Europe’s political, economic, cultural, and technological supremacy or dominance coexists with the concept of ‘non-historical peoples, ‘backwardness’. In the special literature, the expression ‘backwardness advantage’ is used. It is noteworthy that E. Wolf in his work *Europe and People Without History* (1982) was one of the first to note that the cause of the industrial revolution was the ‘backwardness privilege’ of aggressive and peripheral Europe which managed to lead globalization centred in Asia⁴¹.

40 Ibid.

41 *Wolf E., Europe and the People without History, Berkeley, 1982; Вульф Ерік Р. Європа і народи без історії / Пер. з англ. І. Пошивайла. Київ, 2004; Ионов И. Н. Глобальная история как форма конструирования и репрезентации прошлого. С. 39–40.*

Within the methodology of the ‘new global history’, the problem of backwardness becomes relevant⁴². For example, American-Spanish researchers Mónica Burguera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, in the preface to one of the issues of the journal *Social History* entirely devoted to the problem of backwardness, talk about it in the Spanish context⁴³.

Instead, the Russian researcher A. Kamensky considers the problem of backwardness as a basic theoretical concept in the study of the history of Russia in the 19th century⁴⁴. The ‘backwardness’ concept has two aspects: emotional and scientific. In the first case, it seems to contain negative connotations, notes of resentment, contempt; in the second – plays an instrumental role in the study: *‘On the one hand, it is quite clear that the very word ‘backwardness’ and especially the very phrase ‘backward country’ on an emotional level can be perceived as contemptuous, even offensive. However, in this case, we are talking about the language of science where the concept has not evaluative but ascertaining value’*⁴⁵. Given this, historians on an emotional level seek to look for analogues of the ‘backwardness’ construct. Thus, in Russian historiography, they use instead the concepts of ‘normality’, ‘normalisation’, ‘norms

42 Burguera Mónica, Schmidt-Nowara Christopher, Backwardness and its discontents, *Social History*, 29, 3, 2004, p. 279–283; Burdiel Isabel, Myths of failure, myths of success: new perspectives on nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism, *Journal of Modern History*, 70, 4, 1998, p. 892–912; Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». *Quaestio Rossica*, Vol. 6, 2018, № 1. С. 185–206.

43 Mónica Burguera, Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Backwardness and its discontents, p. 280.

44 Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 186.

45 Там же. С. 200.

in history'⁴⁶. In the 1990s, according to A. Kamensky, *'the very notion of 'backwardness' was found offensive, but instead, people began to talk and write not about a backward country/culture/economy but about another culture, another model of economic and social development, another model of modernisation, and so on'*⁴⁷.

It is noteworthy that Spanish historians use such an analogue of the 'backwardness' concept as 'cultural backwardness' or the 'late-comer status'. They link the peculiarities of modern Spanish historiography to concerns about its 'intellectual backwardness' or rather late-comer status. This means that in the last two centuries of Spanish history, it is not easy to fit into the European models due to the intellectual and institutional isolation imposed by F. Franco's thirty-year regime⁴⁸.

The term 'backwardness' in various historiographies has its own history. It was widespread in the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire, in particular when assessing such events as the reforms of Peter I, the reforms of the mid-19th century, and the reforms of Stolypin – Witte.

The term 'cultural backwardness' also existed in Soviet historiography. And since the 1990s, the concept of modernisation, a component of which 'backwardness' was considered has been gaining popularity in Russia. The prevailing view was that modernisation in this country was 'catching up'. Moreover, the concept of 'catching

46 Миронов Б. Н. Социальная история России периода империи (XVIII – начало XX в.): генезис личности, демократической семьи, гражданского общества и правового государства: В 2 т. Санкт-Петербург: Дмитрий Буланин, 1999.

47 Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 191.

48 Burguera Mónica, Schmidt-Nowara Christopher, Backwardness and its discontents, p. 282.

up modernisation' provided for the defining role of the state as a regulator of economic processes and was mostly associated with autocratic or dictatorial forms of government. In the popular 'patriotic' discourse in Russia, its 'age-old backwardness' should be considered a 'myth that needs to be refuted'⁴⁹.

The idea of backwardness is also actualised in Spanish historiography. Narratives of national history and culture of early modern times, according to Christopher Schmidt-Nowara and Mónica Burguera, are called 'Black Legend' (the invention of the propagandists of the Dutch Revolution of 1568–1648). It portrayed the Spaniards as 'cruel and intolerant, sadistic murderers of Protestants in Europe and Indians in America'. With the decline of Spanish hegemony, the object of study is no longer the cruelty of the Iberian Peninsula inhabitants but backwardness. And as a consequence, the cliché of backwardness erased from the history of Spain in the 19th–20th centuries such extensive research programmes of European historians as 'the transition from the Old Regime to capitalist bourgeois society, the history of the working classes, the experience of world wars, European processes of political and economic modernisation, issues related to empire, decolonisation, and postcolonialism'⁵⁰.

It was the pessimistic atmosphere of F. Franco's regime that created modern Spanish history, written in the 1960–1970s, according to which 'the crisis of the 20th century was considered the result of a series of failures

49 *Каменский А.* К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 187–189.

50 *Burguera Mónica, Schmidt-Nowara Christopher,* Backwardness and its discontents, p. 279.

and collapses: the collapse of the industrial revolution, collapse of the bourgeois revolution, weakness of Spanish liberalism, lack of political mobilisation.’ The unrestrained dynamics of the class struggle in the context of economic, political, and social backwardness inevitably led to ‘*the fratricidal war of the second half of the 1930s and to the emergence of the fascist regime which carried out cultural and political repressions*’. The authors call for a review of such unproductive intellectual dichotomies as ‘backwardness’ and ‘modernity’⁵¹.

In the 1990s, under the influence of anti-colonial criticism, the ‘backwardness’ concept which was used in Western discourse on Eastern and Southern Europe, entered a phase of reinterpretation, resemanticisation, i.e. change of meanings. Backwardness first begins to be perceived in the framework of multiculturalism which meant not weakness, secondariness, inferiority but rather otherness, identity, self-sufficiency. Later, the very idea of historical progress became questionable. Researchers have argued that the accelerated development of Western Europe is not the norm but an exception that needs to be explained. At the same time, the economic progress of Eastern Europe, according to M. Todorova, should be perceived not as backwardness but on the contrary – as the norm⁵².

A. Kamensky also believes that the idea of ‘normality’/‘backwardness’ is fully correlated with the idea of multiculturalism because it is not about backwardness

51 Ibid, p. 280.

52 Todorova M. *Imagining the Balkans*. N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005, p. 146; Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 191.

but about the difference of Russia, the countries of Eastern Europe. According to the author's logic, multiculturalism, which emphasises the multivariance of history, is a direct sign of the crisis of Eurocentrism: *'The second track of 'normalisation' of Russian history is presented mainly by Western historians. The main ideas related to it are that the very concept of norm is vague, that the orientation to Western Europe as a norm is unproductive and scientifically unfounded, not least because 'West' or 'Europe' are intellectual constructs rather than historical reality. It is clear that such a view is associated with the general departure of modern historical science from Eurocentrism and the assertion of the idea of historical development multivariance. The main conclusion that is drawn is that Russia was not 'abnormal', but, according to the rules of a multicultural approach, it was different*⁵³.

One cannot disagree with A. Kamensky's opinion that new empirical studies of foreign and Russian historians create a more voluminous, complex, multidimensional image of the past than that which existed in the historiography of previous centuries. Therefore, the interpretation of this new image of history requires *'more subtle tools which are neither reduced to the "backwardness" concept nor to the concept of "other" one. It is not a matter of rejecting these concepts but of supplementing them with new, clarifying definitions and filling them with new meaning*⁵⁴.

Thus, the resemanticisation of the 'backwardness' concept opens new perspectives and instrumentalistic possibilities for the modern historian. In the framework

53 Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 194.

54 Там же. С. 202.

of multiculturalism, backwardness is perceived as otherness and allows the rejection of the idea of progress. Interpretation of backwardness from the perspective of multivariance in history destroys the authority of the Western model of development as a historical norm and model. All this allows us to fit the idea of backwardness into the set of tools of the new global history. In the practices of modern historiography, the reinterpretation of the 'backwardness' concept indicates the state of the Eurocentrism crisis.

Given the situation with the 'backwardness' construct, of some interest is the position of Spanish historians Jorge Luengo and Pol Dalmau. In the essay *Writing Spanish History in the Global Age: Connections and Entanglements in the 19th Century*, they construct their model of Spain of the last century not from a traditional, nation-centric perspective but from the point of view of global history – the methodology of connections and entanglements⁵⁵.

The 'Spanish 19th century' is identified by two major themes (liberalism, empire) that have influenced world history. It is noteworthy that the history of Spain was viewed through the 'backwardness paradigm' which, the authors note, began to be challenged in the last two decades, although the focus remained on the nation state. However, the history of Spain can be re-read in the light of the 'entanglements' and 'connections' approaches. Liberalism and empire – the key ideas of the Spanish 19th century – have 'hybrid origins, including the European, Atlantic, and global dimensions'. By the way, the authors

55 Luengo Jorge, Dalmau Pol. *Writing Spanish history in the global age: connections and entanglements in the nineteenth century*, *Journal of Global History* (2018) 13, p. 425–445.

attribute the Spanish Empire to the so-called ‘peripheral’ empires⁵⁶. This typological series also includes the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires of the 19th century.

The basic postulate of researchers is that ‘the Spanish Empire of the 19th century is the space of global interaction.’ As an argument, they refer to the words of Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister (1898), who foresaw the future of the world, ‘Living nations will gradually invade the territory of the dying one, and the seeds and causes of conflict between civilised nations will appear rather quickly’⁵⁷. It is from the dichotomy of ‘dying’/‘living’ peoples, that they traditionally explained the history of the Spanish Empire in the 19th century.

At the same time, J. Luengo and P. Dalmau state, if Spain is portrayed as ‘petrified’, then the French and British empires were dynamic and experiencing an era of expansion. If the decline of the Spanish Empire is due to two factors – ‘a painful combination of political despotism and religious fanaticism’, then Great Britain and the United States embodied the ‘virtues of Protestant European nations’, such as democratic institutions, freedom of religion, policy of non-interference⁵⁸.

The article writers manifest their position as global historians, proposing to abandon the colonial approach (Prescott’s paradigm⁵⁹) and look at the past of Spain in the 19th century from the standpoint of the methodology of interactions and relationships: ‘*First, it should be noted that the loss of territorial possessions in the 1820s and 1898*

56 Ibid, p. 428.

57 Ibid, p. 434–435.

58 Ibid, p. 435.

59 See: Ibid, p. 435.

*did not put an end to the Spanish presence outside Spain, but rather changed its character and shape. For example, [...] migration, trade, and the exchange of ideas between the former metropolis and new Latin American republics remained stable for a century. Thus, the new formula which strengthened “cultural and linguistic ties across the Atlantic” meant a “new empire” on the basis of which Spain was considered a colonial power in the 20th century*⁶⁰.

It is obvious that researchers use the tools of ‘histoire croisée’ or ‘entangled’ history when talking about such connections and interactions as migration, trade, and exchange of ideas. This opens new horizons of the global-historical approach, proves its heuristic potential which can be useful in interpreting the history of other regions, countries, and peoples.

J. Luengo and P. Dalmau also analyse specific forms and mechanisms of global connections, such as migration and population mobility: *‘The global nature of Spain in the 19th century can also be considered through human mobility. Many slaves, slave traders, political refugees, and migrants have crossed borders and continents over the centuries. Spain is particularly relevant to the issue of slavery from a global perspective due to the fact that it was the last European country to abolish slavery: in 1873, in Puerto Rico and in 1886, in Cuba’*. In general, the century before last was characterised, according to the article writers, by ‘global mobility’ in the form of such different patterns of migration, as movement of population of the Caribbean, Peru, North Africa, Algeria⁶¹.

60 Ibid, p. 436.

61 Ibid, p. 440.

Thus, Spanish researchers suggest global history as an alternative approach to national history: *‘Contrary to the general tendency to view Spain as a disintegrating state, we have briefly shown through various themes and plots how deeply the country has been involved in a wide range of global relations’*. The researchers conclude that when one writes modern Spanish history, they *‘should take into account the globe, not just the Iberian Peninsula’*. They build Spain’s entry into global history on the basis of a methodology of connections and entanglements: *‘We believe that tracking connections and entanglements will show the extent to which Spain has served as a zone of contact between Europe, America, Africa, and Asia’*. At the same time, the authors oppose the dominance of the nation state and support the polyphony of national history⁶².

In Russian ground, the idea of backwardness is perceived not only as a basic concept of the history of Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries but has political implications. This idea was borrowed by Russian Slavophiles from European romantics and was interpreted as a *‘special way’*. Backwardness as a *‘special way’* – this thesis is present both in Russian historiography and in the mass political discourse of the last two centuries. Later, it was transformed into the concept of Eurasianism and now appears as an idea of Russia as a special civilisation which gives grounds for modern Russian politicians and publicists to manipulate the *‘concept of “civilisation” to justify Russia’s identity and unacceptability of Western democracy for it’*⁶³.

62 Ibid, p. 444–445.

63 Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 194.

The problem of backwardness as a special way of Russia is the subject of discussion in modern Russian and Western literature. Thus, the Russian researcher L. Milov argued that the long existence of serfdom and autocracy in Russia is due to special climatic conditions⁶⁴. Some Western authors, such as A. Stanziani, perceive such phenomena as the labour of serfs, the lack of freedom of millions of Russians 'as a cultural identity inherent in them by default'⁶⁵.

While discussing the book by Swiss historian F. Schenk,⁶⁶ one talked about two approaches to the history of the Russian Empire in the 19th century. The first, from the point of view of the 'backwardness' paradigm or 'catching up modernisation', involved comparing the socio-economic and political development of Russia with the ideal type of the 'West' and a positive assessment of the modernisation process. The second approach to Russian history of the 19th century proceeded from alternative ways of its development and recognised the modern era ambivalence. In the end, it all came down to recognising two different models of modernisation, and Russia's belonging to Europe was denied: *'The author insisted that it is a question of modernisation, but its other model; therefore, it should not be compared with modernisation in the European countries'*⁶⁷.

64 Милов Л. В. Великорусский пахарь и особенности российского исторического процесса. Москва: РОССПЭН, 1998. 573 с. Див. также: Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 194.

65 Див.: Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 197.

66 Шенк Ф. Поезд в современность: Мобильность и социальное пространство в России в век железных дорог. Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2016.

67 Див.: Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 195.

As a result, F. Schenk proposes to consider ‘the history of transport and technical development of the Russian Empire in the 19th century’ not in the ‘backwardness’ paradigm but from the perspective of its socio-political and cultural transformation as a result of the emergence of transport on a steam engine. In other words, F. Schenk’s focus is not backwardness and ‘insufficiency of Russian history’ but those ‘ambivalent social and cultural development trends that got impetus from the construction and use of railways in the Russian Empire’⁶⁸.

In general, A. Kamensky considers the use of the ‘backwardness’ construct an intellectual trap implying that some researchers talk about the similarity of Russian and European histories, while others on the contrary – about Russia’s special path. The author sees a way out of this situation in updating the methodological tools of modern historical studies by giving the used concepts a new meaning and significance.

A. Kamensky himself is convinced of the Europeanness of Russia which made two historic (civilisational) choices in favour of Europe in the 10th and 18th centuries. In the 10th century, Russia converted to Christianity in ‘*its Orthodox version*’ and ‘*the fact that it was a choice in favour of Judeo-Christian civilisation, and therefore, in favour of Europe, remains in the background*’. At the turn of the 17th–18th centuries, Russia made a second conscious choice in favour of Europe, embarking on a path of borrowing socio-political and cultural institutions and achievements of European civilisation, such as science, education,

68 Шенк Ф. Поезд в современность... С. 488–490; Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 196.

art, theatre, literature, music, architecture, lifestyle, gastronomy, clothing, noble titles, awards, public press, collecting, charity, banks, principles of capital turnover, practices of leisure and interpersonal communication, cartography, ideas about society, the state, education, etc. *'Each of these institutions had its own history, not necessarily originated in Europe, was characteristic only of it, but together, in combination with each other, they formed what is commonly called European civilisation'*.

Russia borrowed all those achievements in original modifications from different parts of Europe – Holland, Sweden, England, France, Germany, Italy. The result of that complex and nonlinear process of cultural reception, according to A. Kamensky, was Russian public opinion which creatively rethought the ideas of the French Enlightenment of the 18th century, German romantics of the 19th century, various conservative, liberal, socialist trends of philosophical and social thought, and 'consequently, great Russian culture of the 19th–20th centuries, and the 18th century were conditioned and possibly determined by the choice of the 10th century?'⁶⁹.

In our opinion, the 'backwardness' concept in the new global history acquires new meanings and accumulates useful heuristic potential. As we can see, it (in the Russian format, it's 'normalisation', 'normativeness', the 'norm') quite naturally fits into the frame of anti-colonial criticism, in particular the epistemological framework of multiculturalism, as well as the concept of 'plurality of modernities'. This means that any originality, identity (backwardness), exclusivity in the

69 Каменский А. К проблеме «вековой русской отсталости». С. 199.

history of any country, state, people is perceived as a variant of development, a case of difference, a historical norm/normality. It is quite appropriate to use the old/new term 'backwardness' in rethinking the Ukrainian history of the 19th century.

Of course, the general crisis of Eurocentrism has an impact on the current state of domestic historiography. The metanarrative and multiple local narratives were Ukrainian-centric in nature. Traditionally, they were constructed using such structural units of studies as the 'state', 'nation', and 'territory'. The manifestation of the crisis of Eurocentrism in the post-Soviet intellectual space is associated with the formation of neo-colonial thinking as a result of the totalitarian regime collapse and the Soviet-style Marxism crisis.

Today, when free intellectuals distance themselves from the absolutisation of the norms and rules of European historical writing and recognise alternative types of historiography, many Ukrainian historians focus exclusively on European canons, standards of thought. Thus, the colonial style is manifested in ignoring their own historiographical traditions, borrowing ready-made ideas and forms of historiography, in particular the national-state scheme. By analogy with Soviet historiographical practices, it's mandatory to use quotations from Western authors and references to opinions and works that have long been considered obsolete. At the same time, there is neglect of Ukrainian historiographical traditions, names, ideas that were not understood or rejected by contemporaries.

It is a well-known fact that at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, access to European science, spiritual and

cultural values opened up great opportunities for domestic historians. Educational programmes, business trips, internships at the best universities, scientific communications contributed to the revival of the ethos of Ukrainian historical science. The borrowing of ideas, forms, and norms of European writing created the illusion of renewal of science and modernisation of scientific thinking. The dream of Europeanness, the desire to follow the patterns of European history and the canons of writing blocked the search for authenticity, uniqueness, originality of their own history.

However, it is no secret that Europeans are interested not so much in similarity as in the exclusivity of other histories and historiographies. This means new experiences, exchange of ideas, technologies, cultural values.

Neocolonial thinking as a manifestation of the crisis of Eurocentrism is due to a number of reasons. First, there is the decline of basic research in the post-Soviet countries and, in particular, in Ukraine. After all, it is known that basic science is the prerogative of developed countries, with their great financial opportunities, an extensive university system, and a powerful human capital. Secondly, there is a dependence on Western science and frustration. Abandonment of achievements of the recent past, such as the same Soviet scientific heritage. The fact is that the legacy of the Soviet era historical science was the development of such reflective disciplines as historiography and source studies. The paradox is that under the rule of monoideology, the energy of Soviet intellectuals was aimed at honing methodological tools, studies and improvement of methods, techniques, and procedures for analysing sources and literature.

The only way out of the situation with neo-colonial thinking is to create one's own intellectual product that meets the requirements of the time, using at that the language of international science. The basis for this may be the features of their own history which were previously perceived as drawbacks, but now – as the advantages.

In the historiography of the 19th century, it was popular to divide peoples into 'historical'/'non-historical', 'complete'/'incomplete'. As is well known, Ukrainians were also considered 'non-historical'. The division of nations into 'historical'/'non-historical' was theoretically considered by Hegel and 'acquired independent significance in the legal and administrative practice of the Habsburg Empire'. During the revolution of 1848, the term 'non-historical peoples' appeared in the journalistic literature and spread in political debates. According to Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, in the Habsburg Empire, the peoples of Austria-Hungary were divided 'into two categories: "national groups with independent national history" and "national groups without independent national history"'. The former included the Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Croats, and Italians, while the latter included the Slovaks, Serbs, Slovenes, Romanians, and Ukrainians (Ruthenians). In contrast to the 'old established nations of Europe', the Ukrainians were among the 'new nations'⁷⁰.

As we can see, the 'nonhistoricity', 'incompleteness' of the nation was identified with backwardness; these were categories of the same series that degraded the importance of a nation. However, as I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi noted,

70 *Лисяк-Рудницький І.* Зауваги до проблеми «історичних та «неісторичних» націй // Його ж. Історичні есе: У 2 т. Т. 1. Київ: Основи, 1994. С. 32–33.

‘historicity’ *‘has not always been just a boon. In some cases, it burdened the nation with an undesirable legacy’*⁷¹. Conversely, ‘nonhistoricity’ and ‘backwardness’ could give advantages to ‘peoples without history’.

Thus, such features of Ukrainian history as the discreteness of state life, continuity in the history of elites, transparency of cultural borders, polyethnicity, which were traditionally perceived as its flaws, signs of backwardness, ‘incompleteness’, can now turn into advantages. As a ‘young’ nation, the Ukrainian people (by the logic of M. Todorova⁷²) is open to the new, i.e. has a tendency, based on national traditions, using the previous experience of other peoples and countries, to accelerate the pace of its development and bring it to a qualitatively new level. Due to its peculiarities, Ukraine can overcome the path that other countries and peoples have followed for centuries in a historically short period of time (V. Lypynskyi).

The identity of the Ukrainian past ‘means constant confrontation, interaction, and interpenetration of communities and cultures’⁷³. These words of I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, spoken in the early 1980s, sound relevant today in the context of the ideology of the new global history. It is new research practices and ideas that make it possible to perceive the Ukrainian past through the prism of global interaction of territories, ideas, cultures, while emphasising the originality and inclusiveness of Ukrainian history.

71 Там само. С. 35.

72 *Todorova M. Imagining the Balkans. N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997.*

73 *Лисяк-Рудницький І. Зауваги до проблеми «історичних та «неісторичних» націй. С. 37.*

Empirical Turn

Thus, global history as a new historical ideology implies the rejection of universal, world histories written on the basis of general historical laws, the destruction of the cult of nation states, the European model, the crisis of Eurocentrism and at the same time, recognises the multiplicity of histories and diversity of modernities, as well as the view of history as the space of cultural and historical communications. This general picture should be supplemented by another factor of the new historical ideology – the ‘empirical turn’ in history. According to the German researcher Jürgen Osterhammel, it means a departure from historiosophical schemes, supertheories, and historical fantasies⁷⁴.

At the same time, an ‘empirical turn’ in history does not mean abandoning the theory at all. Today, when the historian is offered a choice of multiple, competing approaches and cognitive models, it is important to determine their options and sequence. It is fundamental to combine modern methods, ideas, and concepts provided by modern socio-humanities with local historiographical traditions and approaches. Nowadays, when multiple theories and categories are available in the space of various narrative writing practices, the historian’s task is to compare local, national narratives with the concept of ‘multiplicity of modernities’ and such global challenges of the present era as environmental problems, hunger, human rights (P. O’Brien).

⁷⁴ Osterhammel Jürgen. *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Gottingen, 2001), S. 176–178; *Ионов И. Н. Глобальная история как форма конструирования и репрезентации прошлого*. С. 37.

Given this state of affairs, ‘middle-range theories’ seem relevant to global historians. That concept was proposed by Robert Merton in 1947⁷⁵. The point of this approach is that over-generalisation and despecification are inferior to historical analysis procedures when empirical despecifications are tested in practice⁷⁶.

Currently, the problem of ‘middle-range theories’ is actively discussed in the literature. Thus, Lorina Riepina believes that they ‘have instrumental significance and are based on the complementarity of competing research strategies’⁷⁷. Igor Ionov also speaks about middle-(intermediate-) range theories. On the one hand, the emergence of variants of traditional concepts in the plural (including ‘capitalisms’) was a characteristic feature, on the other – ‘world-system theory’ was recognised as ‘too deterministic, economically centric, utilitarian, materialist, and revisionist’⁷⁸.

In the section Middle-Range Historical Theory I. Ionov identifies areas of global studies in Russia. ‘*School*

75 Чеснокова В. Роберт Мертон: Теория среднего уровня: Референтные группы. Режим доступа: <http://polit.ru/article/2009/01/20/merton/>; Спигель Г. М. К теории среднего плана: историко-писание в веке постмодернизма // Одиссей: Человек в истории. 1995. Москва, 1996. С. 214–219.

76 *Andre Gunder Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley, Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1998, p. 338; Schäfer Wolf, *Reconfiguring Area Studies for the Global Age*. Access mode: <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/reconfiguring-area-studies-for-the-global-age/>

77 Репина Л. П. Может ли история обойтись без теории? // Историки в поисках новых перспектив / Под общ. ред. З. А. Чеканцевой. Москва: Аквилон, 2019. С. 50.

78 Ионов И. Н. Историческая теория среднего уровня // Там же. С. 92, 94. Див. також: Чешков М. А. Глобалистика: предмет, проблемы, перспективы // Общественные науки и современность. 1998. № 2. С. 131.

of Cliodynamics is logical-mathematical modelling of historical processes. The interests of this school are focused on the study of global evolutionary processes in the framework of 'big history' and the world-system approach using synergetic, evolutionary, sociological theories, on the basis of which mathematical models are created. These are models that cover and analyse the objective preconditions of certain historical phenomena, conflicts, options, as well as prospects for world social development'. According to I. Ionov, 'this is the only direction in Russia of truly global studies because it was founded by historians of oriental studies, historians of Africanism, and defines an unprecedentedly wide field of comparisons and verifications of mathematical models'⁷⁹.

It is noteworthy that I. Ionov views particularly global history as the source of the basic concepts of the school of cliometrists. According to him, cliodynamics is constantly 'expanding the range of basic concepts through global history and global network analysis, without losing touch with globalism and the world-system approach'. In short, they define their direction as 'historical globalism', the implementation of the principle of 'global evolutionism'.

That global evolutionism is based on the ideas of synergetics 'which explain the emergence of self-organised systems of various types (natural and social) and the emergence of new structures in them'. It is 'global evolutionism' that serves as the fundamental idea of the scientific picture of the world⁸⁰. At the same time, I.

79 Ионов И. Н. Историческая теория среднего уровня. С. 99–100.

80 Там же. С. 104.

Ionov calls the neglect of the humanitarian component, in particular reflections on the concepts they use, a 'weak spot' of cliodynamics.

The second direction of global history in Russia is a transcultural approach (M. Lipkin, L. Riepina, I. Ionov) which offers another 'set of problems of global history and ways to study them'⁸¹. I. Ionov explains, that in contrast to the school of cliodynamics, this direction pays more attention to the cognitive problems of global history and provides the 'analysis of the development of global history theory as a middle-range historical theory that takes into account both human motives and the interaction of natural and social structures'⁸². Obviously, I. Ionov refers global history itself to the rank of middle-range theories. It is significant that he also qualifies the theory of civilisations as a middle-range historical theory, which was also marked by M. Barg.

I. Ionov sees the embodiment of the ideal of the middle-range historical theory in a combination of generalisation and professional historical analysis. After all, the middle-range theory focuses on new research approaches that are related to a specific historical analysis. The researcher outlines a fairly wide range of approaches and ideas accumulated by a middle-range theory. To such

81 Там же. С. 106–107.

82 *Ионов И. Н.* Историческая глобалистика: предмет и метод // *Общественные науки и современность*. 2001. № 4. С. 123–137; Его же. Основные направления и методология глобальной истории // *Новая и новейшая история*. 2003. № 1. С. 18–29; Его же. Глобальная история и изучение прошлого России // *Общественные науки и современность*. 2014. № 6. С. 125–128; Его же. *Мировая история в глобальном веке: новое историческое сознание*. Москва: Аквилон, 2015; Его же. *Историческая теория среднего уровня // Историки в поисках новых перспектив*. С. 107.

components, he refers the use of experience of all 'turns' of historical knowledge (linguistic, cultural, spatial, etc.), hierarchical (vertical) and horizontal models, as well as taking into account specific historical perspectives (national, religious, political, social) and a reflective approach. Moreover, the middle-range theory prevents the essentialisation of the subject of study, using the category of an 'ideal type'. All this, I. Ionov concludes, reproduces the characteristic features of the middle-range historical theory 'which combines interest in the general with the predominant attention to the special'⁸³.

As we can see, the concept of the 'middle-range theory' is also the subject of discussion. In such a situation, a common point may be to look at it as an ideal type, the content of which varies in different contexts. It should also be agreed that the 'middle-range theory' contains generalisations that can be verified.

Unlike Igor Ionov, who speaks of global history as a middle-range theory, I believe that global history itself uses a whole range of middle-range theories. After all, the methodological basis of global historical studies is the middle-range theories: the world-system analysis (I. Wallerstein, A. Frank), which, by the way, is now criticised for excessive deterministic, economic-centric, reductionist nature⁸⁴; theories of modernisation, which, despite the crisis of Marxism, survived and changed the forms of representation; principles of postcolonial critique (E. Said's orientalism, D. Chakrabarty's multiculturalism / Subaltern Studies, etc.).

83 *Ионов И. Н.* Историческая теория среднего уровня. С. 118–120.

84 Там же. С. 95. Див. також: *Чешков М. А.* Глобалистика: предмет, проблемы, перспективы. С. 131.

Currently, the traditional historiographical vertical models (in time) are supplemented by new models of horizontal (in space) historiography. Thus, the principles of horizontal-integrative methodology in modern historiography are re-actualised by the concept of multiple modernities of S. Eisenstadt. In the new cognitive model of global historical studies, the categories that reflect the logic and progress of history appear in the plural, that is, in the form of modernisations, industrial revolutions, colonialisms, wars, and revolutions.

In global studies, positive experience is felt in the practice of addressing the multiple 'turns' of historical knowledge (linguistic, cultural, methodological, spatial, visual, local, material turn, etc.). The basic principle of global history as a new historical ideology was the principle of intersystem and intrasystem interaction (I. Ionov).

In general, global history as an ideology and a new direction in science in the 21st century, has the Internet revolution as its methodological basis and planetary thinking as the philosophical basis. In practice, global history as an ideology presents such types of new historiography as transnational history, social theology, *histoire croisée* which fit perfectly into the methodological framework of postnonclassical science.

CHAPTER 3.

Transnational History

*'Transnational History' in a Family of Related
Terms*

Term's 'Career'

The Debate about Transnational History

Transnational History's Subject

Transnational History and Methods

Transnational History vs National History

Transnational History and Modernity

‘Transnational History’ in a Family of Related Terms

The term ‘transnational history’ is one of the most controversial concepts in the field of modern global history. Due to the fact that the definition of ‘transnational’ is considered vague and uncertain, it is no coincidence that there is a lot of discussion and controversy around it (K. Patel). However, the common denominator is that the concept of ‘transnational history’ belongs to a large family of related terms.

Pierre-Yves Saunier (2008) talks about the linguistic family of concepts related to ‘transnational history’. He gives a certain thesaurus of terms. For example, Jerry Bentley, Patrick Manning, Chris Bailey, Anthony Hopkins feel comfortable using the concept of ‘world history’. Matthew Connelly and Adam McKeown prefer ‘international history’. The terminology is continued by the concepts of ‘connected histories’ (Sanjay Subrahmanyam), ‘histoire croisée’ (Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann). Some specialists supported Shalini Randeria’s call for an ‘entangled history’. Bruce Mazlish proposed the idea of a ‘new global history’. At the same time P.-Y. Saunier draws attention to the fact that American authors (David Thelen, etc.) popularised the term ‘transnational history’ before it was done in Germany.

As a result, P.-Y. Saunier notes that most historians do not spend their time discussing differences and imposing their opinions on each other because they feel that they are moving in the same direction as all definitions are ‘used almost interchangeably’. However, according to the researcher, this ‘common mental landscape’ does

not exclude different guidelines and aspirations, i.e. the motivation of specialists.

Some wanted to ‘decentralise the nation state as the primary source of historian interest’, which is why American historians rejected the idea of American exceptionalism. Australians Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake followed a similar path in *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective*, seeking to ‘break out of Australia as an isolated historiographical and historical concept’¹.

Postcolonial historians (Prasenjit Duara)² also went beyond national history; for them, the transnational perspective ‘became the key to the beginning of the postnationalist history age’. Many researchers have become ‘transnational’ for various reasons: through the search for the beginnings of a multicultural world or narratives of cooperation and mutual understanding outside the ‘clash of nation states and civilisations’³.

Moreover, the spread and popularity of ‘transnational history’ and its derivatives in the social sciences and humanities, according to P.-Y. Saunier, gives grounds to speak of a ‘transnational family terms’. The researcher notes that many sociologists have seen some social and political benefits of using them.

Though, the paradox here is that, on the one hand, these terms were used to understand ‘globalization from

1 *Curthoys A., Lake M., Connected Worlds. History in Transnational Perspective*, Canberra, 2005.

2 *Duara P., Rescuing. History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago, 1995.

3 *Saunier Pierre-Yves, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*. Access mode: <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00328138>, p. 7.

below', glorifying the potential of diasporas with their transnational identities and communities that opposed the hegemonic logic of capital and nation states. On the other hand, it was about 'globalization from above' when the tone was set by capitalist corporations and elites⁴. The author emphasises that the academic epic of the 'transnational family' (transnationals, transnationality, transnationalism), which began in the 1990s, has reached its peak today which is proved by the attempts to create a new subdiscipline of transnational studies⁵.

J. Bentley also spoke of a whole family of old and new terms in global history (2011). In them, the author saw alternative approaches to world history, such as 'universal', 'comparative', 'global', 'big', 'transnational', 'connected', 'entangled', 'shared' history. Of course, J. Bentley identifies transnational history as one of the alternative approaches to world history. However, he emphasises that all these options are in some way related to each other⁶.

S. Conrad's monograph *What is Global History?* (2016, English edition) also discusses the replenishment of the set of terms of transnational history. He says that since the 1990s, there has been a steady increase in transnational research in many parts of the world, including the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, where permeable and border areas (such as Eastern Europe) are being studied. The author fixes a whole line of terms: 'transnational history', 'transnational

4 Ibid, p. 10–11.

5 Ibid.

6 *Jerry H. Bentley, The Task of World History The Oxford Handbook of World History*. Access mode: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

studies', 'transnational', a 'transnational approach', as well as alternative formulations 'transregional', 'translocal' history, 'cross-border processes'⁷.

At the same time, S. Conrad recognises the difference between the transnational approach and the 'international' one because the latter 'studies only the international relations of any country – for example, its diplomacy or foreign trade'⁸. The researcher also distinguishes between transnational and global approaches, but believes that 'they have a common goal – to overcome the idea of history which consists of separate "containers" and "modules"; both seek to go beyond an "internal" analysis'⁹.

It is clear that the concept of 'transnational history', which emerged in the 1990s, is now gaining weight and a certain status in the family of related terms. Most often, 'transnational' correlates with the concepts of 'international', 'global', 'world' history. However, experts assess differently the relationship between them within the family.

For example, some researchers believe that 'global, world, transnational, and international history have much in common. They are all involved in a project for reconstructing those aspects of the human past that go beyond one nation state, empire, or other politically defined territory'¹⁰. While others emphasise that 'international', 'transnational', 'world', and 'global' history

7 *Конрад С.* Что такое глобальная история? Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2018. С. 67–71.

8 Там же. С. 67.

9 Там же. С. 69.

10 *Beckert Sven et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in: *American Historical Review*, 111 (2006), p. 1445.

have different meanings, but together, they give a new way of understanding the world¹¹.

Thus, C. Bayly practically identifies 'transnational' history with 'international'¹². J. Bentley and P. Manning perceived 'transnational' history as 'global', encompassing large-scale population migration, global trade, the spread of infectious diseases, the transfer of cultures, technologies, ideas, and ideals. P. O'Brien in particular understands 'transnational' history as 'global', the main directions of which he connects with the history of goods, economic activity, social and interethnic relations, politics, wars, science, and so on. From this perspective, 'global' or 'transnational' history extends beyond the nation state and territorial boundaries.

Currently, there is an expansion of the terminological spectrum of 'transnational history' which includes the concepts of 'transnational historical analysis' (W. Kozol), 'transnational revolutions' (C. Bayly), 'transnationalism', 'transnational research', and so on.

It is obvious that there is a rather complex situation evolving around the term 'transnational history': the historians' opinions do not just differ but often contradict each other. After all, in contrast to concepts with a well-established professional genealogy (such as 'world', 'human', 'shared', 'comparative', etc. history), 'transnational' belongs to the relatively 'young' terms, hence many questions. It is noteworthy that today 'transnational history' is considered more methodologically than empirically.

11 *Connelly Matthew et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in: *American Historical Review*, p. 1447.

12 *Bayly Christopher A. et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in: *American Historical Review*, 111 (2006), p. 1442.

Term's 'Career'

Despite the fact that the term 'transnational history' appeared in the linguistic family of global history concepts only in the 1990s, it made a successful 'career' in a short time.

As we know, the term 'transnational' and its derivatives are spread particularly in the field of social sciences and humanities. Pierre-Yves Saunier traced the circumstances of its emergence.

The first mentions belong to the second half of the 19th century. The German linguist Georg Curtius used that term without quotation marks in his first lecture in 1862 at the University of Leipzig, emphasising that national languages were associated with lexical families that spread beyond modern national borders. 'Every language is fundamentally something transnational', Curtius wrote¹³.

During that period, the term 'transnational' was at times used in academia to mean something that crossed national borders. Later, they began to use it systematically.

Thus, in the 1930s and 1940s, it found application in such fields as jurisprudence and economics. According to P.-Y. Saunier, historians are a bit late. It is also known that the American Randolph Bourne used it in 1916¹⁴.

The term 'transnational' was established in American history in the 1990s. Such a 'global vision' emerged in the

13 See: *Saunier Pierre-Yves*, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, p. 9.

14 *Bourne R.*, Trans-National America, Atlantic Monthly 118, July, 1916, 86-97.

United States through ‘black history’ and the struggle for ‘black liberation’; in short, interest in ‘connections and exchanges’ arose long before transnational aspects became popular among professional modern historians¹⁵.

Thus, according to P.-Y. Saunier, the ‘transnational turn’ began in America. The concept of ‘transnational history’, popular overseas, eventually spread in Europe.

Kiran Patel also refers to the prehistory of the term ‘transnational history’. From the beginning, it was widespread in jurisprudence, political science, and anthropology, and each of those disciplines gave it a different meaning. It is noteworthy that the concept has gained popularity outside of academia, particularly in the field of big business. Thus, American corporations used it in their self-description, setting thereby a certain tone, especially after 1945. And only since the 1990s, this term has gained significance in national historiographies and historical subdisciplines¹⁶.

The special literature discusses the social, cultural, and intellectual preconditions for the emergence of the term ‘transnational history’ and the reasons for its conceptualisation. Criticism of American and European imperialism and racism, as well as the problems of gender inequality and heteronormativity, is thought to have had a direct impact. Socio-political factors in the formation of transnational thinking were anti-colonial and nationalist movements, the struggle for civil rights. The emergence of

15 *Saunier Pierre-Yves*, *Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*, p. 1.

16 *Patel Klaus Kiran*, *Transnational History*, in: *European History Online (EGO)*, published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. Access mode: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/patelk-2010-en>

transnational discourse is associated with movements of feminists and LGBT communities.

All those circumstances forced to reconsider the attitude in society and public consciousness to such phenomena as population displacement, education system, and globalization. A 'transnational historical analysis' emerges particularly as a result of the dialogue between activists and scholars and examines social inequality and structures the 'movements, flows, and circulations' that define the characteristics of transnationalism¹⁷.

However, more convincing is the opinion of those researchers who believe that the more probable reason for the emergence and spread of the concept of 'transnational history' is related to the crisis of the nation state as a unit of historical analysis. It is obvious that transnational history, which entered the structures of the historians' consciousness in the 1990s, was due to powerful social shifts and changes in the mental landscape of society in the days of a new wave of globalization at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries.

It is noteworthy that researchers pay attention to the semantic features of the concept of 'transnational history'. Thus, in contrast to global history, the term 'transnational' has a dynamic character, 'creates a sense of movement, interpenetration' for it is associated with the study of social and political diasporas that cross national borders¹⁸.

Some researchers connect the dynamic nature of transnational history with the idea of movement, flows,

17 Kozol Wendy *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1445.

18 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in: *American Historical Review*, 111 (2006), p. 1442.

circulations, and others – with networks, institutions, ideas, the history of migration, social movements, and the history of the modern world as a whole. For example, Isabel Hofmeyr prefers the term ‘transnational’ (rather than ‘global’) history, ‘because it opens up broader analytical possibilities for understanding the complex connections, networks, and actors in the global South’. After all, according to the author, the key point of the transnational approach is the idea of ‘movement, flows, and circulations, not just as a theme or motive but as an analytical set of methods’¹⁹.

Sven Beckert believes that the transnational approach focuses on the diversity of ties that ‘go beyond politically defined territories’. These connections are formed through ‘networks, institutions, ideas, processes’, an important role in the structuring of which belongs to rulers, empires, and states. As noted by S. Beckert, it is significant that the history of interaction between different regions on the basis of networks is more in line with transnational history than global²⁰.

Another feature of transnational history that researchers pay attention to is that it is usually focused on the present. In particular, C. Bayly associates transnational history mostly with the 20th century, i.e. modernity: ‘I believe that the sense of nationality already existed in some parts of the non-Western world, but labelling ‘global history’ as ‘transnational’ one would not be very useful to

19 Hofmeyr Isabel et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1444.

20 Beckert Sven et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1446.

1914²¹. From M. Connelly's point of view, this is why it is necessary to discuss global and transnational histories in order to describe "the history of migrations, empires, social movements, and so on. In other words, the origin of the modern world"²².

It is noteworthy that in the professional environment of historians, the attitude to transnational history was ambiguous. C. Bayly noted that most scholars were sceptical and wary of transnational history, and some perceived it as 'a concern for theory and an exotic style of discourse'²³. Some, states S. Conrad, generally considered it inappropriate to use the term 'transnational history' in relation to 'early epochs before the formation of nation states'²⁴. On the other hand, the wide and intense existence of the term testified to its popularity and attractiveness which led to the blurring and vagueness of its meaning.

Generations of 'transnational historians' have also been mentioned in special literature. Thus, P.-Y. Saunier mentions experts such as Patrick Manning, Jerry Bentley, Christopher Bailey, and Anthony Hopkins, who focused on 'world history' and were concerned with intercultural and global comparisons and connections. While to the younger generation of transnational historians, he refers Kiran Patel and Sebastian Conrad²⁵.

21 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1443.

22 Connelly Matthew *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1447.

23 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1449.

24 Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история? С. 71.

25 Saunier Pierre-Yves, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, p. 2.

At the same time, ‘transnational history’ was considered an important factor not only in research but also in education. After all, according to C. Bayly, students in Britain and the United States are more focused on documentary fetishism than on the contextual knowledge provided by transnational history. Thus, transnational history is a vital way to encourage students to think more broadly and challenge their capabilities. The author believes that writing and teaching transnational history is very difficult, due to the problems of geography and modelling of time’ which are solved rather by national or regional history²⁶.

The paradox of the situation around ‘transnational history’ is that, on the one hand, this dynamic concept and the number of transnational studies are gaining popularity, and on the other – the place of transnational history in the structure of historical disciplines and subdisciplines remains uncertain. Some believe that transnational history is an alternative approach, others call it a method, direction, or a fashion brand. Such uncertainty, the contradiction of the concept of ‘transnational history’ has become a source of ‘global historians’ constant interest in it, the subject of numerous discussions about it.

The Debate about Transnational History

The fact that the intellectual homeland of ‘transnational history’ became the United States generated the first attempts to conceptualise it and the beginning of historiographical discussions in the columns of the

26 Bayly Christopher A. et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1449.

influential American Historical Review (AHR) in 2006. The motivation was the desire to end the researchers' focus on national history. It is noteworthy that a similar justification was inherent in European discussions.

K. Patel states that the direct consequence of that was the spread of transnational history in national historiographies and various academic cultures, although very uneven. In particular, the problems of transnational history were actively discussed in Germany, France, less in Italy, Bulgaria, and other countries²⁷. The debate that began in the United States was perceived differently in the European environment; thus, K. Patel admits that transnational history 'has not become a central arena for a common understanding of European historiography'²⁸.

At the same time, with the increased reflection of European scholars, there have been identified two directions in the study of transnational history. This is the Anglo-Saxon school and the European direction, represented primarily by French and German historians²⁹.

Anglo-Saxon School. Materials from the 2006 discussion on transnational history were published in the American Historical Review. It was attended by a group of invited experts from various historical disciplines, representatives of the Anglo-Saxon intellectual space. Namely –

27 *Patel Klaus Kiran*, Transnational History, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. Access mode: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history>

28 Ibid.

29 *Yun Casalilla Bartolomé*, Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe, in: *Historisk Tidskrift* (Sweden) 127 (2007), p. 675.

Christopher Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, Patricia Seed.

The focus of the discussions were three blocks of problems: 1. The uniqueness of transnational history, the meaning of the concept, the reasons for its emergence. 2. Methods and methodology, the relationship of transnational history with the idea of development, the theory of modernisation. 3. Outlining the main directions of transnational studies. The discussion demonstrated the disagreement of researchers on all identified problems and areas and the lack of a consolidated position on the meaning and significance of transnational history.

It is no coincidence that the journal editor began the discussion with the fact that transnational history was not new and was the latest embodiment of different approaches, such as comparative, international, world, and global history. All those approaches were equal, but they all attempted to move beyond the nation state as a unit of analysis and ethnocentric history which prevailed in the West's history³⁰. Of course, not all participants in the discussion supported that editorial board's opinion, in particular, C. Bayly linked transnational history with the existence of the nation state.

It is significant that the discussants defined in different ways the *essence* of transnational history (such as the movement of goods, technology, interaction of regions on the basis of networks), its *methods* (from traditional historical to theories of development, dependence, and the idea of circulation) as well *areas of transnational studies* (from the history of states, diasporas, global ideas, such

30 AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1441.

as racism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, environmentalism to the history of globalization). It is noteworthy that the participants in the discussion did not refer to the work of European, namely German or French experts on global or transnational history. This fact testifies to the search for one's own way of studying history from a transnational perspective. The fact that the Anglo-Saxon tradition representatives did not always refer to the achievements and experience of their European counterparts in that area was to some extent due to the lack of established links between national historiographies and academic cultures³¹.

There are many approaches to determining the nature of transnational history, but there is no consensus as to whether the transnational history model is limited to certain periods and themes. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon school representatives linked transnational history with large-scale global processes that included local, regional, and national components. Attempts to define transnational history from the perspective of local and regional, national and global were quite common and at the same time, debatable. Thus, C. Bayly considered it necessary to include regional, national, and local in historical writing to prevent fragmentation and fractionalism that researchers fell into so easily³².

Patricia Seed, a participant in the American Historical Review discussion, also noted that transnational history did

31 Yun Casalilla Bartolomé, *Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe*, p. 664.

32 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, p. 1449.

not pose a threat to local and regional studies, traditional for historians, but rather provided opportunities to conceptualise new projects in new terms. It is important that transnational history encourages the modern historian to perceive their topic in a broader context. In other words, local and regional studies can take the structure of the larger world they belong to. The author refers to such large structures the state or commercial centres, while the introduction of the transnational dimension means that we should look for such a large structure³³.

Wendy Kozol linked the concepts of globalization and transnationalisation with the 'binary model' of domination (power) and resistance. She explained that if globalization was seen as a powerful process of oppression of the times of developed capitalism, then transnationalism represented 'cultures of resistance' in response to the globalization challenges. That binary model appeared in the 1990s studios which sought to distinguish between local and global cultures³⁴.

Attempts to consider transnational history as a method of research have been on the pages of the AHR discussion. In particular, Sven Beckert defined the meaning of transnational history as 'a way of seeing, open to different methodological preferences, different topics'. It is based on the relationship between the history of mankind as a whole and recognises the importance of states, empires, as well as 'networks, processes, ideas, institutions that go beyond these politically defined

33 *Seed Patricia et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1464.

34 *Kozol Wendy et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1451.

spaces'. However, we are talking about transnational history purely in theory³⁵.

It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxon school is characterised by a tendency to identify transnational history with either the global (P. O'Brien) or the world (J. Bentley, P. Manning), or with the international (C. Bailey). Proponents of the Anglo-Saxon tradition associated transnational history with large-scale processes, big structural models that contained local, regional, and national components. Their focus was on flows and networks of goods, ideas, and technologies. The line of differences between the representatives of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in the field of transnational history was largely due to their attitude to the problem of the nation state. Some linked transnational history to the period of the nation state formation, while others, on the other hand, believed that transnational studies transcended all national and territorial boundaries.

European Direction. European historians focus not so much on flows and clashes but on the processes of interaction between societies, regions, and groups. Thus, the Spanish historian Bartolomé Yun Casalilla in his exploration *Localism, Global History, and Transnational History: Reflections of the Historian of Early Modern Europe* (2007) formulates an attitude to transnational history from a European perspective. The European school of historians considers the relationship between local and global to be the key to understanding transnational history. Those experts who went beyond European history saw the meaning of global or transnational history in the

35 Beckert Sven et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in *American Historical Review*, p. 1459.

interaction of regions in different cultural contexts. B. Yun Casalilla emphasises that the history of relationships is of great interest and has great potential in studying the local consequences of such contacts, as well as in comparing these different societies, the links between which determined the trajectories of their development.

Thus, the author understands global history as transnational one or *histoire croisée* which studies the relationships between different social groups that are at the centre of imagined communities and conditioned by these communities³⁶. According to him, global history can be seen on an intercontinental scale as a history of interaction between cultures and civilisations. These are migrations, diasporas, or international organisations that are based on the ‘transnational networks’ that influence them³⁷.

Thus, B. Yun-Casalilla, as a specialist in modern history, notes that interest in the ‘new’ history should be based on ‘the inclusion of local to global’ in a more effective way than before³⁸. In general, he believes that world history cannot be discussed without local history³⁹. In fact, Yun-Casalilla identifies transnational history with ‘entangled history’ as a result of the relationship between local and global⁴⁰.

Thus, key categories in the arsenal of European researchers of transnational or global history are a ‘cultural transfer’, ‘borrowing’, ‘adaptation’, ‘reflectivity’ which serve

36 *Yun Casalilla Bartolomé*, *Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe*, in: *Historisk Tidskrift* (Sweden) 127 (2007), p. 664.

37 *Ibid*, p. 663.

38 *Ibid*, p. 662.

39 *Ibid*, p. 664.

40 *Ibid*, p. 667.

as innovative tools for transnational studies. The fact that these terms are rare in most works of the Anglo-Saxon tradition representatives, the author explains not so much by 'lack of similarity and analytical complementarity, which are directly involved in the transnational perspective' as the lack of links between different historiographies⁴¹.

Moreover, the researcher believes that global and transnational history need linguistic communication which is also becoming global. Its market is gradually becoming more global, the audience of global and transnational history is expanding. However, the scientific communities that create this product are scattered around the world, so a convenient means of modern communication is English⁴².

Given these circumstances, Yun Casalilla sees the danger in a situation in which the 'Anglocentric vision of history' is presented as 'global history'. In this way, the author actualises the problem of the local language, based on the fact that good global history is based on deep knowledge of the local material and language. How will future historians – both global and transnational – cope with the diversity of languages? *'This situation is twice as problematic if we support the idea that good global history is based on deep knowledge of the local, and if we believe that, whether we like it or not, the historiographical production that has developed in recent years and is based on original local languages often proved to be indispensable'*⁴³.

Thus, while 'globalizing' history, the historian must not forget about the linguistic dimension. It is noteworthy

41 Ibid, p. 664.

42 Ibid, p. 675.

43 Ibid.

that Yun Casalilla draws attention to the differences in the field of transnational history between the Anglo-Saxon school representatives, in particular, the participants in the discussion on the pages of the *American Historical Review*, and French and German historians: the former do not refer to the latter⁴⁴.

Transnational history has been the subject of analysis by the French specialist Pierre-Yves Saunier. In his notes on the publication of a dictionary of transnational history Palgrave (2008), the historian speaks of his feelings, similar to those of a famous literary character Monsieur Jourdan, who was very surprised to learn that he spoke prose; likewise Saunier was professionally studying transnational history and did not know about it. P.-Y. Saunier recalls that he experienced a real 'subdisciplinary shock'.

P.-Y. Saunier is convinced that it was researchers of American history who proclaimed a 'transnational turn'⁴⁵. At the same time, he identifies two areas of transnational history formation: the first is related to the study of migration history; the second, epistemological, focuses on the study of cultural transfers, in particular between France and Germany, because neither social nor national history could explain their cultural identities which were formed under the influence of each other. P.-Y. Saunier draws attention to the fact that back in 1995, Michael Geyer and Charles Bright identified the perspectives of transnational history: the task of historians was to tell about the global

44 Ibid.

45 Saunier Pierre-Yves, *Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*. Access mode: <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00328138> Submitted on 9 Oct 2008, p. 2.

past of the world and not to perceive globalization as a recent phenomenon⁴⁶.

Kiran Patel begins his 2010 article with a critical observation of the ‘transnational history’ debate in the United States. The intensive debate, the researcher states, was aimed at ending ‘the pervasive obsession of historiography with national history – be it the United States, China, or other parts of the world.’ The same motivation was inherent in European discussions, the direct consequence of which was the spread of transnational history in national historiographies and different academic cultures, although very uneven⁴⁷. It is obvious that the problems of transnational history were actively discussed in Germany and France.

Naturally, European historians have limited the approach to transnational history to European history. Thus, K. Patel considers transnational history in the context of European history in three directions: enlightenment; industrialisation; creation of a general welfare state. These are phenomena that, according to him, were transnational, *‘with a strong European accent, and therefore, cannot be fully appreciated and understood from a purely local or national point of view’*. These phenomena have been studied transnationally, in particular as an intercultural transfer⁴⁸.

46 Geyer M., Bright C., World History in a Global Age, in: American Historical Review 100, 4 (1995), 1034–1060; Saunier Pierre-Yves, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, p. 8.

47 Patel Klaus Kiran. Transnational History, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. Access mode: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history>

48 Ibid.

At the same time, European history reminds us that it cannot be limited to connections and flows. It is also characterised by the fall, destruction, oblivion, and disappearance of transnational relations: *'Internationalism before the First World War was a good example of how previously established ties were severed during the world wars'*. Therefore, the researcher believes, it is impossible to create a monoline history of the transnational because the processes of nationalisation and transnationalisation or globalization occur in parallel and have a certain dialectical potential. As we can see, European researchers of transnational history not only identify the global and the transnational but also recognise the role of the national factor.

Therefore, taking into account these factors, they perceive the concepts of 'Europe' and 'Europeanisation'. Over the past 250 years, the concept of 'Europe' has changed more than once: it began to take shape in the early modern period, strengthened in the 18th century and especially in the 20th century thanks to numerous transnational processes: before that, 'Europe' barely existed in that sense. Only in that way did 'Europe' kept becoming a self-reinforcing subject⁴⁹.

According to the researcher, the time from the second half of the 20th century played a crucial role in the process of integration of Europe as a whole, because *'without the process of economic and political integration that began in the second half of the 20th century, it was doomed to peripheral existence. Roger Chartier once wrote hyperbolically that only the French Revolution created the Enlightenment. Similarly, it can be argued that only European unification*

49 Ibid.

created Europe’. These are integration processes under the auspices of the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and similar policy projects that present transnational interactions in and around Europe⁵⁰.

K. Patel emphasises that in Europe, transnational ties were especially strong, so thanks to them, transnational history gives an idea of what Europe is. It is through a transnational approach that Europe’s place in the world can be determined⁵¹.

The definition of ‘Europeanisation’ aims to include all those political, social, economic, and cultural processes that ‘changed or contributed to the strengthening of intra-European ties and similarities, either in the form of assimilation, exchange, or networking’. K. Patel notes that at the same time, connections and similarities always coexist with such forms as exclusivity or ‘other’, as well as fragmentation and conflict⁵².

It is obvious that European historians are characterised by the identification of concepts of global and transnational history. At the same time, they interpret the latter either in European context as intercultural history or a ‘cultural transfer’, or interactions and relationships between societies, cultures, groups, or, more broadly, as processes of interaction between regions, cultures, and civilisations.

The idea of interaction, connections, and interactions is key for European historians focused on the transnational

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

perspective. Because of this, the tone in the study of transnational history in European context is set mostly by French and German experts. Various centres of global, universal, transnational history have been established in German universities (Mainz, Leipzig, Bielefeld, Constance, Munich etc.). An important platform for discussing the problems of transnational and global history was the electronic English-language German resource – European History Online (EGO). As we know, representatives of the transnational tradition in French historiography were Marc Bloch, the founder of comparative history, Fernand Braudel, as well as the researcher of early modern history, Pierre Chaunu, and others. The debate over transnational history proves that there is still no consensus on its definition.

Most historians tend to see transnational history as an alternative to the national history hegemony. The question immediately arises as to how ‘transnational history’ is linked to related concepts, such as ‘global’, ‘world’, ‘histoire croisée’, ‘entangled’, ‘international’ history, and ‘postcolonial studies’. After all, the situation is complicated by the fact that different concepts and theories do not coincide in different languages. K. Patel states: *‘Even after 15–20 years of debate, historians still disagree on the exact concept of transnational history, except the definition according to which, it is an alternative to the still dominant concentration on national history. The relationship of transnational history with closely related approaches, such as global history and postcolonial studies, world history and histoire croisée, as well as entangled history and international history – remains controversial’*⁵³.

53 Ibid.

It is clear that to this day, transnational history remains the subject of debate between the Anglo-Saxon school and the proponents of the European transnational perspective. While the former focuses on defining transnational history in terms of large structural models, flows, and networks of ideas, goods, and technologies, European researchers focus on intercultural connections and processes of interaction between regions, cultures, and civilisations, mostly on European history resources.

Transnational History's Subject

As we see, the subject of transnational history is an open question for many researchers. This fact indicates not only the complexity of the issue itself, which is in a hot phase, but also the difficult ways of its reception in the professional historical consciousness. The debates in the *American Historical Review* and current literature provide an opportunity to trace how historians' understanding of the subject field of transnational research is gradually expanding.

Thus, Christopher Bayly considers the transnational history's subject to be the history of diasporas (workers, soldiers, intellectuals, engineers), as well as the history of ideas characteristic of early modern and modern times, such as liberalism, Marxism, and other systems of ideas that 'transformed and often deepened or were generalised in non-European and non-American conditions'⁵⁴. Matthew Connolly also talks about the history of typical global ideas, such as human rights, racism, anti-Semitism and

54 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, p. 1461.

pan-movements – feminism, pacifism, environmentalism, etc.⁵⁵

The discussionist Wendy Kozol further expands the scope of transnational studies to include new communication technologies, the role of the Internet ‘in changing local political structures or shaping social identities’. In addition, ‘transnational perspectives’ produce a new perspective on such global events and processes as migration and neocolonialism⁵⁶. According to Isabel Hofmeyr, the study of transnational history opens up ‘a productive set of topics around those institutions and media through which ideas are disseminated transnationally’. The transnational history’ subject includes the history of reading and writing: ‘*Transnationalism hence opens up the possibility of producing new histories of reading and writing*⁵⁷. Patricia Seed understands the transnational history’s subject as ‘the modern movement of groups, goods, technologies, or people across national borders’, and considers such ‘transit of similar or related objects and people in earlier times’ quite possible⁵⁸.

J. Bentley examines transnational history from the perspective of a global turn, which actualises alternative approaches to history, invites researchers to go beyond the problems of professional historical science from the mid-19th century, such as cultural differences, unique

55 Connelly Matthew *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1461.

56 Kozol Wendy *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1462.

57 Hofmeyr Isabel *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1462.

58 Seed Patricia *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1443.

identities, local knowledge, and experience of national communities. Instead, the 'global turn' puts on the agenda a number of large-scale processes, including 'mass migration, imperial expansion campaigns, *histoire croisée* trade, environmental change, biological exchanges, technology transfer, cultural exchanges, including the dissemination of ideas, ideologies, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions'⁵⁹. These processes ignore 'national, even geographical, linguistic, and cultural borders', they have a more transregional, transcultural, global scale, and affect the experience of both 'individual societies and the development of the world as a whole'. *'If one of the goals of professional historical science is to understand the world and its development over time, then,'* J. Bentley emphasises, *'these processes require the attention of historians along with the experience of national communities and nation states'*⁶⁰.

Analysing such debatable views and approaches of historians, it should be noted that the most successful and convincing definition of the transnational history's subject is found in Patrick O'Brien, a representative of the British school of global historians. In his opinion, the subject of global historical studies is: 1. Global history of goods (sugar, tea, coffee, silver, opium, cotton, silk, etc.). 2. Economic activity (banking, trade, industry, transport). 3. Social and interpersonal relations. 4. General topics, such as politics, military affairs, and science. 5. A global biography that contains a study of human life worlds (for

59 Bentley Jerry H., *The Task of World History* *The Oxford Handbook of World History*. Access mode: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

60 Ibid.

example, the biographies of a Roman slave and a Chinese concubine complement the global history of slavery and sexual exploitation)⁶¹. I believe that the concept of ‘global biography’ deserves special attention since it has a powerful heuristic potential, through which you can overcome geographical and national borders, as is often the case in the life of a prominent person or an ordinary person in times of change, social catastrophe, revolution.

What P. O’Brien means by ‘global history’ is a transnational history that goes beyond certain national state and territorial frameworks. Such history, the author emphasises, has its own structure (geographies, chronologies, theoretical basis), i.e. contains *‘confirmation of knowledge about the past by relevant geographies, numerous chronologies, and the development of a theoretical basis with the borrowing of methods of natural and social sciences’*⁶².

Unlike the Anglo-Saxon school, which focused on the flow of goods, capital, large structural models, European experts in determining the transnational history’s subject preferred cultural ties and migration. Thus, Bartolomé Yun Casalilla connects the transnational history’s subject both with the study of traditional connections between regions, continents, civilisations, a cultural transfer, and with new topics, such as environmental history, the history of plants, of microorganisms. According to the historian, global history, which deals with connections between regions on different continents, is not new or an alternative to long-established prospects. The history of empires, commercial

61 O’Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 36–38.

62 Ibid, p. 36–37.

ties at the global level, technological and cultural transfers between civilisations is part of the ancient and productive tradition of historians. This tradition is supported by new perspectives – such as ‘environmental history, history of plants, animals, and microorganisms, etc.’⁶³.

Pierre-Yves Saunier defines the transnational history’s subject from the point of view of ‘transnational turns’. In his opinion, there have actually been three of them in the last fifty years. The first one (in late 1950s), in the field of law, was related to the concepts of ‘transnational law’ (which includes all laws that regulate all acts and events and go beyond national borders) and ‘transnational justice’. The second one, which took place in the field of political science in the 1960s, was introduced by the concept of ‘transnational relations’ (rather than ‘international relations’) and focused on contacts, coalitions, relations outside borders, such as the ‘movement of money, people, objects, and ideas’. The third transnational turn took place on a wave of fascination with the ‘global’ and was based on the ‘three whales’: the social sciences, migration research, and world politics.

P.-Y. Saunier says that conceptualisation of ‘transnational’ took place between ‘multicultural’ and ‘postnational’. Thus, in the social sciences, the term ‘transnational’ was used as ‘a means of defining, observing, evaluating, and predicting the new multipolar and multicultural world created in the 1990s’.

Another field of use of the term ‘transnational’ is the study of migration. Anthropologists and sociologists

63 Yun Casalilla Bartolomé, *Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe*, p. 662.

sporadically studied the migration history in the 1970s and 1980s. Eventually, their work turned into a real intellectual movement to study 'new migrating populations' with their many identities that did not fit into the traditional territorial framework.

P.-Y. Saunier traces the path from the episodic use of the terms 'transnational', 'transnationalism', 'transmigrants' in the 1970s and 1980s to their understanding as a whole in the 1990s, when researchers talked about the need to remodel (rethink) migration from positions of the global capitalist system. In short, the third direction (core) of 'transnational revival' provided for a revision of such concepts as the 'race', 'class', 'ethnicity', and 'nationalism' in the context of the transnational perspective of migration. The goal is to cover the 'internal, mostly economic soul of globalisation'⁶⁴. At the same time, the current globalisation of capital, people, and images, according to the researcher, emphasised the irrelevance of nation states, and the social sciences were to explain those major changes in world history.

As we can see, the transnational history's subject is in the 'hot phase' of comprehension, discussion, and clarification. There is much in common between the Anglo-Saxon school and the European researchers of the transnational perspective in approaches and characteristics, but there are also serious differences. Representatives of the Anglo-Saxon area associate the transnational history's subject with flows, networks, large-scale processes, while European scholars in determining

64 Saunier Pierre-Yves, *Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*, p. 10–11.

the transnational studies' subject prefer connections, processes of interaction, exchange.

Historians define the chronological outline of transnational research in different ways. Some associate transnational history with the present or the recent past, the 19th and 20th centuries. Others extend its chronological boundaries to the late Middle Ages and early modern period. Thus, Bartolomé Yun Casalilla speaks of the possibility of using transnational history as an analytical approach to study the historical period that preceded the industrial revolution⁶⁵. He considers it appropriate to use the term 'transnational' for early modern times, despite its narrow interpretation for the 19th and 20th centuries, in the presence of such a marker as the nation state.

A stumbling block for many researchers, who belong to different traditions of studying transnational history, is to determine the place and role of the nation state in the transnational research. Some see nation states as a unit of transnational analysis, while others emphasise that transnational history transcends national, political, and territorial boundaries.

Transnational History and Methods

Opinions of historians differ significantly on the methods and methodology of transnational history. There is no single view on this issue. Controversial ideas in this regard were expressed by participants in the above-mentioned discussion which took place in the columns

65 Yun Casalilla Bartolomé, *Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe*, p. 672.

of the American Historical Review. Some authors have believed that transnational history is based on the methods of culturology, anthropology, and Subaltern Studies.

Thus, C. Bayly stated that the idea of circulation, popular in cultural studies, will prevent the possibility of transnational history to fall into the trap of binary (domination/resistance, metropolis/colony) or the history of the nation. In his opinion, 'a complete transnational history of these ideas, based on living experience that goes beyond the elite-subaltern divide, is extremely necessary'⁶⁶. In addition, he thinks there are traditional approaches to transnational history that are relevant to national histories (economy, state, ideology).

Most 'transnational historians' prefer a certain 'fundamental approach' to explain historical change – economics (agrarian and industrial revolutions, industrialism), the state (statehood, ethnographic state, etc.), or ideology (the Machiavellian moment, the crisis of liberalism)⁶⁷. However, the use of fundamental approaches to different periods in different parts of the world leads to chaotic changes, such as 'transnational revolutions' which cannot be attributed to any of these 'drivers' or domains⁶⁸.

Other participants in the AHR discussion linked transnational history with cultural studies and Subaltern

66 За словами К. Бейлі, «я згоден із тим, що ідея циркуляції, як вона була розвинена в літературі з культурології, дає можливість займатися транснаціональною історією, не потрапляючи знову в пастку бінарності панування й опору або історії нації. Зокрема це допомагає розбити бінарний файл метрополії – колонії або принаймні зробити його набагато більш складнішим». Bayly Christopher A. et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1451–1452.

67 Ibid, p. 1449.

68 Ibid, p. 1450.

Studies. Thus, I. Hofmeyr notes that transnational history is difficult to imagine without culturological research. She considers the principle of circulation of people, ideas and texts to be one of the key problems of transnational history⁶⁹.

M. Connelly also talks about the achievements of cultural anthropology and Subaltern Studies in the field of global history⁷⁰. At the same time, P. Seed emphasised that Subaltern Studies appeared in the early 1990s as ‘a literary movement that caused a great deal of research and intellectual uplift’⁷¹. Culturology and Subaltern Studies have lost their intellectual leadership and given way to technology giants – cyberinfrastructure, communications, transport. Cyberinfrastructure has changed the transnational scale of the historical discipline and the communicative space of the historical discipline itself, which has led to ‘changes in the transnational disciplinary networks of historians’⁷².

The position of S. Beckert, another participant in the discussion initiated by the *American Historical Review*, is unusual. He does not speak of the methods or methodology of transnational history, but perceives transnational history itself as a method. In fact, the researcher does not deny the role of the history of culture and ideas in the framework of transnational history because we live in

69 *Hofmeyr Isabel et al.*, *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, p. 1450.

70 *Connelly Matthew et al.*, *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, p. 1452.

71 *Seed Patricia et al.*, *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, p. 1454.

72 *Ibid*, p. 1455.

an era of rapid economic change, acute social inequality, and the distribution of political power between states and within them⁷³.

However, S. Beckert does not connect transnational history with a certain direction or approach: transnational can be political history, cultural history, intellectual history, or business history. The researcher sees the transnational history's strength in the fact that it covers such methodological diversity and is in some ways similar to local history. Ideally, transnational history is a way of seeing⁷⁴.

Thus, according to S. Beckert, transnational history as 'a way of seeing, open to different methodological preferences, different topics' includes the history of mankind, recognises the importance of states, empires, networks, processes, and institutions that go 'beyond these politically delineated spaces.' However, this is a transnational history in theory⁷⁵.

In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon school, European researchers associate the methods of transnational history mostly with the processes of interaction, interinfluence, and connections, the means of study of which are comparative history and cultural transfer. Thus, Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla believes that if global history deals with cultural transfer, which emphasises the processes of transmission, reception, and adaptation of new values, behavioural forms (models), scientific and technological discoveries, then transnational history determines its own methodology in

73 *Beckert Sven et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1435–1454.

74 *Ibid*, p. 1454.

75 *Ibid*, p. 1459.

those same sources – in terms of ‘entangled’ history and *histoire croisée*⁷⁶.

K. Patel also connects the methods of transnational history with comparative history and cultural transfer. According to him, transnational history, which focuses on the processes of interaction, is based ‘on work from comparative history and cultural transfer to the history of networks and diasporas inspired by anthropology and postcolonial studies’⁷⁷.

P.-Y. Saunier speaks of ‘methodological nationalism’. History, as the humanities and social sciences, has long been a servant of the nation state, so historians cannot abandon or replace the national idea. The task of history-science is to investigate how different states and currents form ‘entangled components of the modern age’⁷⁸. The transnational perspective should not be the background narrative for positive or negative assessments of the postcolonial world⁷⁹. There is a rating scale or system of levels: ‘Local history is parish (local), national history is a key factor, while international and global events create the overall picture’⁸⁰. Therefore, it is important to trace how social movements, ideas, goods flow up and down the levels.

76 Ibid.

77 *Patel Klaus Kiran*, Transnational History, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. Access mode: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history>

78 *Saunier Pierre-Yves*, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, p. 14.

79 Ibid, p. 16.

80 Ibid, p. 18.

Notably, P.-Y. Saunier points out that the debate over transnational history takes place as a dialogue limited by regional and linguistic factors due to asymmetric relations in the scientific world. According to the researcher's logic, rather important are the opinions of those 'transnational' authors who write in Chinese, Arabic, Italian, or any other language except English as the main language of the humanities and social sciences.

Thus, the Anglo-Saxon school considered culturology and Subaltern Studies to be the main methods of transnational history and discussed the possibilities of applying traditional methods to it, such as economic, political history, history of states and empires. European proponents of the transnational perspective focused on the processes of interaction and communication, the history of diasporas and networks, so for them, the methods of transnational studies were comparative history, a cultural transfer, diplomatic, 'entangled' history, and *histoire croisée*.

Transnational History vs National History

Among transnational historians, the most controversial issue was the relationship of transnational history with national history, the state, and the metanarrative. The division between specialists here is not based on the principle of belonging to a particular school of transnational history but on their recognition of the role and place of the nation state in transnational studies.

It is significant that the editorial board of the *American Historical Review* directly raises the question before the conversation participants: how transnational history which

has a broad subject and methods, correlates with the grand narrative constructed around such binary oppositions as North – South, elite – subaltern, resistance – dominance, the rejection of which is part of a transnational approach⁸¹.

The opinions of the conversation participants differed significantly. For some researchers, the fact that national history is a component of transnational history seems obvious. Thus, C. Bayly believes that transnational history, the state, and the national grand narrative are not ‘primitive elements’ but rather the later products of the wider world history formed ‘just by nations and nationalism’⁸². In his opinion, transnational and national histories have the same tools – traditional approaches to national history from the perspective of economics, state, and ideology.

Other participants in the AHR conversation also did not deny the idea of a grand narrative in transnational history. In particular, I. Hofmeyr connects transnational studies with the grand narrative of ‘dominance and resistance’⁸³. M. Connelly speaks of the sceptical attitude of historians to the narratives of world history, but notes that it is popular history that tends to be national history. He uses the term ‘transnational narrative’ which cannot be ‘concentrated around one centre’ and correlates it with the idea of mankind’s common history: *‘If there is such a thing as transnational history that shapes the lives of people who may otherwise seem to live on different planets, should we*

81 See: AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in *American Historical Review*, p. 1456.

82 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1449.

83 Hofmeyr Isabel *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1450.

*not seek to help them understand how they are all part of the same history?*⁸⁴

According to S. Beckert, transnational history uses well-known grand narratives, but offers a new narrative of the history of globalization because transnational history captures the ‘relationship in economic, political, cultural terms’ which has intensified over the past five hundred years. However, globalization is far from one-line development: ‘moments of rapid globalization were sometimes accompanied by moments of deglobalization’. And although globalization explains a lot, it did not give a complete picture of social change, while capitalism and the state form two main processes of the modern era, but they cannot be understood without global connections⁸⁵.

It is noteworthy that to grand narratives, S. Beckert includes the theory of modernisation, the concept of dependence, and Marxism. All of them are ‘transnational in their orientation’, so transnational history should use all available large-scale descriptions of social change: *‘The theory of dependence is based on the relationship of different parts of the world to each other; the global spread of capitalist social relations is important for Marxism; the theory of modernisation postulates the possibility of global spread of modernity, partly as a result of the interaction of different states with each other’*⁸⁶.

S. Conrad (2016) also supports the idea of the close connection between transnational history and national

84 Connelly Matthew et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1457–1458.

85 Beckert Sven et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in American Historical Review, p. 1460.

86 Ibid.

history. He recognises that the history of one's own state remains the 'dominant form' of historiography since 'the essence of transnational history is reduced to understanding the same national history in a broader spatial scale, dimension'. The author calls 'a specific feature of the transnational approach' the recognition of 'the powerful role that nation states have played in most of the world over the past two centuries. That helped to make national history more dynamic and in tune with the peculiarities of the historical process. Many new works do not set the task of finally abandoning national history: they rather seek to expand its borders and thus "transnationalise" it'⁸⁷.

At the same time, among 'transnational' historians there are many who oppose transnational history to national. They perceive transnational history as a fundamentally new approach or alternative to the national one or a safeguard against Eurocentrism. Even some representatives of the Anglo-Saxon school do not link transnational history to national one. Thus, researchers of American history D. Tylen, T. Bender, I. Tyrrell in the early 2000s led a movement against the dominance of national history. We are talking about the works of Thomas Bender *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History* (2006) and Ian Tyrrell's *Transnational Nation, United States History in Global Perspective since 1789*, etc.⁸⁸

Whereas J. Bentley (2011) demonstrates sceptical attitude to the nation state and national metanarratives.

87 *Конрад С.* Что такое глобальная история? С. 69.

88 Див.: *Bender T.*, *A Nation among Nations, America's Place in World History*, New York, 2006; *Tyrrell I.*, *Transnational Nation, United States History in Global Perspective since 1789*, New York, 2007.

During the 19th–20th centuries, according to him, nation states '*subsidised the discipline of history, supported national archives, created societies for the publication of documents, funded universities, opened professorial departments of national history, and studied the history of patriotism in school curricula*'. In the 19th century, 'the symbiotic connection' between nation states and a professional historical science remained virtually unchanged. A historical science has in fact become an 'ideological servant' of the nation state. As a result, J. Bentley calls a professional historical science 'an intellectual artifact of the nation state era in world history'.

However, the 20th century brought 'huge changes in the theory and practice of a professional historical science'. Historians have expanded the thematic framework of analysis, softened the 'intense nationalism' of their predecessors of the 19th century. However, actual attachment to national communities and nation states persists to this day. Though social historians and feminists, who stay away from political and diplomatic history, 'generally study national communities': the formation of the English working class, the history of the oppressed in the colonial India, the experience of women in American history, and others.

The metanarratives underlying these studies, states J. Bentley, are based on such 'categories of universal importance' as a 'class' or 'gender'. However, historians rarely exercise '*basic studies on class and gender issues in contexts beyond national communities*'. Even when historians criticised 'patriotic and hypernationalist narratives', they perceived the past through the prism of nation states which they criticised.

J. Bentley emphasises that with regard to earlier periods, before the emergence of modern nation states, historians have also viewed the past through the prism of national communities, such as early imperial China or late medieval Germany. ‘Obsession with the nation state’, the researcher stresses, ‘remains an important characteristic of a professional historical science to this day’. Over the last two centuries, national communities and nation states that have had a powerful impact on people’s lives have themselves become a ‘global historical process’⁸⁹.

In general, according to J. Bentley, the ‘global turn’ actualises alternative approaches to history, invites historians to go beyond the professional historical science of the mid-19th century and focus on large-scale processes such as mass migration, imperial expansion campaigns, cross-cultural trade, environmental change, biological exchanges, technology transfer, cultural exchanges, including the dissemination of ideas, ideologies, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions.

One should admit that European historians have for the most part been opposed to transnational and national history. Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (2007) generally emphasised that ‘the crisis of the nation state was a key aspect of the development of transnational history’⁹⁰. He directly argued with C. Bayly who in his debate on transnational history, remarked that in the absence

89 *Bentley Jerry H.*, *The Task of World History*, *The Oxford Handbook of World History*. Access mode: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235810.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199235810-e-1>

90 *Yun Casalilla Bartolomé*, *Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe*, p. 660.

of a nation state, there was no point in talking about transnational history⁹¹.

Yun Casalilla (like O'Brien, by the way) argues that global history is not that new and has a long tradition. He considers the creation of a metanarrative that goes beyond Eurocentrism (the study of the West's rise) provoking 'reasonable criticism among scholars' to be an urgent problem in modern world history. As a result, there is a growing interest in research from the perspective of comparing West and East which 'led to the different development of Europe and Asia'.

The Spanish historian considers it appropriate to use the term 'transnational' for the early modern period, despite its narrow interpretation in relation to the 19th and 20th centuries, due to the presence of such a marker as the nation state. From his point of view, projecting the idea of a modern state into the past complicates the use of the term 'transnational': *'It is true that the efforts of early modernists in recent years to eradicate the habit of projecting into the past the idea of the so-called "modern state" as a precedent for the nation in its own sense have forced us to limit our use of the term "transnational"'*. At the same time, some historians consider transnational history an anachronism, the use of which can lead to 'analytical errors' in relation to the period preceding the 19th century.

Thus, Yun Casalilla concludes that the term 'transnational' can be used in a broad epistemological sense for several reasons. For example, *'nations as groups of people born in a certain society', if we do not interpret the nation in the modern sense and do not identify it with the*

91 Ibid, p. 665.

nation state.' The author considers such an imagined society the 'Castilian nation'⁹². Such communities formed another imaginary society 'which became a nation called "Spain" of the 19th century'⁹³. From the perspective of the current state of early modern history, the author is convinced, 'the need to combine local, global, and transnational is becoming increasingly apparent'⁹⁴.

Kiran Patel (2010) saw the novelty of transnational history in the fact that it appears as an 'alternative to the dominance of historiography structured around the nation'. At the same time, he acknowledges that most practising historians 'do not want to understand transnational history as a new paradigm or a new master narrative'. Thus, the novelty and alternativeness of transnational history, according to K. Patel, is that it is not engaged in the logic of regional, national, even global history but can 'directly combine the local with the supranational and transcontinental'⁹⁵.

P.-Y. Saunier uses the concept of 'methodological nationalism' which means the dominance of national history in traditional historiography⁹⁶. According to

92 Ibid, p. 667.

93 Ibid, p. 68.

94 Ibid, p. 670.

95 *Patel Klaus Kiran*, Transnational History, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. Access mode: <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history>

96 Термін «методологічний націоналізм» доволі поширений. Див.: *Wimmer A. and Schiller N. G.*, Methodological Nationalism and beyond: Nation-state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences, *Global Networks* 2, 4 (2002), 301–334; *Saunier Pierre-Yves*, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, p. 14.

him, ‘methodological nationalism’ arose as a result of ‘ontological relationship between the nation-state and history as a discipline’, but it was not a kind of ‘iron cage’ because many have been able to escape.

At the same time, Saunier gives examples of an alternative approach to historiography in European historiography. Opposition to ‘methodological nationalism’ met support from where it was not expected. For example, the historian, publisher, and journalist, ‘defender of French identity’ Pierre Chaunu called quite harshly to ‘burst out of the national framework when writing the history of early modern Europe.’ According to P.-Y. Saunier, the works of Fernand Braudel and Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s *Connected Histories of Early Modern Europe* were important guidelines in the study of medieval and early modern history outside of regional or global history.

By the way, the traditions of transnational history in France are associated by P.-Y. Saunier with comparative history, the founder of which was Marc Bloch, whose works are directed against the ‘narratives of national exclusivity’. The researcher views the works of American and Australian historians of world history J. Bentley, P. Manning, D. Rogers, I. Tyrrell, T. Bender, and others, who opposed the dominance of national history in historiography, an important step on the path to transnational history⁹⁷.

It is noteworthy that along with the concept of ‘methodological nationalism’, P.-Y. Saunier’s lexicon features the concept of ‘post-nationalist history’. He said that for postcolonial historians, ‘the transnational perspective

97 *Saunier Pierre-Yves, Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, p. 3–4.*

has been the key to opening the era of postnationalist history'. Thus, the transnational perspective contains such intellectual and political components (search for the roots of the multicultural world, narratives of exchanges, cooperation, mutual understanding) which broke with the history of the clash of nation states and civilisations⁹⁸.

Thus, the literature analysis shows that most historians, supporters of the transnational perspective, perceived transnational history as an alternative to national history which dominated the professional historiography of the 19th and 20th centuries. By the way, the concept of 'methodological nationalism' used by P.-Y. Saunier destroys the very idea of national metanarratives and actualises the study of the multicultural world and large-scale, long, cross-border historical processes and extensive networks of political, economic, and cultural ties between different groups, communities, and societies. In view of this, it is reasonable, in my opinion, to think that transnational history is associated not with national but with postnational history.

Transnational History and Modernity

It is significant that in the minds of the Anglo-Saxon school representatives transnational history is associated with modernity, while European historians usually project it on ancient times – the late Middle Ages or early modern history. One of the issues discussed in the *American Historical Review* was the relationship between transnational history and modernity and theories that describe it, such as modernisation, Marxism, the theory

98 Ibid, p. 7.

of dependence, and whether a transnational approach can create a new narrative of development⁹⁹

Thus, C. Bayly, who, as usual, opened the AHR conversation on each new issue, blames the modernisation theorists of the 1960s and 1970s for repeatedly rethinking the process and defining ‘only one model of “modernisation” without noticing the capacity building away from the “western core” in the form of ‘rapid industrialisation of modern China or the modern economy of India’¹⁰⁰.

Of course, knowledge of modernity has different aspects. Thus, according to M. Connelly, the ideas of modernisation, development, and globalization have provoked historians to seek means to explain the world in which we all find ourselves today. Moreover, the researcher believes, ‘peoples expect grand narratives that could better explain our time’ (these are the works of S. Huntington, T. Friedman, J. Diamond). The ‘transnational way of seeing’ can provide new perspectives on such popular topics as military and political history. M. Connelly, like C. Bailey, draws modernity, the modern world, from the last decades of the 19th century and connects it with the ‘unprecedented movement of capital, goods, people, and ideas’. Today, world politics is becoming more pluralistic not only thanks to the new states but also to international non-governmental organisations, ‘including corporations, communications networks, terrorist clusters, and criminal syndicates’¹⁰¹.

99 Див.: AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, in *American Historical Review*, p. 1456.

100 Bayly Christopher A. *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1456.

101 Connelly Matthew *et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1457.

From the point of view of another discussant, P. Seed, the theory of modernisation, the theory of dependence, and Marxism were ‘variants of the idea of development.’ These theories of the 19th–20th centuries absolutised the nation state – the driving force of economic growth. Transnational history has changed the situation. First, it was formed in studies from one state to a number of independent economic entities – individuals, communities, migrants who played a role in the country, city, region, and state. Second, the ‘transnational historical approach’ did not focus on connections but on the processes of forming those connections¹⁰².

According to S. Beckert, it is capitalism and the state that form ‘two main processes of the modern age’, but they ‘cannot be explained without transnational and global ties’¹⁰³. Unlike P. Seed, he believes that transnational history a priori does not differ from the theory of dependence, Marxism, and the theory of modernisation, although it occupies a fundamentally new analytical space.

The point is that transnational history must use existing ‘large-scale descriptions,’ that is, grand narratives that are essentially transnational. Thus, the researcher notes, “the theory of dependence is based on relations between different parts of the world; the global spread of capitalist social relations is important for Marxism; the theory of modernisation postulates the possibility of global spread of modernity partly as a result of interaction of different states among themselves’ or through competition between them¹⁰⁴.

102 *Seed Patricia et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1458.

103 *Beckert Sven et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1460.

104 *Ibid*, p. 1460.

Historians who think in terms of transnational history perceive 'modernity not as a separate part of the world, or one part of the world that serves as an example for the rest but mostly as a change in relations between different parts of the world'. According to S. Beckert, it's the changing image of the global that is central to modernity: '*Modernity is based on African slaves, Indian peasants, Chinese merchants, and Arab mathematicians, as well as Lancashire mill workers, Scottish philosophers, German chemists, and American political theorists*'¹⁰⁵.

I. Hofmeyr notes that transnational history complicates the understanding of modernity, radically expanding the idea of many peoples and lands. This changes the perception of time and space and makes linear chronologies or paradigms of modernisation somewhat limited. I. Hofmeyr sees one of the aspects of transnational history in the 'post-secular orientation'. Due to the fact that the nation is not the only automatic referent, such a component of it as secularism disappears, but otherworldly factors appear, such as 'heaven', 'world of ancestors' etc.¹⁰⁶ Thanks to the idea and the trope of circulation, 'transworldly spaces' fall into the framework of modernity, and its significance expands¹⁰⁷.

According to W. Kozol, 'transnational historical approaches' create narratives that lead to 'a revision of such basic conceptual categories as development and modernity'. Today, perceptions of modernity as 'Western progress and enlightenment' are changing. Transnational

105 Ibid.

106 *Hofmeyr Isabel et al.*, AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1456.

107 Ibid, p. 1457.

standards show that modernity is a multidimensional process through which economic, political, and cultural exchanges take place in different ways. The tradition of associating the concepts of law and justice with the Western Enlightenment means that in other cultures, there was no history of law that could be used to condemn oppression and coercion. But *'a transnational historical perspective can explain how non-Western human rights defenders appropriate and reconfigure international demands for rights and justice, as well as mobilise discourses from other cultural and political traditions'*¹⁰⁸.

Thus, the problem of modernity in a transnational perspective has a conceptual significance. First, it is from modern times that researchers have derived transnational history: some sought its roots in the 19th century, some derived from the early 20th century, linking transnational processes with globalization. Secondly, the problem of modernity has actualised the idea of development in the form of new concepts of time and space in the era of globalization. Third, from the perspective of a transnational approach, modernity is directed against the Eurocentrism ideology.

In general, if we perceive transnational history as a kind of global history, a type of modern historiography, it has its own short but interesting past. The term itself originated in the Anglo-Saxon area, while the United States rightfully became its intellectual homeland. Only later did the term enter the lexicon of European historians and national historiographies.

The conceptualisation of transnational history was accompanied by a heated debate. The literature has already

108 Kozol Wendy et al., AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1459.

recorded the fact that the discussants were divided into two camps: the Anglo-Saxon school and the European direction. The first connected transnational history with large-scale flows, cross-border processes, and clashes. The latter preferred transcultural relations, processes of interaction, and migrations.

We believe that transnational history as a type of modern historiography has its own subject and set of methods from traditional to modern. The stumbling block for transnational history is the attitude towards the nation state and metanarratives. Thus, transnational history transcends all territorial, political, and national borders and thus, completely levels the nation state as a universal unit of historical analysis. However, some historians acknowledge the possibility of narratives of transnational history or suggest a narrative of the 'history of globalization'.

The ideological basis of all debates and versions of transnational history is the question of chronology. Some derive transnational processes from the nineteenth century, others from the early twentieth century, and still others associate them with the current wave of globalization. In our opinion, transnational history is an intellectual product of modernity, a means of describing and studying it. The present, which exists between the past and the future, has very moving boundaries, each generation of historians is looking for own point of intersection of past and present, history and politics.

CHAPTER 4.

Social Theology

Social Theology: Conceptual History

*'Political Theology' and 'Social Theology'
in Religious and Public Discourses of Russia
and Ukraine*

Social Theology as a Part of Christian Theology

Social Theology as a Field of Academic Research

*Social Theology and Ukrainian Intellectual
Tradition*

Ukrainian Religious Narrativ

Social Theology: Conceptual History

The special literature contains *inter alia* such explanation of events and historical causality as social theology. Beginning from the middle of the 20th century, a semantic number of related concepts appeared in philosophy, theology, and political science, including: 'anthropological religious philosophy', 'biblical anthropology', 'doctrinal anthropology', 'theological anthropology', 'Christian sociology', 'social theology', 'social Christian theology', 'political theology', 'theology of politics', 'theological politics', etc.

The concept of 'political theology' and its derivatives are quite common in Western European and Russian religious and public discourse. It is noteworthy that this term was proposed by M. Bakunin in a discussion with G. Mazzini, who emphasised the providential role of Italy in world history¹.

It was introduced into wide scientific circulation by the German sociologist and lawyer C. Schmitt, who argued that the key concepts of the doctrine of the state were nothing more than secularised theological concepts². A 'neo-Orthodox' theologian, founder of crisis theology, K. Barth insisted that it is social political theology that allows 'to explain the whole life of society through Christ'³.

1 Идетсья про есей М. Бакунина «Політична теологія Мадзіні й Інтернаціонал» (див.: Филиппов А. Ф. К предыстории «Политической теологии» [Электронный ресурс]: <http://gefter.ru/archive/14981>).

2 Шмитт К. Политическая теология: Сборник / Пер. с нем. Москва, 2000. С. 57.

3 Barth K., The Word of God and the Word of Man, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 55: Philosophy and Religion: Selections from the Twentieth Century, Chicago, 1990, p. 469.

Another Protestant intellectual D. Bonhoeffer believed that the secularisation of consciousness has the opposite side: 'Now that the world has entered the age, it is more godless and, for just that reason perhaps closer to God than ever before.' When a child stops listening to adults, they become adults. Thus the humanity of the 20th century became an adult, so theologians should talk about God in a 'secular manner'⁴.

In the second half of the 20th century, within the framework of Western Christian theology, there emerged a whole trend – the 'new political theology' which was initiated by the Protestant and Catholic theologians J. Moltmann, D. Soelle, J. B. Metz⁵. It is believed to be formed as a result of a number of such global historical events of the 20th century as the collapse of Nazism, the Holocaust, World War II, decolonisation, and national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Its formation was also facilitated by the reforms carried out by the Second Vatican Council.

The ideologues of the 'new political theology' argued that to give faith political significance in the context of the historical process, one should introduce such Christian theology categories as 'sin', 'grace', 'redemption', and 'salvation'. Their main idea is the Christianity 'deprivatisation'. Thus, the Catholic theologian J. B. Metz emphasised that the category of 'salvation' is not the personal salvation of Jesus, it lies not in the private sphere of the individual, personal,

4 *Bonhoeffer D.*, Prisoner for God, New York, 1959, p. 167.

5 *Барабанов Е. В.* Новая политическая теология И. Б. Меца и Ю. Мольманна [Электронный ресурс]: http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov_Buks/bogoslov/Article/Bar_NovPol.php

but is social⁶. The protestant theologian D. Soelle justifies her political theology by the fact that the acts of creation of the world continue to this day. They involve all people whose actions are inextricably linked with God's actions⁷.

At the same time, political theology is the object of study not only of Christian intellectuals but also of political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and lawyers. Researchers distinguish three types of it: 'legal political theology' (means the transfer/shift of political and legal concepts from the theological field); 'institutional political theology' (emphasises the connection between religion and the current political order and sees the essence of faith in the legitimation of such an order); 'appellate political theology', based on the idea of 'Christian revelation' and focused on involving Christians and the church in maintaining the socio-political order, which is perceived as the realisation of Christian existence. So it is appealing to theology to justify the participation of believers in a particular political process, in support of a certain political position or decision of the authorities⁸.

There is no consensus among researchers of political theology on the definition of its subject and functions. Thus, the American political scientist M. Leela emphasises that this is a 'discourse on political power based on the connection with a divine revelation'; political theology is

6 *Выжанов И.* «Теология освобождения» в римско-католической церкви: история движения, ч. 1 [Электронный ресурс]: http://www.portal-slovo.ru/theology/44804.php#_ftnref12

7 *Мельникова Е. В.* Зёлле Доротея [Электронный ресурс]: <http://www.pravenc.ru/text/199759.html>

8 *Арзуниан Р. В.* Центры власти в XX в.: Взаимоотношения между политическим и религиозным на современном этапе. Москва, 2015. С. 136.

*'first of all political and only then theological, it is a part of politics that stands on a theological foundation'*⁹.

It is significant that most Russian authors also emphasise the political component of Christian theology, namely religious-political and religious-state relations in society. Some see political theology as 'a set of religious doctrines used for political purposes'¹⁰, others – 'a part of Christian theology which develops in the form of state ideology'¹¹.

The position of the Russian religious sociologist V. Bachinin became the most reasoned and theoretically substantiated from the point of view of political theology. In his coordinates of thinking, political theology creates 'models of socio-political reality which is based on the idea of the ideological priority of faith over reason'. In short, political theology is related to both theology and political theory which are a huge 'corpus of religious-humanitarian and religious-public (social) ideas'¹².

9 Див.: Кутрунов А. А. Политическая теология: концептуализация понятия [Электронный ресурс]: [https://sibac.info/archive/social/8\(55\).pdf](https://sibac.info/archive/social/8(55).pdf)

10 Першин Ю. Ю. Политическая теология в топологии радио-нального дискурса // *Личность. Культура. Общество*. 2011. Т. 13. Вып. 1 (61/62). С. 251.

11 Андреева Л. А. «Политическая» теология христианства, феномен наместника Христа и наместническая модель сакрализации власти: Дисс. ... д-ра филос. наук. Москва, 2003. С. 4. На думку релігійного соціолога А. Кирлежева, політична теологія – це «теологічне осмислення політичного, як у сенсі теоретизування на тему політики з релігійного погляду, так і у сенсі обґрунтування релігійного ставлення до конкретних політичних форм і феноменів» (див.: Кырлежев А. И. Мистическая политика как *contradictio in adjecto*: На полях книги Аристотеля Папаниколау // *Государство, религия, церковь в России и за рубежом*. 2014. № 3. С. 249).

12 *Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии // Политика и общество: Научный российско-французский журнал по вопросам социальных наук*. 2005. № 4. С. 62.

For a political theologian, in contrast to an atheist political scientist, faith is an active component of their theoretical activity, their own identity, and normative consciousness. The Russian theologian G. Florovsky once noted that the very fact of Christians' faith and loyalty disposes them to 'very special interpretations of known events in history, as well as to a certain interpretation of the historical process as a whole'¹³.

According to V. Bachinin, since millions of people perceive reality through the prism of Christian concepts, they need 'Christian political science' because secular political science is outside the Christian worldview. The task is to bring the modern man's political consciousness out of the 'atheistic state'. It is political theology that must 'decipher the hieroglyphs of historical events, translating their meanings into the language of theology'. Thus, V. Bachinin considers the subject of political theology not the empirical political life of individuals and 'masses' but the fate of large political communities/entities – peoples, states, civilisations in their biblical sense.

It is noteworthy that in the Ukrainian spiritual and intellectual space the concept of 'social theology' is preferred. In contrast to the 'political', the nature of social theology is a combination of religious and social because it provides 'social proofs of God's existence and the reconciliation of faith with social reality'. According to the philosopher and religious and public figure M. Cherenkov, the subject of social theology is theological meanings of social changes: *'It is a theology which, being conscious of its*

13 Флоровский Г. В. *Время и культура*. Санкт-Петербург, 2002. С. 674. Див. також: Бачинин В. А. *Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии*. С. 62.

*own sociality, chooses as its subject the theological meanings of social transformations, and thus is able to reconcile the social and the religious – both in itself and in the subject of its study*¹⁴.

In the current situation, theology is perceived as the key to understanding the current and future life of the people, country, state: as the events of recent years showed, *‘Ukrainians demand from theology answers to socially acute, topical questions. Theology is expected not so much to justify God as to clarify His mode of presence and explain His message, that is, how He works in the world, what He wants to say, and what meanings to reveal*¹⁵.

An important question is the social theology status. Implicitly, it is an integral part of Christian theology. According to M. Cherenkov, institutionalisation of social theology began in the 20th century and was due to the urgent need to explain radical social changes, transformations in society since ‘the pace and scale of transformations went beyond traditional explanatory schemes and required new tools’. The tasks of social theology were not only to assert the spiritual foundations of society but to analyse the decisive events, crises, revolutions, social experiments in the life of society and determine the ways of its further development: *‘Since then, social theology had not only to teach about the stable and immovable spiritual foundations and age-old principles of social life but also to explain the creative evolution of society, evaluate revolutionary experiments, show perspective in a deep social crisis’*.

14 Соціальна теологія як theologia prima нашого часу (блог Михайла Черенкова) [Електронний ресурс]: <https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~cherenkoff/60472/>

15 Там само.

Social theology as a field of knowledge has a certain structure. M. Cherenkov considers the following areas of research: 1. *social eschatology* (in which the Christian responsibility for the images of the future is realised); 2. *hermeneutics of social events* (in which the social changes are deciphered as symbols and signs of the times); 3. *social criticism* (which offers estimates of the existing, adjustments, and transformation programmes); 4. *social theology of the kingdom of God* (which distinguishes itself from the 'theology of the church' and recognises the social logic, signs, and loci of the coming kingdom of God, as it manifests itself in the events of history); 5. *analysis of social positions of leading Ukrainian denominations*.

The basic goal of social theology is not only to understand the religious meaning of social processes but to correct and improve those processes: *Find and explain the religious meanings of social transformations, as well as offer their own positive worldviews to optimise social processes. Such meanings and guidelines can be found on the other side of the religious and political, spiritual and social, ecclesiastical and cultural, symbolic and real – that is, through their rapprochement and reconciliation*¹⁶.

It is obvious that the importance of social theology can be assessed in theological and scientific dimensions. Social theology is currently *'the most relevant area of academic humanities research. Christian theology cannot ignore this demand, so we should expect from it structural changes and reassessment of priorities. Social theology as theologia prima can become not only a promising direction in the*

16 Там само.

*development of domestic theology but its cornerstone, the basis of the original tradition; and also a way of actualisation for theology and Christianity in general*¹⁷.

Indeed, today we see clear signs of institutionalisation of socio-theological research in Ukraine. Its factors are the media, public initiatives, the creation of religious and public organisations and educational institutions, academic societies. Among flagships in the media spiritual and religious space are the Internet platform named Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU) (since 2001) as a project of the Institute of Religion and Society of the Ukrainian Catholic University which serves as a platform for discussion of anthropological, religious, and theological issues¹⁸, as well as the religious portal, the oldest church resource in our country – ‘Orthodoxy in Ukraine’¹⁹. It is about the creation of formal and informal public and religious associations: Ukrainian Christian Academic Society (UCAT), UCU’s Institute of Ecumenical Studies, Open Orthodox University of St. Sophia the Wisdom as educational institution of non-classical type, specialising in educational activities on religious and social issues. Rather spread are such forms of presentation of social and theological researches as publishing, popularising activity, public and educational initiatives, holding festivals, forums, including regular web conferences, seminars, etc.

17 Там само.

18 Див.: [Електронний ресурс]: <https://risu.org.ua/>

19 Див.: [Електронний ресурс]: <http://orthodoxy.org.ua/>

'Political Theology' and 'Social Theology' in Religious and Public Discourses of Russia and Ukraine

Summarising historiographical observations on the existence of the concepts of 'political theology' and 'social theology' in the religious and mass discourses in Russia and Ukraine, we can say that these concepts are usually perceived as synonyms because both have a great cognitive resource, combining the human factor with transcendental forces. However, they also have significant differences. If political theology in Russian academic and mass discourses mostly focuses on the political aspect, speaks of politics on a theological basis, of Christian theology as a state ideology, then social theology in the spiritual world of Ukrainians is conscious of its own sociality. It advocates the reconciliation of social and religious, spiritual and social as a basis for understanding the theological meanings of socio-historical processes, their correction and improvement. This difference in approaches to understanding seemingly similar concepts is explained by a number of social, political, spiritual, mental, and psychological factors.

Of course, the dominance of such political categories as 'state', 'politics', 'power' in the minds of Russian intellectuals is due not only to old traditions of socio-political thinking but the nature and change of political regimes, mental dichotomy of power/people, king/subjects, leader/masses. Analysing the peculiarities of the Russians' religious consciousness, the American culturologist Mikhail Epstein introduces the concept of 'poor religion' (in the English version, it is minimal religion). He defines it as one of the directions of the religious thought that arose as a result of

the collapse of atheism and traditional secularism of the Soviet era.

According to opinion polls, 25 % of Russians 'believe in God, but do not belong to any religion'. M. Epstein states that it is in this gap between faith and religion, that 'a poor religion emerges that has neither statute, no books, no rites'²⁰. He considers it appeared due to 'the disbelief of Soviet times' which formed a special type of modern man – 'a mere believer'²¹.

In general, the researcher interprets the phenomenon of 'Soviet atheism', whatever it is called (the 'mass', 'scientific', 'state' one) as a 'new phenomenon of world history'. There have been 'mass heresies' before, but they have not changed the 'religious core of the worldview' nor have they negated faith in God, in the Scriptures, in the soul's immortality. And only in the USSR did militant atheism spread among the 'masses', forming several generations of unbelievers, not always directly hostile to religion but deeply indifferent to it. If they themselves did not burn icons and demolish temples, they never prayed, did not call on the God's name, forgetting about His very existence'.

M. Epstein sees the paradox of the religious situation in post-Soviet Russia in the fact that Soviet atheism, which was a type of apophatic (negative) theology, prepared the ground for the return of religiosity 'in its pure form', without theological dogmas and ritual traditions. In short, poor religion, as a negative theology, has passed the stage of atheism and regained its religiosity in the form of 'faith in general': *Negative theology eventually denies itself as a*

20 Эпштейн М. Религия после атеизма: Новые возможности теологии. Москва, 2013. С. 21.

21 Там же. С. 20.

theology, becoming atheism, that is, a direct and conscious denial of God... And so, in the vacuum of the late Soviet era, in the 1970s and 1980s, religiosity began to revive in the very form that atheism had prepared for it: as simple faith, without clarifications and additions, without clear confessional signs, as a whole, indivisible feeling of God which grows outside of historical, national, and specifically church traditions’.

The researcher identifies three trends in the minds of today’s post-atheistic society: traditionalism, neo-paganism, ecumenism. The first is the ‘religious revival’ which he understands as a return to its ‘pre-atheist state’. This means that traditional religions (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Buddhism, Judaism) have returned to the religious map of Russia²².

The second trend is neo-paganism, in the spirit of which Orthodoxy itself is perceived. It is noteworthy that M. Epstein’s arguments have clear connotations with political theology, that is, Orthodoxy as a special branch of Christianity is closely connected with the ‘state and military serving Russia’, its ‘great God-bearing people’. The researcher sees the superiority of Orthodoxy over other Christian denominations in ‘dual faith’, in ‘the organic fusion of the religion of “Heavenly Father” with the ancient cult of the native mother earth’. Quite in the spirit of political theology, M. Epstein perceives Orthodoxy as a combat-ready form of patriotism ‘which has long protected holy Russia from Jewish, Catholic, Masonic, and all other foreign evil’.

To neo-paganism, he also attributes ‘*various passions for magic, psychics, spiritism, and other beliefs stemming*

22 Там же. С. 17.

from the earliest animistic and fetishistic notions. In fact, the revival of this whole complex of primitive religions was one of the natural consequences of communist construction. Communism was conceived as a revival at the highest historical stage of pre-class community formation – and in this sense, a return from the religions of class society, which “alienate”, to the belief in the universal spirituality of matter, which is the source of self-movement and therefore corresponds to the pagan notion of nature spirits’.

The third trend in the religious life of post-Soviet Russia is defined by the researcher as ‘religious modernism’ (or ecumenism, universalism, eclecticism): *‘In the late 1960s, universalist sentiments began to emerge among the Moscow hippies and intelligentsia, in bohemian and dissident circles, where various religious sentiments, from Buddhism to Baptism, from Orthodoxy to Pentecostalism, penetrated in fragments. They all mixed on a general and abstract basis: religiosity as such, the idea that there is something or even Someone “there”’*²³.

The author connects these three trends with the peculiarities of the religious worldview of Russian intellectuals. M. Epstein sees the same trends in the history of the Russian religious thought of the early 20th century: *‘The first, traditionalist one, is associated with the name of Paul of Florence and is firmly based on the philosophically meaningful church canon and the church fathers’ heritage. The second one is associated with the name of Vasily Rozanov, converges with paganism, with the original cults of the sun and the earth, and sanctifies the archaic element of sex and fertility. The third, modernist one, is associated with the name*

*of Nikolai Berdyaev, based on the apophatic notion of pure freedom that preceded God Himself and the act of creation, and provides for the ecumenical rapprochement of faiths in the face of the coming Advent and eschatological end of history*²⁴.

In general, we can agree with M. Epstein that ‘poor religion’ is not a fantasy but reality of a spiritual life, which corresponds to the realities of post-Soviet Russia. According to a 2012 large-scale opinion poll provided by the author, conducted as part of the Atlas of Religions and Nationalities project, 25 % of respondents ‘simply believe in God’ without professing any particular religion; 13 % are atheists; these include 4.5 % of ‘ecumenists’ – Christians who do not belong to certain denominations. Rather interesting is survey data in the Russian Federation on the confessional principle: 41 % of respondents confirmed they belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church, while 6 % – to Islam. It follows from these statistics that every fourth inhabitant of Russia considers themselves a ‘mere believer’, regardless of any religious denomination.

M. Epstein considers such a religious situation to be a consequence of the influence of the militant atheism regime which for decades rejected and suppressed all forms of religion. People were far from certain denominations or choosing between them. On the other hand, in an effort to oppose their atheistic upbringing, they sought their own sense of God which, although unformed, took them beyond the stereotypes imposed on them²⁵.

At the same time, ‘poor faith’ is a sign of the ‘post-atheistic’ spirituality of the globalization era. For comparison,

24 Там же. С. 34–35.

25 Там же. С. 32–33.

M. Epstein provides the following data. In the United States, 33 million do not belong to any denomination, of which only 13 million are atheists and agnostics. Thus, the group of 'poor believers' ('non-denominational believers') is about 20 million, or 12 % of the adult population of the country, i.e. twice less than in Russia. *'It is noteworthy that non-denominational Christians are the fastest growing group in the United States: there were 8 million of them in 2008, and since 1990, their number has increased forty times (!) – much more than in any another religious group. For comparison: the next fastest growing group – evangelical and newly born Christians – tripled, and the number of Buddhists and atheists/agnostics doubled.'*

Thus, 'the problem of poor faith is becoming increasingly urgent for the Western world as well'²⁶. It acts as a kind of spirituality that 'manifests itself in a close circle of family and friends, not temples', as a sign of a new turn to 'post-religious' spirituality²⁷. As we can see, this phenomenon of post-atheistic, post-secular spirituality is characteristic not only of the countries of the former USSR, in particular Russia, but also of the modern globalizing Western world.

After the collapse of the policy of state atheism and secularism, independent Ukraine experienced a real 'religious renaissance' – both in the sphere of personal consciousness of citizens and in the practices of religious-state relations. The church situation was characterised by the restoration of the population's Orthodox identity, the expansion of the religious network in the country. Signs of a religious renaissance were a radical change in the

26 Там же. С. 33 (прим.).

27 *Taylor Ch.*, *A Secular Age*, Boston, 2007, p. 533–534; Эпштейн М. Религия после атеизма: Новые возможности теологии. С. 401.

appropriate behaviour of the population (visiting temples, performing rites), as well as significant changes in the minds of citizens (attitude to God, acceptance of church dogmas).

It is believed that Ukrainians are more 'church-going' than Russians. An important factor is certainty with religious identity. The vast majority of believers in Ukraine are Orthodox. Sociology from the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after O. Razumkov is especially noteworthy (the study was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine from March 23 to 28, 2018, in all regions of our country, except for the temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). Statistics show that up to 80 % are believers, of which 67 % are Orthodox, 8 % are Greek Catholics, 1 % is Roman Catholics and Protestants, 9 % consider themselves simply Christians, 5 % are non-believers, 2–6 % did not decide on the answer²⁸.

The level of Ukrainians' religiosity has a clear regional character due to the presence of socio-political, spiritual, and mental features. Thus, in the west, 91 % of residents consider themselves believers, in the south-east – up to 59%. Unbelievers or atheists are least in the west (2 %), most are in the south (13 %) and east (12 %)²⁹. The fact that the

28 Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення українських громадян: тенденції 2010–2018 рр. (інформаційні матеріали). Київ, 2018. С. 3–4. Див. також: Большинство украинцев считают себя верующими христианами – Инфо-графика [Електронний ресурс]: http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1594%3A1&catid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=ru

29 Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення... С. 4.

religiosity level in the western part of our country is higher than in the east is explained by historical circumstances because in the conditions of foreign political domination and church (Catholicism) influence, faith was a factor in preserving social, cultural, and local self-determination. Therefore, another feature of the Ukrainians' religious identity is that the problem of interdenominational choice traditionally appears as political, not as ecclesiastical.

To define the church situation in Ukraine over the past twenty years, Ukrainian scholar, theologian Viktor Yelenskyi uses the term 'religious culture'. According to him, religious culture crosses confessional boundaries, is 'not a system of beliefs and practices, clearly organised around the church core, but rather a set of values, symbols, customs, and behavioural norms'. The specificity of modern religious culture in our country (except for the western territories) implies not so much an intensive church life or a high level of knowledge about religion, as public approval of the churchism and the support of consistent religious behaviour: *'All prominent statesmen, public figures, pop stars, and athletes declare their respect for the church; presidents, prime ministers, and senior officials obligatory rebuild temples in their small homelands and readily, and sometimes obsessively refer to religious symbols in their rhetoric'*³⁰.

The church as a public institution occupies a special place in the religious culture of Ukrainians. In various cultural areas where Ukrainians lived (even in the days of state atheism and secularism imposed by the Soviet regime), the religious tradition was preserved in the close

30 Еленский В. Украинское православие и украинский проект // Pro et Contra. 2013. Май – август. С. 29.

memory of generations, especially in rural areas. According to surveys, the family's influence on religious education increased from 31 % in 2000 to 40 % in 2018. Religiosity in the family circle is more common in the western part of Ukraine 'where 79 % of respondents received such upbringing at home', the least is in the east (21 %).

Most believers in Ukraine identify themselves as Orthodox. However, it's not just about the ritual side. In the post-Soviet period, customs, rites, and church traditions became an integral part of everyday life: visiting temples, observance of religious requirements, celebrating holidays and anniversaries. According to the 2018 sociological data, 58 % of believers attend religious services. In the context of spiritual and religious practices, Ukrainians are characterised by respect for the clergymen; in the minds of most believers, there is a positive image of the priest (it is noteworthy that among the highest hierarchs of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate, there are many natives of Western Ukraine where they received their primary clerical education).

Attempts by church intellectuals to create 'a historiosophical scheme of a special path of Ukrainian Orthodoxy – rooted in a theological, cultural, and even civilisational tradition that does not coincide with Russian Orthodoxy' fit perfectly into the frame of modern Ukrainian religious culture. In this context, V. Yelenskyi refers to the works of Bishop Alexander (Drabynko) and Metropolitan Volodymyr³¹.

31 Див.: *Александр (Драбинко)*. Киев – Новый Иерусалим: К очеркам о киевской градософии (доклад на IX Международных Успенских чтениях «Память и надежда: горизонты осмысления и пути осознания». Киево-Печерская лавра. 27.09.2009) [Электронный ресурс]: <http://arhiv.orthodoxy.org.ua/ru/node/27678>; Володимир.

The basic feature of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is spirituality, sincere faith in God (or the desire for such faith). The mental basis of the Ukrainians' natural spirituality was such a feature of national character as cordocentrism, i.e. 'heart', love, and sensitivity are the basis of faith and determine the thinking, mind, and actions of man. Spiritual revival in Ukraine is not only a phenomenon that is regularly repeated in the dramatic political and cultural-religious history of Ukraine but also a natural mechanism for overcoming political crises, social catastrophes, and revolutionary experiments. In general, Ukrainian society is characterised by religious tolerance which is demonstrated by 75 % of respondents, 44 % of whom believe that 'any religion that proclaims the ideals of goodness, love, mercy and does not threaten the existence of another person has the right to exist', and 31 % are convinced that 'all religions have the right to exist as different paths to God'.

In general, the high level of spirituality of Ukrainians is evidenced, on the one hand, by their tolerance and, on the other hand, by the denial of the national orientation of religion and the church. 37 % of respondents believe that the church, religion should not be nationally oriented, 34 % – deny it, and 29 % have no opinion. It is noteworthy that according to the confessional principle of attitude to the national orientation of the church and religion, there are significant differences on the religious map of Ukraine: 'If among the UGCC faithful, the supporters of

Пам'ять про Новий Єрусалим і київська традиція (слово про Київ на відкритті IX Міжнародних Успенських читань «Пам'ять і надія: горизонти осмислення та шляхи усвідомлення») [Електронний ресурс]: <http://orthodox.org.ua/ru/article/pamyat-pro-novii-%D1%94rusalimki%D1%97vska-tradits%D1%96ya>. Див. також: Еленский В. Украинское право-славие и украинский проект. С. 34.

the national orientation of the church and religion make up the majority (57 %), among the UOC-KP faithful – a relative majority (47 %), then among the UOC faithful, a relative majority (49 %) are opponents of this view³². Therefore, the numerous loyalties of Ukrainian Orthodoxy reflect the multispectral church situation in Ukraine.

It is obvious that in recent decades, the state of the church situation in Ukraine and Russia has differed significantly. The phenomenon of ‘poor religion’ inherent in Russians (mere believers without a denomination) opposes the religious culture of Ukrainians (the majority identify themselves as Orthodox; a favourable attitude to the church and consistent religious behaviour; the search for a special path of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by church intellectuals). Hence the specifics of religious and mass discourses in Russia and Ukraine. If the first focuses on projecting religious meanings on the political reality of the past and present, the second focuses on the search for the theological meaning of social life, human life, and people’s behaviour. It is no coincidence that in the age of globalization, in the conditions of cyberconsciousness, technoscience, and extensive social networks, in contrast to state secularism and atheism, there takes place a ‘religious revival’, although spiritual awakening is observed in various forms, images, and church practices.

In general, social theology appears as an interdisciplinary space for the interaction of theological and socio-humanitarian disciplines. It is perceived as a traditional component of social theology and the newest field of academic research.

32 Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення... С. 6.

Social Theology as a Part of Christian Theology

One cannot but agree with the opinion that the formation of social theology as a direction in Christian theology coincided with the modern era (mid-19th – mid-20th centuries) and to some extent, was prepared by the development of socio-humanitarian sciences. After all, the social theology purpose was to adapt classical Christianity to new social, political, spiritual, mental, and psychological realities. Of course, as a new direction of theological thought, social theology had a powerful heuristic potential – a huge body of sources, based on the Scriptures, the works of Christian thinkers, church fathers, old and new theologians.

Social theology as a branch of theology has its own semantic apparatus and language, i.e. it combines biblical truths, Christian principles and norms with the categories of social theory and the realities of socio-political life. Biblical images and ideas are known to be present in almost all secular texts of the Christian area's authors. However, if most of these authors offer only scattered fragments of biblical material, then in the works of social theologians, one can trace direct semantic lines of sacred texts. It is no coincidence that F. Dostoevsky's novel-prophecy *The Devils* is completely correlated with the biblical intertext. Biblical-Christian memory, which is present in modern texts, creates an opportunity for theological reading of current socio-political realities³³.

Social theology states that God always puts certain meanings in social realities and conveys His messages to

33 Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 64.

people through socio-political events. However, people do not perceive these meanings due to ideological (a secular model of the world, the non-believers are guided by) or linguistic (when the researcher does not speak the language of theology and cannot translate sacred signs and meanings into familiar formulations) barriers. Therefore, the theological meanings of social changes, political catastrophes usually remain outside the secular consciousness.

According to social Christian theory, the catastrophes of society – civil, interstate wars, revolutions, tyrannies, genocides – are perceived as ‘retribution’ to several generations of people, sent by God for their ‘sins’. Thus, in the language of theology, the ‘flood’, the ‘Babylonian captivity’, and the ‘enemy invasion’ are punishments when God turns away from people to change their consciousness and behaviour. According to the logic of social theology, natural disasters, hostile invasions, wars, revolutions, which are accompanied by upheavals and casualties, prove that the punishment is terrible, but the people themselves are to blame.

Thus, the theological meanings of world history appear only in the light of biblical principles, in the context of the theocentric picture of the universe. Instead, secular (usually anthropocentric) consciousness is in opposition to God and does not accept the analytical resources of social theology, so it's unable to truly and deeply understand socio-political realities. This means that the mind must be in unity with faith, and the researcher needs not only faith and personal religious experience but also insight, intuition, moral sense, aesthetic taste³⁴.

34 Там же. С. 65.

Social theology assumes that every event in the past or present has many meanings³⁵. The first layer is specific socio-political meanings that are easy to read in the context of secular thinking. Thus, from a positivist perspective, the October coup of 1917 meant the transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks and a change in the political order and state system. The second layer is political history which determines the preconditions, consequences, and significance of a certain event. From this point of view, the events in Petrograd are explained by the crisis of the Russian autocracy which failed to adapt to new circumstances, unlike, for example, the British

35 Показово, що в корпусі сучасних публікацій щодо аналізу російської реальності В. Бачинін виокремлює кілька рівнів її пояснення. На поверховому русійними факторами виступають конкретні особи та певні історичні колізії. Такий підхід означає перелік імен і подій, що змінюють один одного, і по суті пропонує спрощене пояснення історичної реальності. Саме в такому жанрі працюють історики, економісти, політологи, публіцисти, котрі мають нахил до емпіричних, науково-популярних або художніх конструкцій, інтерпретацій реальності. Другий рівень пояснення історичних реалій більш складний, його прибічники використовують філософські категорії та соціологічні методи, що «оперують не одиничними, а комплексними смисловими структурами». Філософи використовують «блоки факторів», одні з них означають причини, інші – наслідки, при тому ці «блоки» з легкістю можуть мінятися місцями, тобто фактори конструюються у «блоки» довільно, і все залежить від уяви та смаку автора. Словом, секулярна думка легко міняє узагальнення місцями, а отже потребує переходу від секулярних позицій на інший рівень свідомості та узагальнень, що передбачає духовний пошук. Ідеться про думку, «оснащену якісно новим теоретичним інструментарієм». Це мають бути принципи та категорії релігійного, теологічного характеру, що сягають своїм корінням першопричин усього сущого. На цьому рівні, констатує дослідник, «соціальна філософія поступається місцем соціальному богослов'ю, а політологія відступає перед політичною теологією» (див.: Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 61–62).

monarchy. The third layer is philosophical meanings, in the light of which the revolution of 1917 revealed the deep contradictions of existence due to giant faults, where old life forms collapsed, and at the same time in the chaotic vortex of 'troubled times', new practices of social existence were formed. The fourth layer contains religious and moral meanings, through the prism of which 1917 is perceived as the extreme point of moral decline, the fading away of 'brotherly love', when 'brothers turned on each other'. Fifth, the deep, religious meanings of social changes and transformation are revealed by social theology. Thus, according to V. Bachinin, the theological meaning of the coming revolution was defined by F. Dostoevsky in his novel *The Devils* long before its beginning: millions of people of different classes 'got possessed by devils'. The possessed began to call the madness in which they found themselves 'revolutionary passion' and thus destroyed themselves; there emerged 'the absolute evil in its terrible forms'³⁶.

Thus, each of the five options for reading the socio-political reality has its own system of causal and fundamental meanings and connections, and therefore, is self-sufficient. From a theological point of view, social reality is the result of the joint efforts of God and man. The history of nations is God's work for mankind. God has always led and continues to lead the human race, that is, educates it, encouraging or stopping it in time³⁷.

36 Там же. С. 66.

37 Там же.

Social Sinfulness

One of the key concepts of social theology is the category of a sin – personal and corporate. The latter is inherent in large human communities, such as nations and states. Russian secular theologian V. Solovyov used the term ‘collective’ sin when talking about the downfall of Byzantium. In his understanding, social sin is a common, state sin: ‘Kingdoms, as a collective whole, perish only from the collective sins – national, state ones – and are saved only by correcting their social order or its adaptation to the moral order’³⁸. The main ‘collective’ (corporate) sin of Byzantium V. Solovyov considered ‘complete and general indifference to the historical good, to realisation of God’s will in the collective life of people’³⁹. V. Bachinin adds that because of such social sins, that is, the unacceptable deviation from the ‘proper, pleasing to God’, not only Byzantium but also the Russian and Soviet empires perished.

Pope John Paul II also wrote about ‘suprapersonal’ and ‘supra-individual’ sins. In his encyclicals *Reconciliation and Repentance* (*Reconciliatio et paenitentia*, 1984 p.), *The Social Concern* (*Sollicitudo rei socialis*, 1987), he used the terms ‘social sinful structures’, ‘social sinfulness’, ‘sinful systems’, ‘sinfulness of the system’, ‘sinful situations’. In his understanding, structures of sin are ‘social formations and forces that have a depressing effect on higher human gifts, suppress the abilities and talents of people’.

38 *Соловьёв В. С. Византия и Россия // Византизм и славянство: Великий спор. Москва, 2001. С. 159. Див. також: Бачинин В. А. Росийская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 70.*

39 *Соловьёв В. С. Византия и Россия. С. 160.*

The pontiff considered communist and liberal-bourgeois ideologies to be such sinful structures. Structures of sin 'burden the social and spiritual life of mankind, make it dark and destructive'. In a 1984 message, he defined social sinfulness as the concentration of numerous personal sins: *'Whenever the Church speaks of situations of sin, or when she condemns as social sins certain situations or the collective behavior of certain social groups, big or small, or even of whole nations and blocs of nations, she knows and she proclaims that such cases of social sin are the result of the accumulation and concentration of many personal sins. It is a case of the very personal sins of those who cause or support evil or who exploit it; of those who are in a position to avoid, eliminate or at least limit certain social evils but who fail to do so out of laziness, fear or the conspiracy of silence, through secret complicity or indifference; of those who take refuge in the supposed impossibility of changing the world, and also of those who sidestep the effort and sacrifice required, producing specious reasons of a higher order.'*⁴⁰

The fact that there is a close connection between individual and social sin means that responsibility does not lie with the system but with the people within that system, which should motivate them to take constructive action. In devoted to social teaching of the Catholic Church encyclical of 1987, where the global social, economic, and political problems of the world of that time were considered, John Paul II described the state of civilisation as follows: *'It should be emphasised that a world divided into blocs, governed by a rigid ideology, where instead of*

40 Цит. за: Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 70.

*interdependence and solidarity, various forms of imperialism prevail, cannot but find itself under the power of the system's sinfulness. The sum of negative factors that oppose the true understanding of the common good and the duty to promote it, creates a barrier in people and institutions, which at first glance is difficult to overcome*⁴¹.

In the language of social theology, revolution, nationalism, militarism, religious extremism, xenophobia, and other social deviations are perceived as social sins. Each such deviation has its own theological meaning and can be identified as a social sin. All of them have a single basis, that is, they point to the plan of God, who allows such deviations, because each of them allows the human consciousness to come to an understanding of the important. Wars, political assassinations, terrorist acts are not only suffering, they also allow us to overestimate the usual values, lead to an understanding of what 'the Creator needs from His creations'⁴².

It is believed that numerous 'social sins' distort the project of change in geosocial reality. Christian social thought states that man and humanity have no power over the past because it is the 'irreversible reality'. As for the present, it is an area where everyone not only obeys the 'inertia of necessity' but has their own free will.

An important category of social theology is salvation. Everyone has the opportunity for salvation, which is their main goal. This is also the ultimate goal of all mankind, so any deviation from this main direction becomes a fact of 'social deviation'. This is the path taken by the

41 Цит. за: Там же.

42 Там же.

supersubjects of world history – civilisations, states, peoples; those of them who neglect Christian goals, become ‘hostages of dangerous deviations’. According to the French philosopher J. Maritain, order and freedom make civilisations, even powerful ones, ‘equally cruel’, and ‘only a Christian civilisation can be deprived of significant defects’⁴³.

The range of social theology ideas includes the problem of power. The sacred one belongs to God, and He exercises it directly or indirectly through prophets, messengers, and priests. Instead, the bearer of secular power is the state (rulers, judges, legislators) – a collective subject of higher power which performs administrative and managerial functions in society as a whole. Authorities can manifest themselves as God-fearing or ungodly. According to P. Sorokin, intelligent and far-sighted politicians respect religion. And if the first persons of the state are believers, the people forgive their human weaknesses.

At the same time, there is an ungodly power – apostasy which is defined as too negative a manifestation of the policy of secularisation. Perhaps, the most odious kind of apostasy was the Bolsheviks’ policy whose goal was to create an ‘absolutely secular state’. Rather illustrative is the case that happened in the first years of the revolution and was mentioned by Metropolitan John in his book *Autocracy of the Spirit*. In the city of Sviyazhsk, the local Bolsheviks decided to erect a monument to the first God-fighter Lucifer. However, they thought it was contrary

43 *Маритэн Ж.* Знание и мудрость. Москва, 1999. С. 55. Див. також: Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 71.

to the materialist worldview and considered the biblical Cain's candidacy; finally, they agreed to erect a monument to Judas Iscariot as 'the first revolutionary of the new era who rose up against Jesus Christ'. The ungodly Bolshevik power rejected the principle of Christian morality and natural law, neglected the rights and freedoms of citizens, even the right to life. Tens of thousands of church ministers and millions of ordinary believers fell victim to repression. There was a rollback to the 'pre-Christian' and 'pre-legal' state of society.

The theorist and practitioner of state atheism was J. Stalin. Having a clerical education, he became the cruellest tyrant of the 20th century. The paradox is that 'the enemy of religion and morality, the usurper of rights and freedoms, the apologist of atheism and materialism, having mastered the tone of dogmatic Orthodoxy', used it as a party publicist and theorist which allowed him to revive the very idea of the state as an 'earthly god'⁴⁴. The monster state (the new Leviathan), which was at the centre of the Bolshevik apostasy, neglected Christian values and norms, principles of law, legality, and morality, thus leading to radical shifts in the mass consciousness. As the religious thinker M. Trubetskoy wrote: *'Bolshevism managed to remove the mask from the secular man and show everyone Satan in his undisguised form, and thus instill in many confidence in the reality of Satan, consequently leading to faith in God'*⁴⁵.

44 Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 69.

45 Трубецкой Н. С. Мы и другие // Русский мир: геополитические заметки по русской истории. Москва; Санкт-Петербург, 2003. С. 784. Див. також: Бачинин В. А. Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 69–70.

According to the modern Ukrainian philosopher Yuliia Brodetska, the totalitarian practices of the modern era have undergone mutations, becoming a consumer society: *‘Totalitarianism is being replaced by a one-dimensional society, a neo-totalitarian system which exists through the hypnosis of the media that inoculate into every individual consciousness false needs, the cult of consumption’*. In short, mass culture as a technology has created *‘a more sophisticated, and hence even more threatening, manipulative model of the “soft” power of a consumer society’*⁴⁶.

In general, an important postulate of social theology is the understanding of the integrative role of the Christian idea which should be neither Orthodox, nor Protestant, nor Catholic, and which can unite ‘Christians with Christians, as well as Christians with representatives of other denominations and Christians with non-believers’⁴⁷. Unlike secular thinking, with its atheistic-materialist categories, social theology can give a new vision and understanding of social realities in a globalizing world.

Social Theology as a Field of Academic Research

Social theology has significant heuristic, scientific potential in the fields of studying and understanding global history. Given the multidimensional nature of social theology which contains social eschatology, hermeneutics of social events, social criticism, social logic of the kingdom of God, confessional history, it acts as a specific type of historical thinking, a means of understanding and

46 *Бродецька Ю. Ю.* Феномен цілісності суспільства. Дніпро, 2017. С. 174.

47 *Бачинин В. А.* Российская реальность как предмет политической теологии. С. 73.

reproducing global history. As a cognitive model, social theology can be acceptable at different stages of global history – from world human history to regional (large cultural areas of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans), local (Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe), and native (nation states, polyethnic empires) levels.

World history is moving in a way that is not always clear and accessible to the secular thinking of historians, political scientists, economists, and so on. The methodological frame of such history is the religious principle. Thus, in the light of social theology, the great subjects of world history – civilisations, states, peoples – like the common man live by religious and spiritual norms and moral principles. Violation of these norms and principles by states, peoples, and civilisations leads to the emergence of collective ‘social’ sins.

According to the established religious order, any sin, including collective, ‘social’ ones, implies punishment. So people themselves evoke punitive forces. Punishment for their sins is carried out by evil forces – if we move from allegorical to ordinary language – in the form of natural disasters and cataclysms, typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes, natural, environmental disasters, as well as the collapse of political regimes, the decline of great cultures, the destruction of states and civilisations. Punishment for unbelief is a serious illness (the social analogue of such an illness is corruption). However, after punishment, a person takes the path of salvation which is the main goal of the individual and large communities – peoples, states, cultures, civilisations.

In general, social theology should be seen as a type of global history, the conceptualisation of which occurs

through such universal categories of Christian theology as *sin – punishment – salvation*. In view of this, a practical question arises: how do religious and historical narratives relate to each other? Regarding the alternative of scientific and religious narratives, M. Epstein noted that the one which ‘surprises, fascinates, motivates not only to perceive but also to transform the world has the best chances to be spread. Both religious and scientific narratives in themselves contain a lot of incredible, truly poetic and metaphysical, amazing in the Aristotelian sense’⁴⁸.

The very fact of the emergence of global history in the form of social theology is not accidental: it is the result of the historical development of European religiosity. As is well known, the religiosity of the Middle Ages permeated all aspects of the society’s consciousness of that time. During the Renaissance, within the framework of Christian civilisation, there grew a ‘layer of non-religiosity’ which in the 18th century came out and defined the French enlighteners’ ideology. In the 19th century, secularism (atheism) was finally established in the minds of intellectuals from L. Feuerbach, K. Marx to F. Nietzsche. In the 20th century, there was a reassessment of values: ‘The Holy Trinity was reinterpreted as a reflection of the earthly family (Feuerbach), and God – as an adult projection of children’s dependence on the almighty father (Freud)’.

The last century was particularly characterised by such anti-religious movements as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, the development of science and technology, space

48 Эпштейн М. Религия после атеизма: Новые возможности теологии. С. 376.

exploration, and so on⁴⁹. The Canadian researcher of the history of the West secularisation Charles Taylor generally calls the 20th century the 'secular era.' Secularism, in his understanding, is the destruction of the religious picture of the world, the decline of the church's social status, and at the same time, the creation of preconditions for new spiritual movements, religious and secular. In short, in the 20th century, religious consciousness finally gave way to secularism and atheism⁵⁰.

However, the movement of European religiosity did not end there. M. Epstein defines the current situation in 'post-secular' Europe as 'an era when a faith that has declined in the last century, is experiencing a rise.' By this logic, the 21st century appears as the age of 'protoreligion' in the age of globalization: *'It now seems that all those "post" things that multiplied in the 1970s and 1990s: posthumanism, posthistorism, poststructuralism, post-Christianity, etc., are all themselves in the past. The time has come for the beginning of the widespread "proto" [...] protoreligion in the age of globalization [...] the state of our civilisation is protoglobal, protovirtual, protobiotechnical, and even protoangelic (meaning the ability of people to increasingly dematerialise their existence)*⁵¹.

We can state that secularism and atheism of the 20th century prepared the ground for the revival of religiosity, spirituality in the age of globalization. After all, religiosity is not only an external, formal aspect of

49 Там же. С. 381.

50 *Taylor Ch., A Secular Age*, p. 534. Див. також: Эпштейн М. Религия после атеизма: Новые возможности теологии. С. 40.

51 Цит. за: Чижевський Д. Нариси з історії філософії на Україні. Київ, 1992. С. 203..

the attitude to faith (church rules, rituals, traditions), or such a phenomenon as a 'minimal religion', is above all spirituality which means love, faith, sincere attitude to God, which permeates the way of life and constant processes in society.

Social Theology and Ukrainian Intellectual Tradition

In the area of social theology, the conceptual constructions of the philosopher and Christian thinker of the last century P. Yurkevych acquire a modern sound. The source of his views was the biblical doctrine of the 'heart' and 'ideas of the heart' in the European and domestic intellectual tradition. He stood at the origins of Russian religious philosophy and had a significant influence on the formation of the worldview of the secular theologian V. Solovyov – his student, disciple, and successor at the Department of History of Philosophy and Law of Moscow University. V. Solovyov, who himself had Ukrainian roots (through his mother), left interesting thoughts and observations about the Ukrainianness and temperament of his mentor: *'Yurkevych was a native of Poltava region, a Ukrainian by birth and forever hid in his character and speech a bright imprint of his origin. No doubt that Yurkevych's individual character was formed against the general background of Ukrainian nature; hence came his pensiveness, absorption in thought, sensitivity more intense than extensive, as well as stubbornness and isolation, which reached the point of cunning. Yurkevych was inclined to quietly exchange views with a few friends. To these features, we must add another one, also Ukrainian, – a special kind*

*of concentrated humour. He made me laugh, just barely smiling*⁵².

From the perspective of social theology, the provisions of the anthropological-religious concept of the famous philosopher deserve attention. Thus, P. Yurkevych resorted to comparing the state with man, given the complexity of internal relations and organisation within these two systems: 'The state is a man of large size, so by defining the essence of man, you can determine the essence or thought of the state'. At the same time, he noted that the state's perfection was directly dependent on human perfection⁵³.

It is known that due to the controversy with N. Chernyshevsky, P. Yurkevych became the object of persecution by 'progressive publicists', representatives of the revolutionary-democratic camp. In his critical review 'On the Science of the Human Spirit' (1860), the philosopher criticised N. Chernyshevsky's article 'Anthropological Principle in Philosophy', in particular the materialist principles, which in the mid-19th century became a real intellectual fashion. It is significant that N. Chernyshevsky himself treated the opponent with contempt, refusing any debate. As a result of public attacks, P. Yurkevych's manuscripts were practically unpublished, and his works and name were silenced for a long time, especially during the Soviet period.

The core of P. Yurkevych's theological anthropology is his religious-romantic 'philosophy of the heart'. In his

52 Цит. за: *Чижевський Д.* Нариси з історії філософії на Україні. Київ, 1992. С. 203.

53 Див.: *Давидов П. Г.* Антропоцентрична концепція П. Д. Юр-кевича й філософська рефлексія права [Електронний режим]: http://www.apfs.in.ua/v8_2015/10.pdf

work ‘The Heart and its Significance in the Spiritual Life of Man, According to the Teachings of the Word of God’, he developed a theological picture of the world because the source of human development and society is in the spiritual sphere, in the realisation of the Divine plan and the Divine ideal of love. The world can be known only by the heart, so the heart itself, not the mind, is the original essence of man. Knowledge must also pass ‘through the heart’, enlightened by the mind, directly ‘into the habitation of soul’.

The heart, in the understanding of P. Yurkevych, is the centre of mental and spiritual life of man, the source of their physical strength and cognitive actions: ‘Man must give God only their heart to become faithful to Him in thought, word, and deed: give me, my son, your heart, God’s wisdom cries out to man’⁵⁴. The highest value of the human race lies in the unity of mankind before God: *‘All our actions, all our behaviour must be guided by the belief that Jesus Christ called the whole human race to unity under one God. He who has transferred this faith from a simple thought into the living meaning of his spirit, from head to heart, sees in every man their neighbour, acquaintance, relative, brother. Disagreements and clashes between people, inevitable in life, will not extinguish in him the feeling of this spiritual kinship of people, that is, they will not extinguish in him the truth and love, which are common and universal grounds for establishing peace and fraternal community between people’*⁵⁵.

Thus, the heart and cordiality serve as a source of a person’s religious feeling and the basis of faith. ‘The basis

54 Юркевич П. Д. Вибране / Пер. з рос. В. П. Недашківського. Київ, 1993. С. 78.

55 Цит. за: Чижевський Д. Нариси з історії філософії на Україні. С. 202.

of the religious consciousness of the human race,' stated P. Yurkevych, 'is in the human heart: religion is not something foreign to its spiritual nature, it is established on natural grounds'⁵⁶.

Thus, P. Yurkevych's views fully fit into the religious and philosophical tradition of Ukrainian consciousness which has its roots in the mysticism of hesychasm, the ideas of polemic philosophers I. Vyshenskyi and K. Stavrovetsky (Tranquillion). Later, it was continued by H. Skovoroda, who considered the heart to be a habitation of happiness, love, and the kingdom of God within us. This tradition is represented in Ukrainian romanticism (M. Maksymovych, M. Hohol, M. Kostomarov, P. Kulish), as well as in the art and literature of the 1920s.

Strange to say, but the thoughts of the political thinker V. Lypynskyi, who wrote about the state of the church and religion in Ukraine, are completely consistent with our present. He stressed that as a moral force, we need a church that 'will turn our today's catfighting for the half-eaten bones thrown into our colonial dump into a struggle for the world place of Ukraine, for our conscious historical mission, which the Great God entrusted us, among other nations and states, to perform on the earth created by Him'.

V. Lypynskyi considered religion a school of social and moral discipline and denied its use for political purposes. Therefore, 'in addition to our own clear and expressive secular faith, political ideology, we need universal faith in God, we need the help of both the church and religion'. He warned against using religion in the interests of political mercantilism, state selfishness, and 'greedy instincts' of

56 Юркевич П. Д. Серце та його значення у духовному житті людини, згідно з ученням слова Божого // Його ж. Вибране. С. 103.

politicians: ‘The speculator, whether in trade, or at the production field, or in religion, or in politics, always wants to make as much profit as possible with the least effort; wants to get higher by all means. *To do this, they need as much freedom as possible. A religion and the church, which by their binding moral precepts restrict freedom; a religion that does not allow to freely deceive, lie, exploit, rob; a religion that commands obedience to authority and restrain one’s selfish greedy instincts; a religion which preaches the greatest efforts in the fight against evil and calls for sacrifice and dedication to the whole community – cannot be pleasant to this type of organisers of public life, and therefore, they do their best to limit its influence, take public life from under its control and restrictive influence, and turn it into a private enterprise that demands nothing of such public politicians*⁵⁷.

Thus, religion and politics have different vectors of movement in society, so they have different understandings of what freedom is: if a politician, or a ‘speculator’, seeks as much ‘freedom’ as they can, then religion and the church with their moral principles in every way limit anyone’s efforts to deceive, lie, and exploit.

Ukrainian Religious Narrative

Many of V. Lypynskyi’s arguments sound prophetic in a situation when religious issues and interfaith confrontation become relevant in modern Ukraine. The creation of a local church is the hard spiritual work of the believers, priests, and the public. While an attempt to split Ukrainian Orthodoxy, as the philosopher and political thinker said, is

57 *Липинський В.* Релігія і церква в історії України. Львів, 1933. Див. також: Сюднюков І. Дорога до українського храму // День. 2018. 6 червня.

nothing more than a 'private enterprise' of some politicians in our country and abroad. Thus, we have reason to state how organically the religious and philosophical reflections of the Ukrainian intellectual of the modern era fit into the circle of spiritual problems actualised by the current age of globalization.

V. Lypynskyi's ideas and reflections are a prologue to the Ukrainian religious narrative. Rather interesting is the view of the history of Ukraine from the standpoint of social theology and its key concepts 'sin' – 'punishment' – 'salvation'. Thus, Patriarch Filaret emphasises that the path from sin to salvation (purification from sin) is only one, through repentance: *'By our power, we will not overcome sin. But by the divine power and the power of the grace of the Holy Spirit. And for this, we need repentance. That is, confession of our sins. It is not so easy to confess oneself a sinner. That is far from simple. Because we justify our every sin by one circumstance or another. And if we make excuses, then we do not repent. And in order to be cleansed from sin, one must repent. And in order to repent, one must confess their sinfulness.'*

According to him, the current state of Ukrainian society is connected with the spiritual revival of Ukraine, the meaning of which he sees in the construction of new temples (during the years of independence, 3.5 thousand of them were built), as well as in trust, in contrast to official authorities, to the army, to soldiers who defend the country in the east, in the development of the volunteer movement. He believes that 'trust in the church in Ukraine is the highest' because it brings the necessary and useful. When people *'turn away from God, this does not mean that God does not exist, and it does not mean that God does not*

*rule this world. It is we, sinners, who turn away from God. Thus drawing troubles upon ourselves. And if we clung to God, kept His commandments, there would be no war, and there would be justice in society if we clung to God and kept His commandments*⁵⁸.

The fact of the globalizing world presupposes cooperation between nations and states: ‘The thing is that we live in a globalizing world; we don’t choose it, but the very historical process makes it impossible for us to live in isolation’; that is, we must cooperate with other states. The aim of such cooperation between Ukraine and Europe is not only to receive but also to give: ‘[...] *We not only want to get something positive from Europe: technology, democracy, freedom of speech, and the like. But we can also give Europe what it doesn’t have. And it has no spirituality. While we have it*⁵⁹.

The Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epiphanius, also speaks about the mission of the church in the global dimension. As he says, Orthodox Christians are sensitive to environmental issues because the planet Earth is ‘our common home which we received from the Lord’. Therefore, everything that needs care and attention should be treated responsibly and carefully: ‘We should not be evil exhausters and consumers of resources’. In such a broad context, Metropolitan Epiphanius emphasises the need to know one’s past, to preserve one’s historical memory, one’s own church traditions, and the common experience of world Orthodoxy: ‘We need to

58 Див.: [Електронний ресурс]: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28217560.html>

59 Див.: [Електронний ресурс]: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2018/06/14/7183252/>

know our true history, remember whose children we are, and think about our descendants and what we will hand them down' as well as 'focus on the best traditions of world Orthodoxy, while maintaining the invariability, purity, and integrity of the Orthodox doctrine'.

At the same time, he reminds that the church 'has glorious history and certain achievements that need to be actualised, studied, and brought back to life. And even shared with the brothers and sisters of other churches'. Moreover, 'our church is open to society', it is not alien to the troubles and griefs of the Ukrainian people, it debunks the myths that 'have rooted in our society and replace the true faith in God with faith in superstitions and rites'.

At the moment, Ukraine deals with the problems of war, corruption, local church, labour emigration. As Volodymyr Smutko, the chairman of the Dnieper Centre for Spiritual Revival considers, today in Ukrainian society, there is 'selecting-out' as those who do not need the Law of God leave (that is, they go 'to their own glory'), while the faithful to God remain. The devil's forces cannot defeat Ukraine. At the same time, the meaning of being as God's law will be revealed consistently⁶⁰.

We live, says Metropolitan Epiphanius, in an 'open information society, the rapid development of science and technology', so it is important to learn to distinguish between good and evil, truth and falsehood. He sees the role of Ukraine in the current conditions in bearing *'light for the world, showing by own example the true values of the Christian life, and returning them to Europe, which, unfortunately, started losing them rather rapidly'*.

60 Див.: [Електронний ресурс]: <https://clarity-project.info/edr/20199191>

The Primate also draws attention to the problem of the relationship between church and state in our time because he considers the former to be the spiritual support of the latter. Of course, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the church and the state are separated from each other. As is well known, Christians take part in all state processes, and Epiphanius is sure that in the future, the state and the church *'will continue to cooperate on a partnership basis. We as a church lend a hand to our state, but the state must also understand its responsibility for the church as its spiritual support. The church is called to serve the interests of its people'*⁶¹.

It is obvious that in the conditions of our hybrid reality and hybrid consciousness, within which there coexist, on the one hand, religiosity, spirituality, and faith, on the other – secularism, 'new atheism', and godlessness, all types of global history, including social theology, have the right to exist and deserve more detailed study.

61 Митрополит Епіфаній: Ворог розуміє мову сили [Електронний ресурс]: <https://zbruc.eu/node/92072>

CHAPTER 5.

Histoire Croisée

Metanarrative in Global History

*Metanarrative of the 19th–20th Centuries
as an Intellectual Artefact*

*National Narrative in the 21st Century:
Challenges of Globalizing World*

*Histoire Croisée: Academic Origins
and Conceptualization*

Histoire Croisée and Metanarrative

Comparative History: Traditions and Innovations

Cultural Transfer as a Concept

Cultural Transfer as a Historical Perspective

Transcultural Model of Europe

Metanarrative in Global History

For many historians today, there remains a debated question of whether global history means the collapse of ‘cosmopolitan’ and traditional narratives limited by chronological and spatial framework. Some researchers believe so, while others hold the opposite view. I see myself in the camp of those who recognise the need for metanarratives in world and national history.

Of particular interest is the position of Patrick O’Brien who characterises the current situation with metanarratives in global history. According to him, nationalist narratives existed from the beginning and had a more than two-thousand-year-old tradition, based on the recognition and affirmation of ‘the spiritual, moral, cultural supremacy of Egyptian, Hellenistic, Byzantine, Islamic, Confucian, Indian, African, and other civilisations’¹. The researcher considers this state of affairs to be quite natural because claims to ‘cultural, modal superiority are inherent in any nationalism and are not a monopoly of the West’². Thus, after the Reformation, as a result of conflicts over religious preferences and national identities, ‘Anglo-, Franco-, Spanish-, German- and other centrist histories’ prevailed in European historiography³.

Radical changes were associated with the era of globalization. Historians have spoken seriously about the renaissance of history and significant changes in the field of modern historiography. According to P. O’Brien, since

1 O’Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, 1, p. 32.

2 Ibid, p. 32–33.

3 Ibid.

the Reformation, *'prospects for constructing cosmopolitan metanarratives in global history look better than ever since Voltaire's time'*⁴.

The expert not only does not deny the existence of meta- and national narratives in the context of global history but outlines the range of tasks and prospects of narratives of the 21st century. In particular, they must get rid of the traditions of nationalism in its classical sense, *'leaving in the past the supremacy of Rome, the pursuit of world caliphate, the moral claims of Confucianism, the claims of spiritual superiority inherent in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and the scientific and technological triumphalism of the West'*⁵.

As P. O'Brien considers, the general narratives of the 21st century must be inclusive and convincing, transcending the boundaries of Eurocentrism⁶. The metanarratives of the new century must abandon the established spatial and chronological framework inherent in the narratives of the Eurocentrism era, i.e. *'to abandon the traditions of narratives, limited chronologically and spatially, engaged in praising, elevating (or denigrating) the achievements of the West in science, technology, economic organisation, and defence, which [...] continue to inform the whole world of themselves for two centuries'*.

P. O'Brien talks about the current historiographical discussion about the future of world (global) history. Modern historiography faces the challenges of global forms of history. In practice, this means abandoning spatial confinements and related national chronologies.

4 Ibid, p. 32.

5 Ibid, p. 36.

6 Ibid, p. 32–33.

According to P. O'Brien, it is the abolition of spatial and chronological limits that can create a favourable ground for the emergence of local, regional, and national narratives of a qualitatively new level. The challenges of global forms of history, which became relevant in the last quarter of the 20th century, mean new perspectives on the representation of the past which include '*ancient historical processes, which were also considered from the standpoint of "globalization"*'.

P. O'Brien sees the ideal of global history in the rejection of any claims to objectivity and bias because global history sets the goals related to the moral needs of a globalizing world. The new requirements of global history require a rethinking of classical historiography. In turn, such a 'rearrangement' of traditional historiography will create 'the space for histories free of national, regional, and ethnic traditions'. This is how the researcher sees the path of global historians to construct metanarratives that, on the one hand, will expand our understanding of the diversity of history and, on the other, help people realise that for millennia, they have been in a stream of global influences mixed with local elements in all possible dimensions⁷. At the same time, P. O'Brien warns about certain epistemological and professional risks in creating metanarratives for global history.

Therefore, it is quite reasonable to think that modern global history does not reject the idea of meta-, national, and local narratives. At the same time, the new image of the metanarrative created within the framework of global history transcends the state, national, and territorial

7 Ibid, p. 38.

borders, has an inclusive character, and represents the distant and recent past from the perspective of global influences.

*Metanarrative of the 19th–20th Centuries
as an Intellectual Artefact*

A constructive approach in assessing the possibilities of metanarratives within global history requires a retrospective view of the intellectual claims, specifics, and requirements of metanarratives of previous epochs. The 19th century was the ‘age of history’, of classical historiography and metanarratives, the period of the formation of classical historical science, ontologically connected with the nation state. Within the framework of scientific state policy, academic culture was formed, professorial departments on national histories, networks of historical archives, scientific institutions and communities were created.

It is noteworthy that in the professional historiography of the 19th century, the final conceptualisation of the categories of time and space took place. The triumph of history as a method is the result of a ‘romantic revolution’. The Romantics who in their chivalric romances were the authors of numerous national histories brought the spirit and taste of history to literature and historiography. It was the historians-romantics who turned time into an object of imagination, a symbolic flow of time, and formulated the idea of ‘the infinity of historical time’. At the same time, they separated historical time from historical space, believing that there were ‘places without time’ (‘Devastated graves’ in T. Shevchenko’s works). Following the Romantics,

positivist historians of the 19th century also became the creators of the ‘infinite history’ project.

As is well known, European historiography of the 19th and 20th centuries was dominated by the idea of nation-centric history which was based on the classical Newtonian model of space-time. The idea of ‘infinite history’ deepened the ‘lower horizon of time’, and thus pushed the origins of national existence far into the past. It led to the emergence of historical narratives which could unfold endlessly in infinite time.

It is no coincidence that in the 19th – early 20th centuries in Russian and Ukrainian historiography, there were historical compendiums already associated with positivism, such as the 29-volume History of Russia from Ancient Times by S. Solovyov, the 10-volume History of Ukraine-Rus’ by M. Hrushevskiy. In positivist historiography, simultaneously with the absolute deepening of historical time, its maximum fragmentation into scales took place: *‘It seemed that no fact, which was interpreted in the 19th century as an “event”, was able to avoid registration in the endless book of endless history’*⁸.

Obviously, the multivolume national narratives of the 19th century were not only a direct result of the titanic work of their authors but also the realisation of the ‘infinite history’ project which left open the lower horizon of historical time. It is known that the multivolume ‘histories’ of the prominent Russian and Ukrainian

8 Ващенко В. «Пам’ять історика»: обмежувальні структури історичного часу та способи їх репрезентації у текстах Михайла Грушевського // Історія – ментальність – ідентичність. Вип. IV: Історична пам’ять українців і поляків у період формування національної свідомості в ХІХ – першій половині ХХ ст. / За ред. Л. Зашкільняка, Й. Пісулінської, П. Серженги. Львів, 2011. С. 81.

historians ended with a description of the events of the late 18th century. Is it a coincidence or a lack of archival resources (which both had enough)? Is this a position due to the general scientific situation at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries?

The fact is that in an industrial society, time remains linear, but becomes dynamic, appears as an ‘arrow time’. The dynamism of time in the industrial age expands the boundaries of social space and at the same time, maintains its value and integrity. The development of railways gave rise to a sense of unity in society. It is no coincidence that it was in the industrial age, that man began to perceive their own life as a biography. In industrial society, a single time thread / timeline has been broken up into identical, uniform segments that follow each other. This perception of historical time was reflected in culture and art. For example, Maurice Ravel’s *Bolero* brought automatism to music, reproducing the rhythm of a working industrial machine, which thus symbolised the ‘conveyor-like’ thinking of industrial society.

However, at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, scientific ideas about historical time and space have also changed radically. M. Lobachevsky’s nonclassical geometry and A. Einstein’s theory of relativity violated Newton’s picture of the world with its inherent ideas about the absolute nature and independent space and time. As a result, time in historiography is also space. As a consequence, in the 20th century, there emerged the idea of M. Bakhtin’s chronotope and P. Nora’s concept of ‘sites of memory’.

It is noteworthy that in the postmodern era, the ‘infinite history’ project was replaced by ideas about its fragmentation (M. Foucault), the idea of ‘the grand

narrative's death' (J.-F. Lyotard) and 'the end of history' (F. Fukuyama). Today, historical time is perceived through the graphics of a certain topos. Thus, in historiography in the late 20th century, the voices of those historians who believed that traditional metanarratives had no prospects or future were heard increasingly louder.

*National Narrative in the 21st Century:
Challenges of Globalizing World*

Despite the pessimistic forecasts, the career of metanarratives in the post-industrial era seems not only attractive but fascinating due to creating intellectual intrigue. Post-industrial, information society, in the interpretation of M. Castells, is a mobile, flexible structure of information flows and communications. In the information and network society, perceptions of time and space are changing radically. 'Dense' physical space has its own virtual projection in cyberspace, within which the concepts of 'here', 'there', 'far', and 'near' lose their original meaning.

The image of M. McLuhan's 'global village' becomes a symbol of the new perception of social space. Instant transmission of information and response to it destroys linear ideas about the chronotope. As a result, the dichotomy center-periphery, which find themselves in a single information space, loses its meaning. At the same time, mobility that is the speed of overcoming the distance between two points determines a person's social status and characterises the degree of social polarisation in society for the cosmopolitan way of life widely advertised in the media is not available to everyone.

Of course, in the network society, the perception of time changes, and its compression occurs – the effect of implosion (internal explosion). Researchers have talked about new temporality – the concept of ‘timeless time’. The main feature of time in a network society is flexibility which allows to ‘compress’ and ‘stretch’ the time. Network production management, says M. Castells, ‘*relies on flexible temporality, the ability to speed up or slow down production and profit cycles, the distribution of time, equipment, and personnel*’⁹.

Thus, in the information-network society, a new image of time is formed which contains numerous temporal flows. The cultural projection of this image is the cult film *Pulp Fiction* where the meaning of events and actions of the characters emerges and intertwines with numerous time flows. In general, the temporality of cyberspace is the temporality of instantaneous propagation or the temporality of synchrony. It is believed that spatio-temporal compression has become the axis of globalization. At the same time, compression, contraction of time in the modern globalizing world is a direct consequence of a number of technological and social revolutions of the 20th century.

The new concept of space-time in the age of globalization creates favourable opportunities and opens unique perspectives on the emergence and quality of national, regional, and global narratives. Metanarrative during the 20th century had a rather dramatic history. The national metanarrative is known to have been constructed around

9 *Кастельс М.* Информационная эпоха: экономика, общество и культура / Пер. с англ. под науч. ред. О. И. Шкаратана. Москва, 2000. С. 407.

such a key category as the 'nation state'. It is the national state narrative that is the legacy of 'Western colonialism and imperialism'¹⁰.

The collapse of colonialism, the end of the Cold War, the rise of Islam, and the crisis of Marxism led to a radical change in the traditional image of the national metanarrative at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. As a result of these socio-cultural and intellectual changes, some national historiographers have taken the path of abandoning the hegemony of the national state scheme of history. Thus, the concept of Subaltern Studies proposed by Indian intellectuals meant '*recognition of the need to go beyond such universal explanatory structures as the nation state. It was recognised that nationalist histories developed as anti-colonial histories*'¹¹.

The intellectual initiative of American historiography to abandon the notion of 'nation' in general deserves special attention. Established in 1995 at the request of the National Center for History in the Schools at the University of California, Los Angeles, state programmes (standards) for teaching history in the United States, including world history, '*rejected a unified understanding of the "nation" and emphasised the pluralism of national cultures, the role of minorities and women in history – an approach that allowed for global intercultural comparisons*'¹². According to G. Iggers and E. Wang, this testifies to the historians' desire '*to go beyond the national paradigm and acquire*

10 Иггерс Г., Ван Э. Глобальная история современной историо-графии / Пер. с англ. О. Воробьевой, науч. ред. М. Кукарцева. Москва, 2012. С. 405.

11 Там же. С. 413.

12 Там же. С. 412.

*a new vision of the past. Of course, this attempt reflects a general trend for historians around the world*¹³.

However, the situation with the national metanarrative in the historiographies of East Asia and Eastern Europe remains conservative. National historiographies in these regions are focused on constructing such historical schemes, at the centre of which the nation state is, which was popular when the communist ideology dominated¹⁴. It should be noted that the positions of the national metanarrative remain attractive to this day because the model of nationalist history has played an important 'instrumental role in shaping the procedures of historical research around the world' (G. Iggers and E. Wang).

On the other hand, it is important to take into account political and geopolitical factors. The 'young' states that emerged as a result of the collapse of the colonial system and the fall of totalitarian regimes in East Asia (Asian 'tigers') and Eastern Europe (post-Soviet countries) are focused on the national paradigm of history. The political elites of these countries are interested in creating respectable national narratives.

Ukraine, like other Central and Eastern European countries, is also focused on creating a persuasive national narrative. The key point of the nationalist programme of Ukrainism remains the idea of an independent state which has gone from aristocratic autonomy, bourgeois federalism, democratic independence through the quasi-national values of the totalitarian Soviet regime to the realisation of the sovereignty postulate.

13 Там же. С. 418.

14 Там же. С. 411.

Of course, this should be a new type of narrative which should determine the worthy place of Ukraine in the intercultural area of its millennial existence. What will be the modern model of national history? The idea of ‘infinite history’, which arose and was represented in the romantic historiography of the first quarter of the 19th century, existed in the form of multivolume histories, which in Soviet historiography were represented by a formation scheme, and in the second half of the 20th century, it finally exhausted itself. In the 21st century, the idea-project of ‘infinite history’ was replaced by the concept of multiple modernities.

Today’s historians face the same problem as their 19th-century predecessors: where is the line between past and present, history and politics? Where is the point of separation of the past from social reality? If different generations of historians of the last century have been thinking about how to write the history of the 19th century, then modern experts are faced with no less difficult problem – how to understand the history of the 20th century. The current generation of historians has already spoken of the ‘long 20th century’ which covers the period from 1870 to 2010. It was then that ‘the world was redrawn and connected by a set of technologies’¹⁵.

In the special literature, there is a concept of a ‘historian’s memory’. In particular, the famous Soviet methodologist M. Barg used the concept of the ‘historian’s time’ and understood it as an ambivalent construction containing the time of the epoch that

15 *Dickinson Edward Ross, The World in the Long Twentieth Century: An Interpretive History, California University Press, 2018.*

the historian studies and their own time that they live in, and the specialist's task is therefore 'a dialogue' of historical epochs¹⁶.

According to V. Vashchenko, a 'historian's memory' does not mean personal biographical recollections, i.e. the historian's own memories or a kind of social memory. A 'historian's memory' is an idea of historical time theoretically substantiated by a certain historical distance. A 'historian's memory' sets the chronological boundaries of the study. It is limited to two points: the lower is the perception of time that is as far away as possible in antiquity, which is inherent in the discipline that the historian represents, and the 'upper horizon of time' fixes the terminal, final temporal point of their 'narrative' and separates 'the past from the present, history from politics'¹⁷.

It is fundamentally important to define the upper horizon of historical time as a point of rupture between past and present, history and political science. Popular in the early 20th century, the concept of 'historical cycles' (consisting of three generations) at the end of the century experienced a second birth. As a result of the new wave of globalization in the 1980s, the interdisciplinary range of historical writing expanded and the concept of historical memory became especially popular. According to Jan Assmann, collective memory consists of close communicative and distant cultural

16 Барз М. А. Категории и методы исторической науки. Москва, 1984. С. 92–93.

17 Ващенко В. «Пам'ять історика»: обмежувальні структури історичного часу та способи їх репрезентації у текстах Михайла Грушевського. С. 75.

memory. The relative contains the ancestral memory of three generations¹⁸.

The time horizon of communicative memory corresponds to three generations, in which different time flows are intertwined and where it is worth looking for a point of transition from the past to the present. In general, the concept of 'cultures of memory' not only limits historical time but breaks it down into multiple temporalities (flows of time). It is no coincidence that historical memory competes with professional historiography, although there is a fundamental difference between them in their approaches to the past. If memory actualises in the past those events that meet the needs of modern elites in their desire to change or maintain the established political order, then historiography (history-science) reconstructs the past not in fragments but in its completeness given the capabilities of its scientific apparatus¹⁹.

Of course, the new tempo-rhythms of our globalized world actualise the methods of modern historiography, in which, along with the traditional genetic (historical) method, a global approach in the form of transnational history and *histoire croisée* is gaining recognition. They capture numerous historical flows, networks, and serve as a key to rethinking the intersection of past and present, history and social reality.

18 *Ассман Я.* Культурная память: Письмо, память о прошлом и политическая идентичность в высоких культурах Древности. – Москва, 2004.

19 *Колесник І.* Исторична пам'ять та історіографія: архетипи взаємодії // *Історія – ментальність – ідентичність*. Вип. IV: *Історична пам'ять українців і поляків у період формування національної свідомості в XIX – першій половині XX ст.* / За ред. Л. Зашкільняка, Й. Пісулінської, П. Серженги. Львів, 2011. С. 54-64.

Histoire Croisée: Academic Origins and Conceptualization

One type of global history, along with transnational, is *histoire croisée*. It has many synonyms: in French, it is *histoire croisée*; in English, it's entangled history and connected history²⁰.

It is noteworthy that the concept of 'entangled history' is mostly in the focus of European historians. An interesting experience of its definition can be found in the online dictionary InterAmerican Wikis: Terms – Concepts – Critical Perspectives (Centre for InterAmerican Studies (CIAS) at Bielefeld University)²¹.

Thus, in the article 'Entangled History' (2015) Sönke Bauck and Thomas Maier analyse the concept's history, its structural connections, and methodological basis. Like transnational historians, they refer it to a whole family of related terms: a 'transfer history', 'transnational history', 'Atlantic history', 'borderland history', '*histoire croisée*', 'world history', 'history of capitalism'²². As we can see, the linguistic family of terms from the area of global history

20 The Making of the Modern World: Connected Histories, Divergent Paths (1500 to the Present) / Ed. by Robert W. Strayer, N.Y., 1989; Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness / Ed. by Yelka Ehuda Franfurkt et al., 2002; *Burson Jeffrey D.*, Entangled History and the Concept of Enlightenment. Contributions to the History of Concepts, 8 (2): 1–24, 2013. Режим доступа: <https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/history-facrubs/47>

21 InterAmerican Wiki: Terms – Concepts – Critical Perspectives of the Centre for InterAmerican Studies (CIAS) at Bielefeld University. Режим доступа: <https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/aboutus.html>

22 *Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas*, Entangled History, InterAmerican Wiki: Terms – Concepts – Critical Perspectives, 2015. Режим доступа: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

provides ample opportunities for their interpretation and at the same time, causes certain risks associated with the linguistic specificity and linguistic behaviour of researchers through different approaches to the glossary of global history in general.

According to the authors of the article, the concept of ‘entangled history’ (EH) arose from two discussions, such as the ‘spatial turn’ and postcolonial studies. The first steps towards creating a conceptual framework for the EH were taken in the 1980s, when political European integration was involved. The authors state that Michele Espagne, among others, showed intercultural transfers between France and Germany (1988)²³. At the same time, supporters of the transfer history advocated for the transparency of borders and against comparative approaches in international history. At the same time, Sanjay Subrahmanyam coined the term ‘connected histories’ (1997) to trace the relationship between India and Europe in the early modern period²⁴.

The authors of the French analogue of entangled history – the concept of *histoire croisée* – were Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann (2002)²⁵, who

23 *Espagne Michel*, *Transferts: les relations interculturelles dans l'espace franco-allemand (XVIIIe et XIXe siècle)*. Paris: Éditions recherche sur les civilisations, 1988.

24 *Subrahmanyam Sanjay*, *Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia*, *Modern Asian Studies*, 31 (3), 1997, p. 735–762.

25 *Werner Michael and Zimmermann Bénédicte*, “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der *Histoire croisée* und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen.” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (4), 2002, pp. 607–636.

criticised a ‘transfer history’²⁶. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria ‘developed a similar perspective for *histoire croisée* in *postcolonial articulation*’. Thus, S. Randeria (1999) used the term ‘entangled modernities’²⁷. On the one hand, those double results were the consequence of ‘enhanced interaction and interdependence’, while on the other, ‘nationalism and categories of race, class, and sex’ contributed to division, and the nation state itself seemed universal: ‘*Modern nation states were both the product and the basis of capitalist and colonial interaction*’²⁸.

Spanish historians Jorge Luengo and Pol Dalmau present their vision of the problem of genealogy and methodology of ‘entangled history’ in the article ‘Writing Spanish History in the Global Age: Connections and Entanglements in the Nineteenth Century’. They connect the genealogy of this concept with the works of F. Braudel and P. Sean who drew attention to the restoration of lost ties which are almost absent in national narratives. The authors claim that Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Serge Gruzinski, under the influence of their predecessors, also ‘advocated the idea of connectedness to mitigate, if not overcome, Eurocentric approaches’²⁹.

26 See: Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas, *Entangled History*, 2015. Режим доступа: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

27 Randeria Shalini, *Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne*, in: *Zukunftsentwürfe: Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, edited by Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb and Norbert Jegelka. Frankfurt; New York: Campus, 1999, pp. 87–96.

28 Ibid.

29 Jorge Luengo, Pol Dalmau, *Writing Spanish history in the global age: connections and entanglements in the nineteenth century*, *Journal of Global History* (2018) 13, p. 445.

It is obvious that the terms ‘entangled history’, ‘histoire croisée’, and ‘connected history’ that are close in content and focused on the reflection of connections, processes of interaction, and mutual influences appeared at the end of 1990s and became widespread in the 2000s and 2010s. Of course, they all need clarification and correlation with other concepts of the great linguistic family of global history. As for me, I understand all three concepts as synonyms.

At the same time, the diversity of the lexical field testifies to the different approaches of researchers. Thus, Wolfgang Schmale believes that the term ‘entangled’ originated in the natural sciences (chemistry, physics) and has since become ‘generally accepted in the cultural sciences, but it must be worked out theoretically and methodologically’³⁰. Sönke Bauck and Thomas Maier consider the principle of interaction to be the fulcrum of entangled history, for neither nations, nor states, nor civilisations are exclusive and exhaustive ‘units of historiography’. According to them, entangled history as a concept explores power structures and their configuration in space, and as a historical perspective – analyses ‘dependence, interference, interdependence, and confusion, and also emphasises the multidirectional nature of transfers’³¹.

It is noteworthy that the Spaniards Jorge Luengo and Paul Dalmau in defining the concept of entangled history note quite interesting nuances. In particular, they

30 *Schmale Wolfgang*, A Transcultural History of Europe – Perspectives from the History of Migration, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010–12–03. Access mode: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010a-en>

31 *Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas*, Entangled History, 2015. Режим доступа: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

distinguish between the concepts of ‘connected history’ and ‘entangled history’, although both belong to a family of terms from global history. The concept of ‘connected history’ proposed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, in their view, means interactions and interinfluence between different parts of the world, and the concept of ‘entangled history’ is associated with the flow of ideas and people that ‘intertwine between political units, cultures, and societies’³². Obviously, Spanish historians do not fully equate the ideas of ‘connectedness’ and ‘entanglement’, though do not deny their impact on global history. For example, they look at the history of the 19th century from the perspective of two major themes, liberalism and empire. They particularly defined the main features of that period and had great potential for testing the ideas of ‘connectedness’ and ‘entanglement’ that influenced global history³³.

I repeat that, in my opinion, the concepts of ‘histoire croisée’, ‘entangled /intertwined history’, and ‘connected history’ are perceived and used mostly as synonyms, and there is no conflict because they are all very close in content, and semantic nuances and interpretive subtleties or differences are explained by the pragmatic goals of a particular researcher.

The methodological principles of ‘entangled history’ are also analysed in the literature. One cannot disagree with the fact that entangled history is interdisciplinary. If we recall that the preconditions for its emergence were anti-colonial studies and the ‘spatial turn’, it is logical to say that

32 *Luengo Jorge, Dalmau Pol, Writing Spanish history in the global age: connections and entanglements in the nineteenth century, p. 445.*

33 *Ibid.*

the ‘entangled history’ is directed against the ‘dominant methodological nationalism’³⁴.

‘Methodological nationalism’ as a fundamental idea of Eurocentrism, aimed at defining the nation state in its Western model, due to the conceptualization of ‘entangled history’, began to lose its dominant position. This means the historian’s rejection of the idea of the inviolability of national and territorial borders. From the point of view of S. Bauck and T. Maier, at the centre of the modern researcher’s reflections are doubts about the monumentality, immutability, steadfastness of national borders and the desire to explain the nature of transcultural exchanges in the world of ‘entangled influences’³⁵.

Another important conceptual impetus for entangled history is the discussion of ‘spatial turn’. Influenced by the works of Fernand Braudel, Henri Lefebvre, Edward Soja, David Harvey, Doreen Massey, and other scholars, historians began to recognise the constructed nature of space, which meant recognising the ‘synchronicity’ of different spatial frameworks and the important role of historical actors, including historians themselves, in determining the spatial structure. Given this approach, space is interpreted *‘not as a given but as a result of relative processes that potentially have an impact on social interaction’*³⁶.

34 Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas, *Entangled History*, 2015. Режим доступа: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

35 Ibid.

36 Midell Matthias, Naumann Katja, *Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (1), 2010, p. Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas, *Entangled History*, 2015. Режим доступа: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

S. Bauck and T. Maier consider borderland history an important component of the entangled history conceptualisation. After all, it is *'historical borderlands that have become a central space for negotiations on power and identity, revealing forgotten history of mutual exchanges between European immigrant communities and indigenous groups'*. Borderlands are not only 'places of mestizos' but also refuge areas where *'deserters, fugitives, and offenders found refuge and new existence'*.

The bimodal system of the centre and peripheries, as well as the theory of dependence, popular in the 1960s and 1970s, according to researchers, were important in the recognition of 'cross-border power structures, asymmetry, and exploitation'. The theory of dependence, as we know, had a great influence on the I. Wallerstein's theory of the world-system; after all *'capitalism is organised around the interregional and transnational division of labour, with North and South America playing a central role in the emergence of a capitalist world system'*.

S. Bauck and T. Maier consider the history of capitalism in a broad sense – political, cultural, economic – from an interdisciplinary perspective on the example of a comprehensive history of sugar: *'The history of capitalism gains weight through the study of the history of individual goods, in particular how the histories of their production and trade shaped societies in the Western Hemisphere and beyond'*. Thus, these histories 'went beyond traditional economic histories, including also social and cultural factors'. Such works on the history of goods (of the same sugar, or rice, cotton, bananas) 'use numerous conceptual and epistemological starting points of entangled history', covering America as well as territories beyond its borders.

Sidney Mintz's work on sugar history entitled 'The Place of Sugar in Modern History' (1986)³⁷ is considered exemplary; its author '*made an innovative attempt to integrate an interdisciplinary perspective linking anthropology, history, and economics, in order to create a compelling narrative about one of the defining subjects of the modern, especially Atlantic, world*'³⁸.

Other far-reaching areas of historical studies on the Americas 'using a perspective based on entangled history' are the history of the Cold War, the history of labour and economic struggle, the history of social movements, the history of epistemological/scientific communities and 'entangled' knowledge³⁹.

Given that the Ukrainian territories are located in the geographical centre of Europe, 'borderland history' is not only attractive for domestic historiography but serves as a modern tool for historical study from the perspective of entangled history – 'histoire croisée' of lands, ethnic groups, and imperial enclaves⁴⁰. It is noteworthy that the place of 'entangled history' or 'histoire croisée' within

37 *Mintz Sidney W.*, Sweetness and power: the place of sugar in modern history, New York: Penguin Books, 1986.

38 *С. Байк і Т. Маєр* також згадують відому працю з історії бавовни: Beckert Sven, Empire of Cotton: A Global History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014; *Беккерт Свен*. Империя хлопка. Всемирная история / Пер. А. Шеломницкой. Москва: Издательство Института Гайдара, 2018.

39 *Vauck Sönke, Maier Thomas*, 2015, Entangled History. Режим доступу: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

40 Див.: *Ходарковский М. А.* «Чё» Россия «опережала» Европу, или Россия как колониальная империя // Политическая концептология. 2013. № 2. С. 85–91. Режим доступу: <http://politconcept.sfedu.ru/2013.2/04.pdf>; Его же. Степные рубежи России: Как создавалась колониальная империя 1500–1800. Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2019.

global history is methodologically determined in terms of the history of connections and structural transformations. Thus, J. Luengo and P. Dalmau, following C. Bayly and S. Conrad, consider productive the idea of connections ‘for writing history from a global point of view, as well as the structural transformations that made those connections possible’⁴¹.

S. Bauck and T. Maier emphasise the important role of entangled history in the debate over global and world history. In their view, ‘entangled history’ has played an important role in shaping global history as a discipline. Historiographically, global history has emerged from the debate over the convergence of the world with such structural elements of ‘westernness’ as the influence of liberalism and the idea of the nation state. So the new global history is different from different world histories (for example, the history of civilisations). Following P. Manning, the authors emphasise that, in essence, global history illuminates the connections in the global human environment, overcoming borders, such as *‘large-scale population movements and economic fluctuations, intercultural technology transfer, the spread of infectious diseases, long-distance trade, the spread of religious beliefs and ideas in general’*⁴².

It is clear that ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’ is a kind of global history. Again, I consider constructive the idea expressed by R. Torstendahl about the division

41 Luengo Jorge, Dalmau Pol, Writing Spanish history in the global age: connections and entanglements in the nineteenth century, p. 445.

42 Bauck Sönke, Maier Thomas, Entangled History, 2015. доступу: www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Entangled_History.html

of global history into two types – ‘transnational’ and ‘entangled’ histories. In numerous debates around these concepts, we observe how their meanings coincide, then antagonise, and crystallise in self-sufficient definitions that illuminate the multidimensionality of global history, its tempo-rhythms, and structures.

At the same time, it is believed that there are certain risks and threats to entangled history. The risks are that many historical works describe ‘various circulations, exchanges, mobility, and influences’, while ‘not taking into account the mechanisms of stratification, exclusion, and power structures in a more general sense’. Therefore, ‘it is necessary to take into account different degrees of entanglement’⁴³.

The place and role of ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’ in modern historiography is determined not only by the epistemological connection with global history but by the specifics of the subject field, the means of its representation, and location in the intellectual environment. S. Bauck and T. Maier emphasise that the concept of entangled history was formulated by European historians. They attribute the reasons for this to the experience of the Cold War and the development of globalization processes, which also affected nation states. Today, this concept remains more popular in Europe than in the American scientific community.

In short, ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’ as a concept and historical perspective is still awaiting its recognition and evaluation. They are only entering the

43 Ibid.

structure of consciousness of the modern historian, but set them many tasks – command of languages, familiarity with other historiographies. The appointment of entangled history as a historical perspective is seen by some as a ‘critical reassessment of modernity’⁴⁴. Others support and disseminate the ideas of connections and entanglements as a tool for criticising or mitigating, if not overcoming, Eurocentric approaches⁴⁵.

In general, the situation with entangled history or ‘histoire croisée’ does not look as contradictory as with the concept of ‘transnational history’. Thus, ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’ as a concept and historical perspective arise and spread precisely in the minds of European researchers because these concepts are focused mainly on intercultural relations, exchanges, and interactions. ‘Histoire croisée’ is also perceived as a means of criticising the ideology of Eurocentrism.

Histoire Croisée and Metanarrative

Metanarrative, as we know, occupies a central place in any national historiography. Within the ideology of global history, the functions of national and local narratives change, and the historian faces new challenges.

The classical great narrative has traditionally been based on various chronologies, genealogies, and a monolithic model of development based on historical laws. The focus was on the nation state, the defining unit of historical analysis. The narratives of the new generation change

44 Ibid.

45 *Luengo Jorge, Dalmau Pol*, Writing Spanish history in the global age: connections and entanglements in the nineteenth century, p. 445.

the standards of professional historiography, focusing on horizontal configurations and perceptions of the past and present in the plural: wars, revolutions, broad-spectrum ideologies, religious denominations, migration-resettlement, nationalisms, capitalisms, colonialisms, and more.

With such changes in the canons of historiography, it is ‘*histoire croisée*’ that serves as an experimental platform for constructing metanarratives on the basis of entanglements and connections. It is most correlated with the methodology of horizontal historiography which is gaining popularity in the age of globalization. Flows of goods, technologies, ideas, people, networks of cultural, political, economic, spiritual ties, as well as processes of clashes, interaction, competition, and cooperation – all together make up a modern set of topics and subjects of global, national, and local studies of historians in a globalized world.

Of particular note is the alternative approach in modern historiography to the history of Spain, proposed by Jorge Luengo and Pol Dalmau. In the article ‘Writing Spanish history in the global age: Connections and Entanglements in the Nineteenth Century’ (2018), they declare two principles-approaches – decentralisation of the history of the country and its insertion in global history. In the case of Spain, if it is ‘freed from territorial attachment to the Iberian Peninsula and even Europe, if connections and entanglements with individual territories come to the forefront of analysis’, then ‘the range of world history topics enriched with integration with Spanish history is enormous’. The authors provide a number of examples illustrating the potential that this approach embodies. In

the end, all these considerations imply a rethinking of the very concept of 'Spain' and its inclusion in the field of global history⁴⁶.

The attention of Jorge Luengo and Pol Dalmau is focused on the history of Spain in the 19th century. It is noteworthy that they construct their model not from the traditional nation-centric perspective but from the point of view of global history, even rather from the methodology of coherence and confusion. Spain, along with Portugal, China, and the Ottoman Empire, was perceived as a 'dying nation', so in the future, 'living nations' will invade its territory. It is in this way that 'the history of the Spanish Empire was traditionally explained'. Unlike the French and British empires, which were experiencing an era of expansion during that period, Spain was portrayed as 'petrified', which 'unsuccessfully clung to the remnants of past glory'.

The authors of this article, as global historians, abandoning the colonial approach, offer to look at the past from the standpoint of interaction and connections. Even after losing its territorial possessions, Spain maintained linguistic, cultural, and economic ties with *the new Latin American republics, which gives reason to talk about the 'new empire', i.e. Spain as a 'colonial state in the 20th century'*⁴⁷. In the case of Spain in the 19th century, the researches link forms and mechanisms of global relations to the institution of slavery and the variety of migration patterns that led to the global mobility characteristic of the 19th century.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid, p. 436.

In general, Spanish historians not only perceive global history as an alternative approach to national history but believe that the latter should be inserted in the context of global relations. Their formula ‘to take into account the globe, not just the Iberian Peninsula’ may become universal for global historians who have faced the challenge of a national metanarrative: *‘Contrary to the general tendency to view Spain as a disintegrating state, we have shown through various themes and plots how deeply the country has been involved in a wide range of global ties. Therefore, when writing modern Spanish history, the globe should be taken into account, not just the Iberian Peninsula’*. At the same time, the authors consider the principle of connections and entanglements to be the means of creating a metanarrative of modern Spanish history⁴⁸.

In short, the constructive position of Spanish historians is that they, first, sought to inscribe Spain in global history; second, understood the latter from the perspective of connections and entanglements; third, they perceived the global approach as an alternative to national history.

It is no coincidence that Thomas Bender’s book *Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History* (2006), which S. Conrad interprets as an example of transnational history, is in fact a wonderful illustration of ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’⁴⁹. After all, it is known that the term ‘entangled history’ is not popular in the United

48 Ibid, p. 444–445.

49 *Bender Th.*, *Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History*, New York: Hill and Wang, 2006; *Bender Thomas* (ed.), *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, Berkeley, 2002; *Конрад С.* Что такое глобальная история? С. 69.

States and is common mostly in European countries. It is significant that T. Bender, in contrast to the traditional understanding of American history, emphasises that 'national histories are part of global histories'. Inscribing national history within the global framework means crossing borders, connections between power structures and systems of the past.

Thus, T. Bender considers the American Revolution (the struggle for independence) in the broad context of the time and connects it with the revolutionary events of the late 18th century in Peru, Brazil, Bengal. The frame of the concept of entangled history (*histoire croisée*) also includes T. Bender's interpretation of American slavery, which he did not consider a phenomenon of purely American modern history – an episode of the Civil War, but perceived as a phenomenon in the global sense associated with the fight against slavery in general in the world. S. Conrad notes T. Bender's book simultaneously overcomes the Americans' feeling of exclusivity because no nation is able to create its own historical context⁵⁰.

From the perspective of 'entangled history' or '*histoire croisée*', it is possible to perceive as well the Ukrainian past as a 'testing ground' for the realisation of its various forms and mechanisms. Ukrainian lands were originally at the crossroads of trade, cultural, and migration flows from the civilised South to the wild North, with rich Asian goods and cultural traditions from East to West, where European countries gained momentum and spun the flywheel of economic,

50 *Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история?* С. 70.

ideological, and technological expansion. Polyethnic population, language freedom, transparency of cultural borders, tolerant attitude of Ukrainians to other religious denominations created the ground for interaction and cooperation with neighbouring ethnic groups, peoples, and countries. Changes in the Ukrainian territories of forms of political rule (princely federations, monarchies, empires), economic systems, and local elites are also an element of *histoire croisée*.

Given the mental features and specifics of the historical path of the Ukrainian nation, the ideas of connections and entanglements are quite organic for understanding its past and present. These ideas serve as a means of integrating the Ukrainian past into the global historical context. They also give the national metanarrative features of inclusiveness. Perception of the past from the perspective of *histoire croisée* means actualisation of the idea of vertical synchrony, rejection of the nation state as a universal unit of historical analysis, recognition of the identity and self-worth of one's own history. Thus, such obvious advantages of the methodology of horizontal history (the '*histoire croisée*' model) are only entering the structure of the Ukrainian historian's consciousness and will determine the agenda of domestic historiography in the near future.

Thus, the concepts of '*histoire croisée*' or 'entangled history' serve as a methodological basis by which the national history of the state, people, nation, region can be considered in the context of global processes of world history, both in the past and present.

Comparative History: Traditions and Innovations

Traditionally, comparative history is associated with French historiography of the first half of the 20th century – with the names of M. Bloch, L. Febvre, F. Braudel. According to Maurice Emar, comparative history in France has come a long way from the idea of seriality, quantitative and statistical research and still retains its significance. Modern comparative history, according to the researcher, is first directed against the descriptiveness in history, which ‘can go on indefinitely’; secondly, after the crisis of the 1970s, it restores the proportionality of time and space and gives historical space the meaning of a ‘full-fledged variable’; third, comparative history should not trust typologies but thoroughly explore the relationship of ‘complementarity and exclusivity’ in order to interpret and structure this space⁵¹.

However, there is an opinion that ‘with the development of the “new global history”, historical-comparative studies acquire a new meaning’⁵². Thus, P. O’Brien connects the difference between comparative and global histories with the expansion of the study area outside the nation states, continents, and oceans. In his opinion, responding to the needs of education and programme research on the production of metanarratives, essentially global and universal in purpose, the comparative method, so to say, ‘loses its dominant position.’

51 Эмар М. История и компаративизм // Новая и новейшая история. 1999. № 5. С. 92, 97.

52 Репина Л. П. Историческая наука на рубеже XX–XXI вв.: социальная теория и историографическая практика. Москва: Круг, 2011. С. 225.

He explains the loss of positions of the comparative method by the fact that a bibliography of global history has already been created, which focuses on 'the development of economics, gender, family, youth, marriage, diets, household, health, military affairs, power, slavery, human rights, parliaments, nationalisms, religions, fundamentalisms, revolutions, etc.'⁵³. What P. O'Brien calls a 'bibliography of global history' actually presents a wide range of issues of transnational history, free from any specific state, national, and territorial constraints.

Other historians note the fundamental difference between comparative history and 'histoire croisée'. For example, George M. Fredrickson in his study, *From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History*, states that if comparative history 'works in sync and explores the factors of national exclusivity', then 'histoire croisée' is aimed at the vector of cross-interaction vertically⁵⁴.

S. Conrad notes the difference between comparative studies and transnational history. If the former are focused on such large-scale objects as empires and civilisations, the latter 'deals with phenomena much narrower in geographical terms'. In contrast to the comparative, the transnational approach focuses on 'current and cross-cutting aspects of the historical process'⁵⁵.

53 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 6.

54 George M. Fredrickson, *From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History*, in: *Journal American History*, 1999, vol. 6, No. 2, p. 587.

55 Конрад С. Что такое глобальная история? С. 67.

The latest approaches and assessments of historical comparison and comparative history from the point of view of the German historical-theoretical tradition are analysed by Thomas Welskopp⁵⁶. In the article ‘Comparative History’, he notes: since traditional historical science was based on historicism and focused on the individual, it is characterised by a sceptical attitude to comparison. In the 19th century, history-discipline considered its main task to distance itself from the natural sciences which were ‘encyclopaedically classifying all things’.

Although representatives of the school of German historicism Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen approached history differently, ‘their main concepts were individuality, longevity, and development’⁵⁷. The rejection of comparative perspectives as a reaction against the natural sciences was considered a common phenomenon in history until the early 20th century. However, the idea of comparison appears in Droysen’s works, whose approaches and theoretical considerations were ahead of his time⁵⁸.

T. Welskopp draws attention to the circumstances and specifics of the spread of historical and comparative

56 *Welskopp Thomas*, Comparative History, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010–12–03. Access mode: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/welskoppt-2010-en>. See also: *Idem*, Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk: Arbeits- und industrielle Beziehungen in der deutschen und amerikanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie von den 1860er bis zu den 1930er Jahren, Bonn, 1994; *Idem*, Crossing the Boundaries? Dynamics of Contention Viewed from the Angle of a Comparative Historian, in: International Review of Social History, 49 (2004), p. 122–131.

57 *Welskopp Thomas*, Comparative History. Режим доступа: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/welskoppt-2010-en>

58 *Ibid*, 1.

research in the 20th century. Historical science, which was part of numerous nationalist movements in Europe, proved unprepared for this; its 'political and moral arguments were directed against historical comparison'. Thus, Holocaust researchers warned against '*trivialisation of this "single" crime*' by comparison or attempt to enter '*National Socialism in the context of European fascism*' and define it '*meaning in the process of transnational modernisation*'.

Consequently, critics who saw history as a source of identity interpreted comparison as an 'act of equality' and took it with political and moral caution. However, T. Welskopp considers a positive aspect of such criticism the perception of comparison as a balanced analytical position that will contribute to the creation of their own identity⁵⁹.

Comparative studies have usually been associated with the so-called 'historiographical mainstream' – medieval and social history. Because those areas were complex and multi-layered, they 'challenged the usual linear narrative'. However, comparative studies did not create explanatory models and theoretical generalisations. The connection between the historical comparison and the explanatory scheme (model) the researcher sees in the fact that the comparison must be guided by theory to obtain an explanatory model that allowed a more accurate empirical verification of the theoretical approach than a specific study could give⁶⁰.

At the same time, sociologists, in particular Max Weber, used 'comparative design': '*They used comparisons*

59 Ibid, 2.

60 Ibid, 4.

*as appropriate in their work [...] to move from empirical typification to the formulation of historical theories*⁶¹.

T. Welskopp points out that since the early 1960s, ‘the theoretical impetus came first from Anglo-Saxon historical sociology, for which there was no and will not be a proper equivalent in Germany’. That impetus was provided by the theory of modernisation ‘as a supplement, or rather an alternative to Marxist historical theory’.

The theory of modernisation – a ‘universalist concept to explain Western development, needed its own confirmation by comparison due to as many cases as possible, as well as deviations from this scheme’. The researcher distinguishes two strategies of historical and comparative studies. The first was when certain national units of study were selected from numerous cases, such as the history of revolutions and social protest in Europe. The second strategy was that such processes in different countries were given an ‘individualised explanation’: usually, they chose ‘three or four units of comparison’ which were deepened into appropriate contexts in order to identify “the decisive factor that seems to explain the difference between nations”⁶².

T. Welskopp connects the next stage in the development of historical and comparative research in Germany with the ‘new German social history’ which adopted many ideas from historical sociology. The latter is known to have abandoned the nation state ‘as a quasi-“natural” or “given” unit of comparison’. Thus, comparing nation states in different ‘social and institutional spheres’, it was possible

61 Ibid, 5.

62 Ibid, 6.

to obtain 'a more accurate interpretation of the unique development of Germany'.

In practice, this meant taking into account a much smaller number of cases for comparison than in historical sociology; 'it was considered adequate that a historian could deal with no more than two or three'. The chronological framework of comparative research has also been reduced: if in historical sociology, it embraced several centuries, now 60 or 80 years were enough, and that 'was a real challenge for historians'.

Thus, for the 1970s, the researcher states, the inclusion of historical comparisons in social history remained programmatic. That meant that comparative hypotheses and constructions prevailed over empirical research, while remaining the 'dominant interpretive model'.

In Germany, comparative history began to develop in the 1980s. Empirical studies within it were given a 'liberation impulse'. New studies quickly and decisively broke out of the 'straitjacket' of the methodological guidelines of 'historical social science'; they 'tended to look for similarities, rather than identify differences'. Thematically, social history expanded from social groups to large comparative constructions. In short, the focus shifted from comparing individual states to comparing social and cultural phenomena in certain contexts, and the nation state became one of the possible contexts, the superiority of which over others had to be proved⁶³.

In the 1980s, according to T. Welskopp, there was a 'systematic critique of the comparative approach',

63 Ibid, 8.

aimed not at empirical studies but at the old programme guidelines formulated by ‘historical social science’ in the 1970s. The brutal attack was directed against the imaginary connection of historical comparison with the nation state which was perceived as an ‘easily accessible data container’. That meant that the state could be ‘only one of the dimensions of historical and comparative research’⁶⁴.

The second line of critique of historical comparison is related to the masternarrative of the relevant national historiographies. According to T. Welskopp, the comparative approach is important not only for national narratives but also for basic models that have much in common⁶⁵.

Thus, at the present stage, the comparative approach has gone beyond nation states and ‘macrosocial phenomena’, gaining a wide range of opportunities. In particular, it is now possible to compare emotions, experiences, political practices, as well as individual social subjects.

The opposite criticism came from the camp of culturologists who believed that comparison, on the one hand, ‘significantly simplifies’ its objects, while on the other – creates ‘dumb comparisons’ between entities. Therefore, says T. Welskopp, the ‘duty to accurately determine the object of study’ is extremely important for comparison. It is believed that comparisons cannot comprehend relationships, but only compare ‘what is not mixed’. However, to explain the common phenomenon, the comparison involves a relationship ‘in the form of transfer, exchange, or joint dependence on transnational processes’⁶⁶.

64 Ibid, 9.

65 Ibid, 10.

66 Ibid, 11– 13.

It is noteworthy that the researcher of comparative history connects it with *histoire croisée*. The fact is that historical-comparative studies have outgrown the phase of 'static comparative structures' and track changes and their causes over long periods. The studied phenomena become similar to each other, then diverge again, or vice versa. According to T. Welskopp, such constant metamorphoses and variable influences serve as a source of *histoire croisée*. The latter also uses comparative approaches. Thus, both comparative and *histoire croisée* have the same direction: *'Both approaches ultimately have a common focus, and comparative history will always pay attention to changes in both context and phenomena, just as histoire croisée also always compares to some extent the relationships of the protagonists of its history'*.

In short, T. Welskopp states that 'comparison, transfer, and *histoire croisée*' should be perceived 'as perspectives that complement each other, and not to oppose them'. He draws attention to the fact that comparative history has a theoretical basis in the form of generalising theoretical models and typing procedures.

Such a generalising theoretical model can be created on the basis of a perfect and comprehensive study of a single case which acquires an abstract, formalised form, and then such phenomena are perceived as 'deviations, erroneous examples, or anomalies'. This is exactly what happened in the case of the 'universal theory of modernisation which essentially embodied the idealised experience of American development in the 20th century'. Concerning the problem of comparison and typification, T. T. Welskopp emphasised that typification, which takes place without 'a theoretical

criterion or is aimed at its replacement, remains arbitrary, inconsistent with reality'⁶⁷.

It is quite natural that T. Welskopp, a representative of 'solid' German thought, takes into account the role and importance of theoretical research models: *'Theoretical models in this sense are conceptual systems, the elements of which can be derived from empirical observations, but which have gone through a process of refinement and definition that separates them from their original context'*. This means that modelling in historical comparison should keep the same distance for all individual cases, i.e. 'should be performed at "equal distance" from the studied cases'. However, T. Welskopp states that experts on cultural transfer and *histoire croisée* deny this possibility. They believe that historians are influenced by 'their national origins, the discursive practices of the scientific networks in which they operate, and the intellectual, cultural, and linguistic traditions'.

In short, the researcher considers the 'study of national or other intellectual traditions, even the "transcendence" of national historiographies', obligatory for historical comparison. This means that 'theoretical comparison is mandatory as a preliminary for historical comparison' because it creates an opportunity for 'symmetrical modelling' and not just one-case studies. According to T. Welskopp, theoretical modelling in comparative history tends to typify.

In general, the researcher's conclusion about the prospects of modern comparative history is optimistic: 'Despite the unreliable fashion in historiography,

67 Ibid, 14, 16.

comparative history thrives. And the possibilities of such an approach are far from exhausted⁶⁸.

It is quite obvious that in the conditions of globalization, the usual and well-known comparative history acquires new features. If the traditional comparative history was focused on the procedures of comparing objects horizontally, in space, the new comparative history considers such processes and phenomena vertically in time. It also transcends national and territorial boundaries, abandoning the fetish of the nation state as a unit of study. Hence its closeness to the concepts of 'entangled history' or 'histoire croisée' which emphasise the interaction, the connections of events and relationships in all spheres of human existence. The difference between them is that comparative history emphasises more exclusivity than similarity. Thus, the new comparative history is rightly part of a large linguistic family of terms from global history.

Cultural Transfer as a Concept

The focus of global historians has recently changed – along with comparative history, the category of cultural transfer is gaining weight, which is also an organic part of the linguistic family of terms of global history. This concept is most common in the studies of European historians and is practically their invention. Some researchers associate cultural transfer with the concepts of 'entangled' history, 'histoire croisée', others – with the 'new comparative' history⁶⁹.

68 Ibid, 17.

69 Репина Л. П. Историческая наука на рубеже XX–XXI вв.: социальная теория и историографическая практика. С. 224–227.

Currently, ‘cultural transfer’, as well as the concepts of ‘entangled history’ and ‘histoire croisée’ is at the stage of conceptualisation. According to Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (2007), global history deals with cultural transfer, which focuses on the processes of transmission, reception, and adaptation of new values, as well as behavioural forms (models), scientific and technological discoveries, diplomatic history, focused on studying groups of people outside the political configurations of their governments⁷⁰.

In publications on the English-language resource of German historians ‘EGO’, Wolfgang Schmale analyses cultural transfer as a concept and historical perspective. In ‘*Transcultural History of Europe – Perspectives on the History of Migration*’ (2010), he identifies cultural transfer with transcultural history. According to the author, ‘the period of European integration in which we live today raises the question of transcultural history anew’. Cultural transfer is defined as the transfer of ‘material and cultural assets’. The latter are understood as individual assets and architectural styles (Gothic or Baroque), institutions (a university, an academy), technology (a clockwork or steam engine), socio-political structures (constitution, monarchy)⁷¹.

The researcher also draws attention to the place of ‘cultural transfer’ in the family of related terms. He

70 Yun Casalilla Bartolomé, Localism, Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe, in: *Historisk Tidskrift* (Sweden) 127 (2007), p. 663.

71 Schmale Wolfgang, A Transcultural History of Europe – Perspectives from the History of Migration, in: *European History Online* (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010–12–03. Access mode: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010a-en>

considers the concepts of ‘entangled history’ or ‘histoire croisée’ to be close to it, but he also sees a difference. While the research of cultural transfer concentrates on the problems of exchange, the concepts such as ‘entangled history’ and ‘histoire croisée’ are tied up to the key concept of ‘networks’ which could give direction to an overview of cultural transfer⁷².

In the article ‘*Cultural transfer*’ (2012), W. Schmale complements and clarifies its definition. The history of this concept is enlightening and proves that there are no cultures that are not intercultural or mestizo. It is being debated, based on ‘the categorisation of culture as a “mode of production” or a “mode of action”’. Following the Viennese sociologist Lutz Musner, W. Schmale understands cultural transfer as ‘processes of exchange between cultural space and cultural systems’ which involves ‘exchange and mediation of texts, discourses, mass media, cultural practices’.

Today, the processes of exchange and appropriation between cultures are perceived in terms of ‘creolisation’, ‘hybridisation’, ‘cultural flows’, which indicate the transition from a local to a mobile paradigm of culture, which corresponds to the ‘moving world’. This means ‘global exchange of ideas, ideologies, people and goods, images, media messages, and software’. Thus, the subject of cultural transfer is ‘that which is inert and transitional’. If we take into account this formula, then cultural transfers through family networks are as relevant as cultural transfers between ‘national cultural spaces’⁷³.

72 Ibid, 16.

73 *Schmale Wolfgang*, Cultural Transfer, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2012–12–05. Access mode: [http:// www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2012-en](http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2012-en)

Along with ‘cultural transfer’, Wolfgang Schmale also includes ‘cultural exchange’ and ‘cultural translation’ in the family of related terms. The latter is perceived both linguistically and in a broader cultural sense. Instead, ‘cultural exchange’ emphasises ‘the bidirectional and multidirectional nature of the transfer of cultures, and in some cases, their mutual nature’. In general, cultural transfer focuses on the process of actual changes in a particular place, whether in local, regional, transregional, national, imperial, or other contexts⁷⁴.

The specialist also determines the chronological contour of the concept of ‘cultural transfer’. It is usually applied to later history, but is now beginning to be used in the Middle Ages history and that of early modern times. So in relation to the research of the 20th century, cultural transfer is understood as the ‘Americanization’ of Europe or other countries. For the most part, the construct is used for the 18th–19th centuries, as well as the period of modernism from the beginning of 1900⁷⁵.

Conceptualisation of cultural transfer involves the definition of ‘procedures’ of transmission and its agents. The ‘procedures’ of cultural transfer include ‘the processes of cultural exchange and transmission, reception, imitation, revival, etc.’ They do not just happen but are carried out by small or large groups of people, less likely by individuals. Subjects or agents of cultural exchange are groups of people formed on ethnic, social, professional, cultural, functional principles. W. Schmale distinguishes several groups:

74 Ibid.

75 *Schmale Wolfgang*, A Transcultural History of Europe. Режим доступа: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010a-en>, 17.

1. Cultural and functional (humanists, enlighteners). The term ‘intellectual’ is more appropriate, but the author considers it a product of the 19th–20th centuries⁷⁶.

2. Ethnic migrations: during the 9th–11th centuries, cultural transfer was facilitated by the Normans, but from the 11th century (except in northern Europe and the Baltics), this type of ethnic migration is disappearing, and ‘in the long run, it has been replaced by other forms of migration for religious, social, economic, and professional reasons’⁷⁷.

3. Migration and cleansing: from the 19th century, forced ethnic movements begin, often resulting in ethnic cleansing as the opposite of cultural transfer and transcultural history. This type of migration, according to the researcher, arose ‘as a result of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the expansion of the Russian Empire, and the end of the Habsburg monarchy’. Ethnic migration and cleansing continued in the interwar period, during and after World War II. These include the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. At the same time, the Holocaust is not equated with ethnic cleansing, as it was a systematic and organised policy of mass murder that in a short time led to the extermination of Jews as a mediating cultural group in Europe⁷⁸.

W. Schmale’s merit is that he reveals the methodological significance of the construct of ‘cultural transfer’ which is directed against the nation state as a unit of study and focused on the concept of ‘cultural space’. At the same

76 Ibid, 80.

77 Ibid, 10.

78 Ibid, 11.

time, according to the researcher, not only specific people initiate cultural transfer: an important role also belongs to the cultural environment, area. Thus, he perceives cultural transfer as ‘an obvious counterweight, or even corrective, to nationalism’. The potential of cultural transfer is directed against the prejudices of national history imparted to it by nationalism, religions, denominations, and ancient civilizations which formed cultural spaces for interaction with each other through cultural transfer.

The concept of ‘space’ is perceived not geographically but intellectually, as in the case of followers of religions, denominations, and so on. The concept of ‘cultural space’ can also be associated with buildings and court culture, or the city/village dichotomy. This concept also means the ‘lifeworld’ of a certain social group, such as the Jesuits, connected not geographically but intellectually, with ideas and notions ‘due to mobility, behaviour, and rituals’⁷⁹. Cultural transfer always happens through people, ‘while modality can be real or intellectual’⁸⁰.

As part of the procedures for conceptualising cultural transfer, W. Schmale speaks about the possible risks of using such ‘unconventional’ approaches from the arsenal of global history as ‘histoire croisée’ and ‘entangled history’. It is the study of cultural transfer that creates the bridge between different approaches. For some of them, ‘epistemological de-bordering’ goes so far that the historical actors (players) who are responsible are lost between ‘the concepts of networks, connections, interconnections, and hypertexts of history’. Conversely, strategies related to entities such as the

79 Ibid, 17.

80 Ibid, 18.

nation, social elite, and ethnic groups remain insufficient. It is cultural transfer that creates the 'intermediate space' that is described through all these approaches⁸¹.

Cultural transfer is undoubtedly actualised in the context of European integration, so it is natural that this is the work of European historians. They use the construct of cultural transfer to rethink Europe's history in response to the challenges of a globalizing world. Thus, the idea of 'transculturalism' and 'intercultural history' is fully adjusted to the processes of globalization. It is no coincidence that the construct of 'cultural transfer' is completely organically included in the family of terms from global history. Note that cultural transfer should be perceived in two dimensions: as a concept and as a historical perspective.

Cultural Transfer as a Historical Perspective

It is noteworthy that W. Schmale considers the Renaissance one of the natural forms of cultural transfer. Recall that this term itself originated in the 19th century and belongs to the French historian Jules Michelet. In his essay, L. Febvre describes the dramatic events of his personal life, which led to the emergence of the term, because the author interpolated his own psychological experience (coming out of severe depression after the loss of loved ones, illnesses, and return to active life) to the cultural era which he called Renaissance⁸². It is no coincidence that the concept

81 Ibid, 32.

82 Аналізуючи ситуацію навколо виникнення концепту «відродження», Люсьєн Февр говорить про дивовижний характер слів, які народжує історична наука: «як тільки їх придумали, вони від неї вислизують. Вони йдуть своїм шляхом. У них своя доля». Поняття

of 'renaissance' arises precisely in the wake of European romanticism of the first half of the 19th century which was perceived as a 'new renaissance' with its inherent rise of spirit, wealth, and prosperity. Born in an era of continuous restoration of cultural life, political awakening of peoples, nations, states, this concept acquires a universal meaning, becomes relevant in the coverage of any historical epoch, marked by features of the rise of the human spirit, self-awareness, economic growth, and political stability.

W. Schmale has long considered the phenomenon of renaissance as a component of cultural transfer and transcultural history. After the beginning of our era, there

«відродження» належить до таких категорій, без яких люди обходилися віками і які раптом доводили свою необхідність, починали жити й ставали настільки звичними, що навіть, критикуючи їх, люди більше не могли без них обходитися, відмовитися від них, писати історію так, буцімто цих понять не існує». Л. Февр називає автора поняття «відродження» й час виникнення – Жюль Мішле та 1840 рік. Прагнучи розкрити таємницю виникнення концепту, дослідник розкриває механізм перетворення банального, звичного слова на історичне поняття, адже Мішле «створив не слово: він створив історичне поняття». Слово, яке було призначено для сухих шкільних підручників, враз наповнилося щедрим життям, яке історик носив в собі». Л. Февр відштовхується від образів та метафор самого Мішле, який вважав, що «історія – шалена гуманітарна хімія, де мої особисті пристрасті перетворюються на узагальнення, де народи, які я вивчаю, перетворюються на мене, де моє 'я' повертається, щоб надихнути життя в 'мої народи'». У такий спосіб Л. Февр занурюється у внутрішній психоемоційний стан історика, особливості його історичної уяви та фантазії, соціологію й естетику творчості. Смерть дружини, зустріч з новою «музою», ностальгічний потяг до смерті, віра у безсмертя – все укупі сприяло утворенню нового поняття внаслідок внутрішнього відродження історика-митця: «Усю свою скорботу людини, котра щойно зазнала втрати, скорботу, що його пригнічувала, та всю свою надію у витоків пристрасті, що його воскрешала. Так народилось, так піднялось з глибин його душі це поняття, таке плідне, таке оригінальне: Відродження». (Февр Л. Как Жюль Мишле открыл Возрождение // Его же. Бои за историю. Москва: Наука, 1991. С. 377-387).

were several renaissances, and some were connected with the history of Greece, the Greeks, others – with Rome. The Carolingian renaissance focused on Rome, and the Renaissance, which originated in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries, was inspired by both Greece and Rome. Classicism of the second half of the 18th – early 19th century combined the assessment of Greece and Rome. Neoclassicism of the late 19th century and modernity may be even more conscious of ancient times than of the Renaissance⁸³.

In the 18th–19th centuries, according to W. Schmale, in European civilisation, there was a clear differentiation associated with the industrialisation of Western Europe. This continued until the ‘forced universal Stalinist industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which until now, was only on the periphery of industrialisation’. At the same time, the author connects the biography of the concept of ‘Western Europe’ with the ‘geography of industrialisation of the 18th–19th centuries and the existence of North Atlantic Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain) where the processes of democratisation in parallel with industrialisation were stronger than on the rest of the continent’. The division of Europe after the Second World War into the ‘free West and Stalin’s East’ formulated the idea that this was not only a political division but also an intercivilisational one. In view of this, in 1989 in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries, there was already a ‘resonant call’ which was repeated in 2004 during the EU expansion, – ‘to return to Europe’,

83 *Schmale Wolfgang*, A Transcultural History of Europe. Режим доступа: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010a-en>, 2.

which, according to W. Schmale, was quite natural and justified⁸⁴.

Cultural transfers (transmission) were initially initiated by non-governmental networks of various kinds (families, communities of humanities, economists, musicians, artists, art workers). It is known from history that most of them fell on the period of the Italian Renaissance, which created a new cultural model. The researcher also connects the impulse of cultural transfer with France during the reign of Louis XIV (1658–1715), whose effect was different in different regions belonging to the area of the Holy Roman Empire. At the same time, under that monarch, France became the first European state to consciously set up its own culture for the purpose of transmission, which coded French transfer as national in other national contexts. The author traces this tendency from the 16th century, during which resistance to Italian cultural influences arose (later, the term ‘Italian France’, *France italienne*, will be applied to that period).

At the same time, the Italian Renaissance became the first general model that led to large-scale cultural transfers, which determined the processes of cultural Europeanisation. As a supplement to the transfer of cultures in ‘macrocontexts’ in the Renaissance and early modern times until the 18th century, there were dependent cultural transfers from the 15th century before the French Revolution, which included other models of the ‘middle range’ such as Dutch art or English constitutional law.

Despite the fact that cultural transfers took place in the Middle Ages as well, it did not give a ‘comparable model of culture’. According to the researcher,

84 Ibid, 6.

the reasons why the Italian Renaissance created a 'comprehensive European cultural model' should be sought in Italy itself, in its Mediterranean context, as well as in the formation of European society, 'which gradually developed European consciousness and possibly European identity'.

The integrity of Europe was perceived in the metaphors of identity: 'Europe as home, 'Europe as a body'. European society as a special social configuration was formed in the 15th century in the form of a network of family ties of the ruling dynasties, to which the judicial communities, clientele, officials, monastic orders, church, artists, scientists were connected. Such a network integrated 'all aspects of power: political, social, cultural, religious'.

It is noteworthy that the author connects the nature of cultural transfer with innovation: 'Cultural transfer is concentrated in the field of innovation, and therefore, innovation is impossible without cultural transfer'. Thus, in the case of Russia, we can talk about cultural transfers after the reign of Peter I (the country was considered part of Europe). Thus, W. Schmale emphasises that '*cultural transfer must be viewed in connection with the history of power and the formation of trans-spatial societies, an aspect that has received too little attention in research to date*'. Transfers lose their meaning when they no longer affect 'the creation, maintenance, expansion, and public display of power'.

It is significant that W. Schmale compares the category of cultural transfer with such 'later approaches' as 'histoire croisée' and 'entangled history'. The author sees the difference between them, i.e. cultural transfer and these approaches, in the fact that the 'operational unit' of cultural transfer is the concept of 'I-culture' or complex

culture, and new approaches use such an operational unit as 'history or histories in the plural'. However, all these approaches are combined with the desire of 'de-bordered' thinking. This approach applies not only to geographical but also social and cultural spaces, such as the nation, the historical region. In short, de-bordered seeing and thinking (which includes the concepts of 'fluidity', 'networks', 'interconnection', 'crossover') are the need for the current period, as, according to W. Schmale, without realizing this, history becomes 'incomprehensible'⁸⁵.

The author singles out a certain sequence of major periods in the development of cultural transfer, namely the Italian and French cultural models, which functioned differently without overshadowing each other. They had competitors. In particular, the American cultural model appeared in the United States which served as a guide for the practical implementation of democracy in a great power. As a result, in the 20th century, especially after 1945, the 'phenomenon of Americanisation' arose.

W. Schmale talks about a new cultural model in the times of the European Union, which is defined in its legislation. This new cultural model, unlike the previous ones, must be adopted by all countries seeking to join the EU. The example of Turkey is a good illustration of what this means because the transfer of European culture, as defined by the norms, '*would have involved a new cultural revolution on a scale almost comparable to that brought about by Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938)*'.

Thus, the large linguistic family of terms from global history includes a group related to 'histoire croisée'. It

85 Schmale Wolfgang, Cultural Transfer. Режим доступа: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2012-en>

includes both known, established concepts ('historical comparison', 'comparative study', 'comparative history') and completely new ('entangled history', 'histoire croisée', 'borderland history', 'cultural transfer', 'new comparative history'). This line of concepts is based on ideas, networks of connections, mutual influences of cultures and structures. What they have in common is the principle of overcoming territorial and political borders. However, some experts are sceptical of the concepts of 'histoire croisée' and 'entangled history'. According to W. Schmale, the proposed concept of 'histoire croisée' is often cited, but 'there are still no examples of its application in practice'. Thus, in the linguistic family of related terms, the concepts of 'histoire croisée' and 'entangled history' are mostly correlated with the concepts of 'comparative history', 'cultural transfer', and 'migration history'.

The concept of 'histoire croisée' has an inexhaustible research potential for the creation of national, local narratives and metanarratives in global history. This is convincingly demonstrated on a theoretical level by Jorge Luengo and Pol Dalmau in the case of a modern reading of Spanish history. With the help of a group of *histoire croisée* terms, such common notions as 'renaissance' are being resemantised, which is now perceived as cultural transfers of different times.

Transcultural Model of Europe

Within the European (German) school of global historians, there are attempts to outline the transcultural history of Europe, using the concept of 'cultural transfer'. According to W. Schmale, cultural transfer has 'agents

of influence' and specific spaces for their dissemination. Separate social groups seem to be created for cultural transfer: merchants, churchmen, scientists (humanists, enlighteners), cultural figures (music, theatre, architecture), highly specialised professional groups (miners), travellers, middle class, administrators, professional soldiers (Swiss mercenaries of the French king, the Irish in the service of the Habsburgs), and others. W. Schmale considers women to be key agents of cultural transfer and explains this by the factor of limiting women's activity by the household and family, and that applied to both court ladies and professional groups (nannies, maids), which existed in the 19th–20th centuries⁸⁶.

The cultural transfer was also facilitated by certain cultural spaces, such as the courts of rulers, monasteries, monastic orders, universities, schools, libraries, ports, and large cities, which were multicultural. In Europe, those spaces were created by separate groups that played a unique role. For example, Jewish ghettos or the 'closed groups' such as the French Huguenots (about 300,000), who left France after the repeal of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 and settled in the Netherlands, England, Brandenburg, and others. It was the latter who became responsible for the transfer of numerous French cultural values to the countries of the new settlement⁸⁷.

In short, from the point of view of W. Schmale, the transcultural history of Europe appears in the form of the main directions and achievements of cultural transfer: *'What would the Italian Renaissance be like without the*

86 Schmale Wolfgang. A Transcultural History of Europe. Режим доступа: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2010a-en>, 2, 20, 23.

87 Ibid, 20.

Greek refugees of the 15th century, who brought with them manuscripts and copies of ancient texts? What would Europe have been without Italy's master builders, craftsmen, architects, artists, musicians, thespians, merchants and bankers between the 15th and 17th centuries? How would Europe have developed demographically without the import of foodstuffs from beyond the continent such as maize and potatoes [...], which during the 18th–19th centuries became mass staple foods? What would have happened to the agriculture of many Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern European regions without the “German” peasants and craftsmen who were brought into the countries? What would the end of the 17th century and the 18th century been without the transfer of French culture as far as St. Petersburg? In what direction would European democracy have developed without the transfer from North America, the United States of America, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries? What would 19th-century industrialisation have been without the great Jewish banking families? What would the so-called modernism of around 1900 have been without Jewish intellectuals? The questions could go on and on⁸⁸.

Cultural transfer in Europe undoubtedly had its own characteristics. In short, immigration and emigration, as well as the mobility of professional groups, according to W. Schmale, depended largely on political decisions, and therefore, each political community could create ‘its own profile of cultural transfer’. It is ‘the period of European integration that we are currently experiencing that raises the question of transcultural history’⁸⁹. Despite the fact

88 Ibid, 21.

89 Ibid, 22.

that in the conditions of the ‘new “European” culture, national peculiarities were, of course, neutralized’, the historical source of cultural transfer does not disappear, although loses its significance. Instead, the European Union supports cultural diversity at all levels which promotes cultural transfer today as well as in the past⁹⁰. W. Schmale states that from the 18th century, definition of Europe has an essentialist character: ‘*Geographical essentialism made it possible to integrate a diversity of states, languages, religions, civilizations and nations*’. Thus, despite the cartographically visualised linear borders of countries, cultures, and religions, Europe was perceived as a whole, as a conglomeration of nation states, and the nation state – as one of the main areas of research in historiography.

The study on cultural transfer is important in terms of the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the debate on the role of these regions for the continent as a whole. W. Schmale states that contextualisation of cultural transfer opens a wide field of possibilities. The fact that it is closely linked to the process of consumption is still insufficiently taken into account. It is also important to trace how the context of integration of European society, government, cultural transfer and art changed in the 18th–19th centuries, as well as in the late 19th and 20th centuries⁹¹.

In general, we can state that ‘cultural transfer’ occupies a self-sufficient place in the family of terms from global history. It is no coincidence that it arose and gained popularity against the background of dynamic globalization

90 Ibid, 24.

91 *Schmale Wolfgang*, Cultural Transfer. Access mode: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schmalew-2012-en>

processes at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. The emergence of this very concept was facilitated by the processes of European integration, especially after a series of ‘velvet revolutions’ in the late 1980s, the creation and expansion of the European Union. In such a situation, cultural transfer is perceived as a concept and as a historical reality.

Cultural transfer includes such a component as agents of influence, subjects of transfer/transmission/shift of cultural values in the form of ethnic, social, religious, professional groups. An important component of cultural transfer is the concept of ‘cultural space’ where cultural and spiritual values are preserved and disseminated (universities, libraries, academies, monasteries, multicultural cities). Also important are the products of transfer (ideas, works of art, styles in culture or literature), its forms and mechanisms (exchange, formation of cultural and intellectual networks, translation). It’s interesting, that each political community, country has its own profile of cultural transfer.

The difference between cultural transfer and ‘*histoire croisée*’, ‘entangled history’ is that the former operates with the concepts of ‘I-culture’ or complex culture, and the latter and the third perceive history in the plural. However, cultural transfer and these approaches are combined by the idea of overcoming borders and abandoning the state as a unit of analysis in historiography. The constructive significance of cultural transfer is that it serves as a means of resemanticising known, ‘old’ concepts, such as ‘renaissance’. Today, cultural transfer is a tool not only for integration but also for reproducing the intercultural model of European history.

CONCLUSION. HISTOIRE CROISÉE – A UKRAINIAN PROJECTION

As a result, we state that global history is a product of globalization at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. From the beginning, it was associated with modernity, large-scale globalization processes in all spheres of society. Modern intellectuals immediately began to project global history on the events of the recent and later distant past. G. Iggers and E. Wang noted that *'globalization, of course, precedes the recent period. Already very early in the history of civilizations, there were exchanges, not only military and commercial but also cultural. The spread of the Phoenician alphabet, derived from Egyptian hieroglyphics, became the basis of the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman alphabets. The Hellenization of the Roman world is another example, as is the spread of the major world religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and later Islam. Yet with the age of discoveries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a particular form of globalization began'*¹.

In the process of historiographical debate around global history, it becomes clear that it has its own dynamics and dimensions. Conceptualisation took place in the 1990s, due to a new wave of globalization. Today we can distinguish such varieties (types) of global history as transnational, *histoire croisée*, and social theology. If transnational history is focused mainly on flows, large-scale cross-border processes, events, large territorial areas, then *histoire croisée* is associated with

1 Iggers G., Ван Э. (при участии С. Мукерджи). Глобальная история современной историографии / Пер. с англ. О. Воробьевой, науч. ред. М. Кукарцева. Москва, 2012. С. 26.

networks, interactions, and interinfluences. Both of them undermine the importance of the nation state as the dominant unit of historical analysis. At the same time, *histoire croisée* does not deny the importance of metanarratives in global history and serves as a means of constructing them.

Ukrainian historians usually perceive the relations of national history with European or world history in the traditional way. Thus, Volodymyr Potulnytskyi considers the history of Ukraine in the context of ‘dominant nations’². Vadym Adadurov offers his method of ‘integrating’ Ukrainian history into the European context which involves the use of European archival sources and substantiation of the idea of interaction of cultural and economic factors³. In my opinion, analysing the scientific situation around global history, it is quite logical to connect the modern metanarrative of national history, in particular Ukrainian, with *histoire croisée*.

Christian Globalization

The origins of global history, apparently, should be traced back to ancient times, from antiquity, associated with Greek colonisation (a ‘spiritual leap’) of the 8th century BC, the Roman Empire, the Hellenistic world, as well as the spread of Christianity on three continents, and providential globalization.

2 *Потульніцький В. А.* Україна і світова історія: Історіософія світової та української історії XVII–XX ст. Київ, 2002.

3 *Ададуrow В.* «Вписування» української історії в європейський контекст і його методологічні засади. Львів, 2013; Його ж. Теорія «вписування» української історії в європейський контекст та її методологічні засади // Наукові записки УКУ. Ч. 6. Серія «Історія». Вип. 2. Львів, 2014. С. 49–76.

Christian globalization originated in the spiritual sphere and later reached all aspects of the life of medieval society. The culture of that time was permeated by theological doctrine, the quintessence of which was that God is the source of being; the essence of all things is the word of God; the word is reflected in Scripture. Therefore, the medieval culture, spiritual and intellectual life of Europe were associated with words, writing, texts. Medieval culture is the culture of texts. It was not the world that was studied but the word about that world, the word was perceived as an object of knowledge. The whole society carried in itself the doctrine of discipleship, rooted in the godlike image of Christ. The ideal of learning presupposed the mastery of literacy. The meaning of the text is given, so it is important to learn to understand it⁴.

In general, in the cultural life of Europe in the early Middle Ages, there were two intertwined tendencies: the ecclesiastical, based on the Scriptures and the dogmas of the first teachers, and the secular which was represented by the 'barbarian Renaissances' (Ostrogothic, Visigothic, Carolingian, and the First Renaissance of the 12th century which 'remained within the religious worldview and had the opposite character compared to the classical renaissance')⁵. In fact, we have every reason to consider those 'barbaric renaissances', which were the centres of culture in the early Middle Ages, in the stream of global history as a cultural transfer. The latter is known to include such a component as 'agents of influence'. The subjects of the

4 *Рабинович В. Л.* Ученый человек в средневековой культуре // Наука и культура. Москва, 1984.

5 *Добиаши-Рождественская О. А.* Культура западноевропейского средневековья. Москва, 1987.

transfer (transmission) of cultural values at that time were such well-known intellectuals, creators of encyclopaedias, schools, new models of education and scientific doctrines (scholastics), as Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Venerable Bede, Alcuin, biographer of Charlemagne Einhard, Pierre Abélard, the first Christian missionaries, members of religious orders and sects.

An important component of cultural transfer was the 'cultural space' in which the activities of missionaries, church teachers, and intellectuals unfolded. Usually, those were centres of culture: scriptoria, monasteries, royal courts with court historians (as under Charlemagne), monastic and parish schools, the first universities of Bologna and Paris.

The products of cultural transfer of those times were literacy, literary translations that spread in the 'barbaric' territories, preservation and transmission of elements of religious knowledge, Christian dogma and ancient heritage, Roman education. The first renaissance of the 12th century is known to have been characterised by the convergence of European and Eastern cultures, Muslim influence that assimilated elements of antiquity, the emergence of universities such as madrassas and mektebs, and the emergence of scholasticism. Thus, Christian globalization took place in the spiritual sphere and was associated with the word of God, i.e. the spread of religious consciousness, faith, church dogma. This spread took the form of cultural transfer – the transfer of writing, texts (Bibles, works of church teachers), translated into local languages.

The cultural movement in the East Slavic lands began in the South (as a civilisational enclave) and spread from

there to the wild North and East. This cultural movement in the East Slavic area is known as the First South Slavic cultural influence. This concept-formula was used by Academician D. Likhachev. I think that in its meaning and significance, this concept coincides with the concept of cultural transfer. An important factor in Christian globalization was Byzantine culture. It was in Byzantium, that the high ancient culture was preserved which was transformed under the influence of early Christianity. The use of the Greek language by church hierarchs, as well as in trade and diplomatic relations contributed to the spread of Byzantine culture and education, created opportunities for acquaintance with ancient, ancient Greek, Roman literature, and original works of Byzantine authors. In general, the culture of Byzantium had a multinational character.

The initial stage of East Slavic culture, as we know, was characterised by a combination of folk, pagan culture of East Slavic tribes with high, scholastic Byzantine culture, which assimilated elements of ancient and early Christian cultures. At this stage of the clash of the two cultural worlds, a special role was played by Bulgarian culture, which became a mediator between Byzantium and Slavism, as well as between all Orthodox Slavic peoples.

In short, Bulgaria 'adapted' the cultural experience of Byzantium in the East Slavic area. Bulgarian culture, like Byzantine, was not narrow-minded but had non-national dimensions. The sermon of the Bulgarian philosophers and enlighteners Cyril and Methodius was addressed to all Slavs and was not limited to the needs of Moravia or Bulgaria. The alphabet created by Cyril and the first Slavic literary language (better known as 'Old Church Slavonic')

were a kind of compromise between the Macedonian dialect and the language of the Moravian Slavs, were crucial for the development of Ukrainian writing, literary language, and literature.

The non-national character of the First South Slavic cultural influence was supplemented by the apolitical character of the sermon of the Bulgarian philosophers and enlighteners. Their word was apostolic in nature and was not accompanied by political pressure. The breadth and openness of ancient Bulgarian culture contributed to its spread in the Slavic world, proving its pan-Slavic and pan-European significance. It is no coincidence that the role of the Bulgarian clergy is compared to the cultural mission of Irish monasticism, whose educational level was the highest in Europe (after Byzantium) in the 4th–8th centuries. Irish monks had extensive international ties from Iceland to Egypt, they carried Christianity, founded monastic cultural centres which prepared the ‘Carolingian Renaissance’ of the 8th–9th centuries. However, unlike the Irish monks, who focused on ascetic renunciation of the outside world, the Bulgarian clergy were ‘secular’, life-loving, focused on literary and educational work. By creating literature common to the entire Orthodox Slavic world, Bulgaria promoted all-Slavic cultural unity and internal cultural exchange between the Slavic peoples⁶.

Thus, the entire East Slavic Orthodox world – Kievan Rus (the Old Russian state) – appears in various dimensions: relations with Byzantium, Khaganates, Europe, nomads,

6 *Лихачев Д. С. Своеобразие исторического пути русской литературы X–XVII вв. // Его же. Прошлое – будущему. Ленинград, 1985. С. 222–226.*

the Golden Horde, Lithuania in the form and interaction of intellectual, cultural, economic, political relations and interactions, and as well as an extensive network of Russian-Lithuanian-Polish, European family and dynastic ties.

Unlike the First South Slavic cultural influence, which had a linguistic-literary and apolitical orientation, the Second South Slavic cultural influence differed in general cultural and theological orientation. The inclusion of Ukrainian lands in the Lithuanian Principality and the Kingdom of Poland resulted in a marked decline in the cultural level of Ukrainian society. There were no brilliant princely courts, the process of Catholicisation and Polonisation of the Ukrainian elite, faith, and education began. The second South Slavic influence appears as a complex socio-cultural phenomenon, a kind of fusion of literary, ethical, and religious ideas, cultural, social, and reform movements of the Ukrainian community.

The second South Slavic cultural influence or cultural transfer of the late 14 – early 15th centuries had a complex ambivalent nature. Ukrainian culture has its roots in the era of East Slavic unity which determined its Greco-Slavic orientation. On the other hand, Ukrainian culture assimilated the achievements of Western European culture (Renaissance, Reformation). Poland acted as a mediating culture, a translator of Western cultural and ideological influences. In general, the Ukrainian culture of that time was on the border of the Greco-Slavic cultural world and Latin Europe, combining national and non-national influences. It is noteworthy that Ukrainian culture and education system were focused on the ideals of national self-

affirmation, national struggle, national self-determination in search of their own identity.

Cultural transfer of the end of the 14th–15th centuries was associated with the literary movement in Bulgaria. From the Slavic South, there came new literary monuments, the so-called ‘Aeropagitics’ – the works of Basil the Great, Isaac Sirin, Simon the New Theologian, Gregory Palamas, Maximus the Confessor (Euthymius’s teacher). All the literature of that period was influenced by the Bulgarian literary movement associated with the activities of the Tarnovo Literary School and its founder, Patriarch Euthymius of Tarnovo (after 1372). He proposed a new spelling, created a circle of editors-translators of religious literature, and developed active translation and publishing activities. In Ukraine, the ideas of the Tarnovo school were spread by Metropolitans Kyprian (in Kyiv in 1373–1374) and Hryhorii Tsamblak (since 1415, Metropolitan of Kyiv and Lithuania).

The Tarnovo school is also known for the perception and spread among the Slavs of the mystical theory of Greco-Byzantine asceticism – hesychasm. This movement arose among the monks of Mount Athos, who professed the idea of the existence of the Divine light, which appeared at Transfiguration on Mount Tabor, and now was to be used as a reward for their anchorite (hermit) life.

The mystical practices of the Hesychasts had their own method of communion with God, which contained special methods of prayer based on the ‘psychosomatic foundation’ (D. Wendebourg). Through the incessant repetition of the ‘Jesus Prayer’, the Christian had to get rid of everything worldly – thoughts, actions, and be ready to meet the Epiphany. This method then included concentrating on

the 'place of the heart' where the 'prayerful activity is concentrated' (the monks knelt day and night, bowing their heads and concentrating their eyes on the navel). According to their ideas, it was this concentration of attention on one point that contributed to the distraction from everything external, everyday, and served as a safeguard for the perception of Uncreated Light. The third component of the method of Hesychasts was rhythmic breathing and appropriate posture (they knelt with their chin pressed to chest)⁷.

The ideologue of hesychasm was the late Byzantine theologian Gregory Palamas (1296–1359). His activity dates back to the 'renaissance' of the Palaiologos. Despite the economic and political decline of Byzantium, which at the turn of the 13th–14th centuries turned into a small, fragmented country, that time *'became absolutely outstanding in cultural terms: art and science, rhetoric and philosophy again reached their peak, and antiquity was again perceived with great elation'*⁸.

G. Palamas did not limit himself to defending the mystical practices of hesychasm; he substantiated it dogmatically with the help of a theological system, drawing an ontological distinction between the essence of God and the energies that emanate from Him. That is, God is inaccessible in His essence, manifests Himself in energies that are directed to the world and are accessible to perception like the Light of the Mount Fabor. Within

7 Wendebourg Dorothea, Gregorios Palamas (1296–1359), *Klassiker der Theologie, Erster Band: Von Irenäus bis Martin Luther*, hrsg. von Heinrich Fries und Georg Kretschmar, München, 1981, S. 252–268 / Вендебург Д. Григорій Палама (1296–1359). *Faith and Reason*. 2000. №. 1. С. 45, 49, 53.

8 Вендебург Д. Григорій Палама 1296–1359. С. 47.

the framework of Christian theology, he developed the concept of energies and the doctrine of the Trinity: 'God is both the essence of energy, and the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit'. Surprisingly, but between the two world wars, the Byzantine bishop was 'rediscovered'. Moreover, according to Dorothea Wendebourg, there was a real 'Palamas renaissance' which covered a wide range of Orthodox theologians around the world. In the works of Russian emigrant theologians V. Lossky and I. Meiendorf, the Orthodox 'Neoplatonic' image of G. Palamas was reproduced⁹. In the context of his doctrine of energies, he is now perceived as a representative of Christian existentialism and personalism.

Cultural transfer of the end of the 15th – first half of the 16th century (the Second South Slavic cultural influence) also contained elements of Western European culture. We are talking about the renaissance ideals of balanced beauty (the ancient ideal of harmony), human values, and the idealisation of nature (D. Chizhevsky). By the end of the 15th – beginning of the 17th century, Ukrainian culture existed in close connection with the Byzantine cultural tradition, although since the 14th century, there began the influence of Western currents, which led to a certain decline of the old Byzantine tradition.

The fact that religious issues in the Ukrainian lands became too sensitive, especially in the 16th century, led to Reformation influences, more noticeable than the renaissance. The key feature of the Second South Slavic influence as a cultural transfer is considered to be the church-theological component. It is no coincidence that

9 Там же. С. 50–55.

such Reformation, heretical movements as the Bulgarian dualistic heresy of Bogomilism, as well as repentance and Hussiteism, spread in the Ukrainian lands. The leading points of the Hussite programme, as we know, coincided with the propaganda of the Jews, which spread in Novgorod and Moscow (rejection of the doctrine of St. Trinity, the prayers of the Saint and the Mother of God, doubts about the divinity of Christ)¹⁰. Reformation influences gained popularity in the form of Socinianism (anti-Trinitarianism) – a sect in Christianity which did not recognise one of its main dogmas – the Trinity.

The Reformation pushed Lithuanian-Russian intellectuals to the problem of literary language. The word of God must become available to all the nations of the world, so their own vernacular must become literary. However, the national-religious movement in the Ukrainian lands, which revolved around the problem of ‘union’, did not contribute to the assimilation of either the Reformation literary tradition or the Renaissance tradition. The Reformation tradition on Ukrainian soil was preserved in the practice of using the vernacular and polemics against the Catholic Church. An outstanding phenomenon is the works of Ivan Vyshenskyi, directed against both the Renaissance and the Reformation in order to return to the old Byzantine tradition. In content and language, the controversy was associated with the Reformation, in style – with the Renaissance. However, those influences were broader and deeper in life than in literature.

In the culture and system of education in Ukrainian society of the 14th–15th centuries, the Slavic-Byzantine

10 *Лихачев Д. С. Своеобразие исторического пути русской литературы X–XVII вв. С. 267.*

tradition prevailed as a means of self-affirmation of the ethnos in the conditions of liquidation of national peculiarities in the administrative system, rights, institutions, and political governance of the Ukrainian lands. From the end of the 15th – first half of the 16th century, there existed two independent tendencies: Slavic-Byzantine and Western European (Latin). Within the framework of the first, elementary, parish schools developed, the next step was cathedral and monastic ones, then – palaestras, schools-workshops, which arose at the chancelleries.

In the Lithuanian part of Ukraine (Volyn, Dnieper, Bratslav region), the bookish version of the native language was studied; in Galicia, Podillia, which were part of the Kingdom of Poland – Latin. In the 15th–16th centuries, the Latin tradition in the education and culture of Ukrainians existed independently of the Slavic-Byzantine one. Thus, there were elementary Latin schools at churches and monasteries, and at the episcopal chancelleries and departments, there were schools of a higher type, which later became city schools under the administrative supervision of the bishop and magistrate or acquired the status of a board of the University of Cracow. The programme of those schools included the study of seven ‘free sciences’, as in Western European high schools. As for higher education, Ukrainian students studied at the universities of Prague, Cracow, Bologna, Basel, and others.

As a result of those spiritual and religious challenges, there was formed the psychotype of the Ukrainian, and appeared the first attempts of their self-identification in the form of ethno-religious consciousness (I am a Ruthenian, i.e. Orthodox). On the basis of the synthesis of

folk and bookish Christian-Byzantine culture, an original style of thinking, a stereotype of the consciousness of the Ukrainian people was created. In contrast to the Western European cultural tradition, which realised the 'Platonic-Aristotelian', logical-rationalist ideal of thinking, which sought an abstract truth independent of man or humanity, in the East Slavic cultural tradition, there prevailed 'Alexandrian-biblical' type of thinking. As the antithesis of the philosophical theorising which is detached from life, the Slavic-Greek-Byzantine type is focused on obtaining not veracity but 'truth', awareness of the peaks of the spirit, the drama of life¹¹.

If the Western style of thinking is characterised by abstractions, the search for truth, the idea of absolute truth, then the East Slavic linguistic consciousness is tuned to the inner, mystical, intuitive knowledge of being. The practices of Slavic spirituality are characterised by a somewhat mundane worldview. Thus, the classical 'concept of veracity, grounded, turned into truth, the aesthetic ideal – into beauty, and moral issues grounded in the category of good'. So truth acts as an attribute of human life, the Veracity exists in the abstract world. Therefore, in linguistic practices and consciousness, the truth is divided into higher, that is, veracity, and earthly, which is unique to each person, is hard to live in and difficult to meet¹².

The worldview of Ukrainians is characterised by 'the search for the truth of life, its essence never finds its

11 *Горський В. С.* Філософія в системі славістики. Історія і культура слов'ян. Київ, 1993. С. 43.

12 *Маслова В. А.* Когнитивная лингвистика. Минск: «ТетраСис-темс», 2008. С. 232–235, 237.

expression in pure abstraction, in the impartial knowledge of things'. In the linguistic consciousness of Ukrainians, the truth is manifested 'practically in the sensual-religious, ethical system, in the explanation of world events' (I. Mirchuk). Thus, the 'Ukrainian spirituality of the past' did not focus on epistemological or natural science problems, as was the case in Western Europe, but 'on questions of historical destiny and truth' (M. Shlemkevych).

In the Slavic-Ukrainian cultural tradition, not vertical but rather horizontal tendencies prevailed¹³. The spiritual energy of Ukrainians was directed not 'upwards' (in the form of philosophical treatises, speculative theorising) but spread 'widely' throughout the space of spiritual culture, saturating with deep philosophical content any work of the spirit – a religious sermon, political treatise, literary work, work of art, drama, poetry (I. Mirchuk, V. Horskyi).

Thus, later, in the 16th – early 17th centuries, cultural transfer remained part of the life of Ukrainian society in the form of transmission of religious ideas (Protestantism, Counter-Reformation), people (foreign scholars, teachers, printers, translators), models and programmes of secondary and higher education (Protestant, Calvinist schools, Jesuit colleges, academies-universities), fraternities as national-religious societies, created in church parishes by members of craft guilds like the medieval religious centres of Western Europe.

13 *Mirchuk I.* O słowiańskiej filozofii, *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, t. II-III, Warszawa, 1927, s. 128.

The Second Wave of Early Modern Globalization General Crisis of the 17th Century

The contours of early modern globalization are outlined by Bartolomé Yun Casalilla who links the relevant processes of those days with a range of factors, such as ‘*migration, the creation and strengthening of trade networks, the reduction of time for sea voyages, the increase in the flow of ideas, the culture shocks that arose between remote areas, the creation of colonial empires that included distant continents, the intensification of transferring microorganisms, animals, and plants – the phenomena pointing to the existence of the process of globalization*’¹⁴. Integration processes between different parts of the world covered not only Europe and were part of the process of globalization, which can warn us against Eurocentrism¹⁵. Thus, under globalization, the researcher understands the process, not the event, and seeks its origins in the distant past¹⁶.

The second wave of early modern globalization is associated with the era of travels and discoveries, the formation of the foundations of the world economy (according to F. Braudel), the manifestations of global synchronisation. Within the framework of early modern globalization, there are periods of ups and downs, general growth (the 15th–16th centuries), and general crisis (the 17th century).

The concept of ‘general crisis’ arose in the European historiography of the 1960s, in the works *Crisis in Europe*

14 Yun Casalilla Bartolomé, Localism, global history and transnational history, A reflection from the historian of early modern Europe, in: *Historisk Tidskrift* (Sweden) 127 (2007), p. 666.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid, p. 667.

1560–1660 (edited by T. Aston, 1965) and Hugh Trevor-Roper's *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, Reformation and Social Change* (1967)¹⁷. Discussions around the concept of 'general crisis of the 17th century' lasted in the 1970s and 1990s, which was reflected in the study *General Crisis of the 17th Century* (edited by G. Parker, L. M. Smith, 1978) and *Crises of the 17th Century, Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (ed. by Manfred Jakubowski-Tiessen, 1999)¹⁸.

According to the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, the crisis of the early modern period was '*not only political and economic but also social and intellectual, which was not limited to one country but was felt throughout Europe*'. He connects the general crisis of the mid-17th century with the 'period of revolutions', which differed from each other, if we study them separately, because they all had specific local causes; but if we comprehend them together, they show 'so many common features that they seem almost like a general revolution'¹⁹. In England, it was the Puritan revolution between 1640 and 1660, the Fronde in France, and the uprising in the Netherlands, Catalonia (1640),

17 Crisis in Europe 1560–1660, edit. by Trevor Aston, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965; *Trevor-Roper Hugh*, *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, New York: Harper & Row, 1967; *Idem*. *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, London, 1967.

18 *The General crisis of the seventeenth century*, edit. by Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978; *Krisen des 17. Jahrhunderts, Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven*, Jakubowski-Tiessen Manfred (Hg.), Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1999.

19 *Trevor-Roper Hugh*, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, in: *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001, p. 43–82. Access mode: <https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/roper-the-crisis-of-the-seventeenth-century>

Portugal, and Naples. I think the uprisings in Russia and Poland in the early 17th century and the Ukrainian Cossack revolution also fit into this series.

The researcher identifies the causes and nature of the 'general crisis' of the 17th century which had its own intellectual background – a persistent sense of impending catastrophe. The universality of the revolution was so contagious that it even became fashionable. The very position of society in the 17th century made it vulnerable to a 'new epidemic of revolutions', while the Thirty Years' War prepared the ground.

At the same time, H. Trevor-Roper considers it inadmissible for Marxists to identify the revolutions of the 17th century with the 'bourgeois-capitalist' ones because this is only an a priori hypothesis: *'The Marxists see, as we all see, that, at some time between the discovery of America and the Industrial Revolution, the basis was laid for a new "capitalist" form of society. Believing, as a matter of doctrine, that such a change cannot be achieved peacefully but requires a violent break-through of a new class, a "bourgeois revolution," they look for such a revolution.'* And when they find in England halfway between these dates a 'violent Puritan revolution', all other European revolutions are perceived 'as unsuccessful bourgeois revolutions'. The expert suggests that social change does not necessarily require a violent revolution; in particular in England, capitalism developed as an 'industrial democracy', i.e. peacefully²⁰.

If the crisis of the 17th century in Western Europe it is not 'just a constitutional crisis or a crisis of economic

20 Ibid, p. 51–52.

production', so what is it? The historian concludes, it was a social crisis, that is, a turning point in the relationship between society and government. Social crises cannot be measured in decades like the communist revolution of 1905–1917 or the French revolution of 1789. Instead, it is appropriate to explain them by the state of the regime they have destroyed or changed. And the pan-European crisis of the 1640s must be explained in view of the previous regime because the political structures of the 16th century remained unchanged: they were focused on the capture and maintenance of new territories, the expansion of empires. As is known, the 16th century is a period of territorial expansion, the struggle of monarchies with the cities-communes, the growth of the 'royal bureaucracy'. In short, the 'general crisis of the 17th century', according to the logic of H. Trevor-Roper, is not a constitutional crisis and not a crisis of the system of production but a crisis of relations between society and power – a social revolution²¹.

During the second wave of early modern globalization, Ukraine was a zone of numerous influences and connections – territorial, political, economic, socio-cultural, ideological. According to Vyrsky Dmytro, the Ukrainian history of the times of early modern globalization can be outlined in the context of three revolutions: noble, Cossack, and tsarist (as a counter-revolution). Thus, the Union of Lublin in 1569 buried the project of the 'feudal empire' of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and in the history of Ukraine, the Polish-Lithuanian dominant prevailed for a long time. For the first time since the period of Kievan Rus, almost all Ukrainian lands were part of one

21 Ibid, p. 53–82.

state. We are talking about the meeting-synergy of Rus with Rus – Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Lithuanian, the acceleration of Ukrainian-Belarusian demarcation and conflict competition with Muscovy-Russia, the birth-revival of Cossack Rus – Ukraine.

Vyrsky Dmytro describes the Rzeczpospolita universalist project as a noble revolution. Using this term, the author refers to the Polish-American historian Andrzej Sulima Kamiński²² which demonstrated the revolutionary significance for Rzeczpospolita as a state project of the ‘noble execution movement’ and noted the connection of that process with the Cossack movement (Cossack revolution) – which flourished when the revolutionary nobility declined. At the same time, the noble and Cossack revolutions of Rzeczpospolita overlap well with F. Braudel’s ‘age trend’ for the whole of Europe (= world-economy): from 1507 to 1510, growth prevailed; from 1650, there was the crisis of the mid-17th century; 1733–1743 – decline.

The incompleteness of the ‘revolutionary programme’ of the century-old noble revolution (1505–1608) caused a new wave – the Cossack revolution (1648–1709), carried out by the ‘nobility’s younger brothers’ – the Cossacks. At the same time, its upper limit is tied to the date when the development-growth of the project ended and the development-degradation began. The reduction of each successive ‘revolutionary epoch’ in time is a clear tendency of both early modern and modern revolutions. Vyrsky Dmytro believes that the participation of Ukrainians in the Rzeczpospolita universalist project and the ability to formulate their own project on its basis made them ‘skilled

22 *Сулима-Камінський А.* Історія Речі Посполитої як історія багатьох народів, 1505–1795 / Пер. з пол. Я. Стріхи. Київ, 2011.

helpers in the development of the later Russian Empire. The tsarist (imperial) revolution / counterrevolution began with the so-called Peter's reforms (from the 1690s) and lasted until complete exhaustion of the Ancien Régime / old regime in 1856, with the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War²³.

Obviously, Vyrsky Dmytro proposed model – the revolution triad (noble – Cossack – tsarist) as a tool for studying the processes of globalization in early modern Ukrainian history, in my opinion, coincides with the position of H. Trevor-Roper, who perceived the 'epidemic of revolutions' of the 17th century not in the Marxist sense – as short-lived explosions, 'bourgeois', 'capitalist' in content – but as deep, long-lasting social revolutions, prolonged since the Renaissance and caused by the crisis in relations between society and power.

Globalization influences in the economic development of early modern Ukraine were due to its location on the border with local world economies: it is a zone of Islamic civilization (in its Turkish-Tatar versions with a bustling market of Istanbul) and Muscovy-Russia with its Siberian rear. Migration, cultural transfer in Ukraine were associated with groups of traders, traditional diasporas – Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, Tatars, and Russians, closed to their imperial state projects, until the end of the 18th century were perceived by Ukrainians as foreigners. Along with diaspora groups from the West – Germans, Italians, Poles, all of them (groups) created that specific

23 *Вирський Д.* Стріла «натягнутого лука»: Україна в Речі Посполитій (1505–1795). 2016 р. Режим доступу: <http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/dyskusiya/1898-dmytro-vyrskyi-strila-natiahnutoho-luka-ukraina-v-rechi-pospolytii-1505-1795>

heterogeneous ‘Ukrainian business, which in modern times greatly slowed down the nationalisation of the bourgeoisie.’ The world of the early modern Ukrainian city was also multicultural. Globalization impulses were also manifested in the culture and life of Ukrainians of that time. Clothes and food, as Vyrsky Dmytro emphasises, looked ‘accentually oriental’. Just like the garden culture (‘a cherry orchard near the house’) which used to come to Ukraine for a long time from the East. In the spiritual and cultural sphere, the author speaks about the influence of Islam on the religious life of the Rzeczpospolita Ukraine; it is the grassroots cultural practices – folklore, fashion, material culture in general absorbed the experience of eyewitnesses of the Islamic world.

As for the ‘high’ Orthodoxy, in the middle of the 17th century, the legitimacy of the Kyiv metropolis was recognised by the Polish royal authorities. Ukrainian Orthodoxy was already capable of widespread expansion in the propaganda of the Cossack revolution and the reform of the church in Moscow’s possessions. At the same time, the Greek Catholic Church became ‘a pillar of Ukrainian Westernisation, forcing Catholicism to remove specific features of Ukrainianness’. Vyrsky Dmytro emphasises that it is a new type of double identification – ‘gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus’ (Ruthenian-Ukrainian of the Polish Rzeczpospolita) and the construction of hierarchies of loyalty that gave a chance to Ukrainian identity to endure stateless times and gain its own experience of tolerance²⁴.

24 *Вирський Д.* Початок сучасності: друга хвиля глобалізації, кінець Старого Порядку та Україна (XV – середина XIX ст.) / Наук. ред. І. Колесник. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2019.

The Imperial Meridian in Ukrainian History

The 19th century, according to global historians, occupies a special place in global history. The works of such well-known researchers as C. Bayly and J. Osterhammel are devoted to its reception from the perspective of globalization processes, their dynamics, and scale.

Thus, C. Bayly in the monumental study *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*²⁵ proves that the world was more globalized than one imagined. The author focuses on such key themes of the history of the 19th century as the rise of the nation state, industrialisation, liberalism.

J. Osterhammel, in the book *The Transformation of the World: the Global History of the 19th Century* unfolds a large-scale history of the century before last²⁶. It is no coincidence that he is called the ‘Braudel of the nineteenth century’, who examines the powerful global changes during the ‘long nineteenth century’, ‘*sheds new light on this momentous epoch*’, showing how it ‘*paved the way for the global catastrophes of the twentieth century, yet how it also gave rise to pacifism,*

25 Bayly C. A., *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* Blackwell History of the World, 2004. Див дискусію: Тесля А. А. Национализирующийся век: опыт глобальной истории: дискуссия о книге Ю. Остерхаммеля «The Transformation of the World» // *Философия: Журнал высшей школы экономики*. 2017. Т. 1. № 2. С. 110–120.

26 Osterhammel Jürgen, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. Див. також: Тесля А. А. Национализирующийся век: опыт глобальной истории: дискуссия о книге Ю. Остерхаммеля «The Transformation of the World» // *Философия. Журнал высшей школы экономики*. 2017. Т. 1. № 2. С. 110–120.

*liberalism, the trade union, and a host of other crucial developments*²⁷.

Global history has different definition markers for determining the place and specifics of the 19th century. It is W. McNeill, as W. Schäfer recalls, who speaks of the ‘long nineteenth century (1850–1950)’, during which ‘the West reached its powerful global position’. By the way, thanks to diasporic historians, in particular I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, that term was introduced into Ukrainian historiography where it later rooted as a construction of ‘a long Ukrainian nineteenth century’²⁸.

In German historiography, there is the concept of ‘saddle time’ (Sattelzeit; English analogue is saddle period). This concept was introduced by R. Koselleck in the 1960s and 1970s, in particular in the dictionary *Basic Concepts in History*²⁹. He defines this period from 1750 to 1855 as a transitional period between early modern times and modernity, which was marked by the coexistence of ‘new’ and ‘old’. In the context of global history, the concept of ‘Sattelzeit’ / ‘saddle period’ is used also by J. Osterhammel, according to whom after Sattelzeit, the world of the 19th century formed in culture, time, and space³⁰.

27 Режим доступу: <https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691169804/the-transformation-of-the-world>

28 Лисяк-Рудницький І. Структура української історії у ХІХ столітті // Його ж. Історичні есе: У 2 т. Т. 1. Київ: Основи, 1994. С. 197.

29 Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland / hrsg. von O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck. In 8 Bänden. – Stuttgart: KlettCotta, 1972–1997; Козеллек Р. Введение // Словарь основных исторических понятий: Избранные статьи в 2 томах / пер. с нем.: К. А. Левинсон; сост.: Ю. П. Зарецкий, К. А. Левинсон, И. Ширле; под общ. ред.: Ю. П. Зарецкий, К. А. Левинсон, И. Ширле. Т. 1–2. Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2014. Т. 1. С. 23–44.

30 Osterhammel Jürgen, Petersson Niels P, Globalization: A Short History. Translated by Dona Geyer. Princeton, N. J. Princeton University Press, 2009.

Representatives of the British school of global history use the concept of ‘imperial meridian’. This concept was widely used in C. Bayly’s ambitious study (as *The Times* defined it), *The Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830* (1989), which focused on the rise, apogee, and fall of the Second British Empire. This period covers the events of the American and French revolutions, the Napoleonic era, the world crisis and lasts from 1780 to 1830³¹.

Unlike C. Bayly, P. O’Brien narrows the chronological boundaries and the content of this period, reducing it to the establishment of European naval and military hegemony over countries and societies of other continents during 1789–1825: *‘In the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1789–1815, Europeans acquired massive additions to the populations, territories and natural resources in Asia, the Pacific and Africa under their direct or informal control. During an ‘imperial meridian’ European naval and military superiority over the states and societies of other continents emerged as virtually irresistible. Western Europe moved clearly onto a trajectory for sustained and accelerated economic growth, which led to widening divergences in levels of technology, productivity, living standards and military prowess between East and West, North and South’*. According to P. O’Brien, Eurocentric traditions in the construction of global histories intersected with theories of social development that followed from the American, French,

31 Bayly C. A., *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830* (Studies In Modern History), Routledge; 1 edition (1989). Access mode: https://books.google.com/books/about/Imperial_Meridian.html?id=nNgYDQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false

and Industrial Revolutions, purported to explain, Europe's geopolitical, technological and economic hegemony over rest of the world³².

The emergence of the imperial meridian is a global change in world history after 1789–1825, which meant the geopolitical technological and political rise of the West in the 19th century, when Europe became a world leader³³. Thus, this period, according to P. O'Brien, was characterised by the creation of a global world economic system, industrial revolutions, wars (from local to the 'Great European Civil War of 1914–1918'), revolutions (social, national, scientific), imperial expansionism.

The research potential and interpretive possibilities of the concept of 'imperial meridian' are evidenced by its verification on the basis of French history materials. David Todd, author of *The French Imperial Meridian, 1814–1870*, in contrast to his British counterparts, presents completely different chronological outlines of the concept. This is *'the period stretching from the restoration of Louis XVIII in 1814 to the fall of Napoleon III in 1870 remains terra incognita of the history of French global ambitions'*. It is the time between the fall of the Bourbon Atlantic Empire and the rise of the African and Indian Empires of the Third Republic, when France remained a military, economic, scientific, and cultural superpower that had a global impact. All this, according to the author, gives grounds to rename the period of 1814–1870 in the 'French imperial meridian' in the sense

32 O'Brien Patrick, Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history, *Journal of Global History*, 2006, No. 1, p. 11.

33 Ibid, p. 24.

of a ‘historiographical gap between the two classical periods of imperial expansion’³⁴.

Thus, if the British imperial meridian, identified by C. Bayly, was associated with a phase of authoritarian rule combined with the forced imposition of economic institutions on the territories under control in the 1780s and 1830s, during the crisis of the Ottoman, Persian, and Mughal empires, the French imperial meridian did not have the same ‘ideological coherence’³⁵. At that time, France remained not only ‘a leading economic power, second only to Britain in terms of foreign trade and foreign investment’ but it had enormous intellectual and cultural influence. Its academic institutions, engineering schools, and cultural institutions enjoyed worldwide prestige, and the French language, especially in continental Europe and throughout the Mediterranean, ‘retained the status of the principal means of intellectual, scientific, and even commercial and financial communication’³⁶.

Key themes of the history of the 19th century are considered to be imperial expansion, the nation state, modernisation, and democratic revolutions. Of some interest are the observations of modernisation analysts on the dynamics of modernisation in the transition from traditional to industrial society. Thus, Cyril E. Black in the work ‘Dynamics of Modernisation: A Study of Comparative History’ (1966) identified different types of transformation: *intellectual* meant establishing

34 Todd D., A French Imperial Meridian, 1814–1870, King’s Research Portal. Режим доступа: <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/57188711/FIM.pdf>

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

control over the environment, *economic* resulted in industrialisation, *social* contained rapid urbanisation, increasing specialisation of labour and changing relations between the sexes, *political* led to the emergence of leaders who guided the processes of modernisation, which stimulated the ethics of industrialism, competition, human self-development. Based on a comparative analysis of modernisation processes, Reinhard Bendix in *National Studies and Citizenship* (1977) and *Kings or the People: Power or Mandate for Governance* (1978) argued that if in Western Europe, industrialisation and democratic revolutions led to emergence of liberal states and capitalist society, in Russia, the tradition of the tsardom paved the way for 'authoritarian rule and egalitarian society'³⁷. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, editors of *The Age of Revolutions in a Global Context* (2010), believe that the main driving forces in the 19th-century history are democratic revolutions and industrialisation³⁸.

J. Bentley states that in general, modernisation analysts have focused on such defining features of modern society as urbanisation, industrialisation, science, technology, communications, mass education³⁹. It is noteworthy that it was in the 19th century that forms of national historiography acted as a political ideology of national movements for independence and unity in the imperial enclaves.

Thus, the concept of 'imperial meridian' is an intellectual product of the globalization era and serves as a tool for the

37 Див.: Бентли Дж. Образы всемирной истории в научных исследованиях XX века. Время мира. 1998. Вып. 1. С. 38–40.

38 *David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Eds.), The age of revolutions in global context, c. 1760–1840*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010.

39 Бентли Дж. Образы всемирной истории в научных исследованиях XX века. С. 40.

study of global history, in particular, is a defining marker of the history of the 19th century. Therefore, it is logical to assume that this concept-metaphor allows us to consider the past of Ukraine in the context of general processes in the world and in Europe. Moreover, to characterise the Ukrainian history of the 19th century, it will be constructive to use not only the metaphor of the 'imperial meridian' but also other concepts on the margins of global history, in particular 'backwardness' and 'national revival' as a cultural transfer.

The imperial meridian existed in two dimensions in the sphere of political, sociocultural, and intellectual history of Ukraine – the Russian Romanov Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Monarchy. In practice, it marked the period of the establishment of radical political, economic, social, and cultural hegemony of imperial governments over those peoples and countries that were part of those huge entities.

The central theme of the 'Ukrainian 19th century' became the idea of creating Ukraine as a global project. The imperial factor is undoubtedly a part of the history of Ukraine in the 19th century because the Ukrainian territories were in two empires – Russia and Austria-Hungary. Both belonged to a number of the so-called 'peripheral' or 'old', in contrast to the dynamic French or British empires, which were based on such Protestant moral and spiritual values as freedom of religion, democratic principles and institutions, free economic market. Instead, Russia and Austria-Hungary, with their multi-ethnic population, were burdened by a cumbersome bureaucracy, weak economy and infrastructure, and underdeveloped public communications. All that in general created socio-political tensions and led to conflicts.

The ‘imperial meridian’ in Ukrainian history is the period from the final destruction of Cossack statehood to the end of the First World War (1780s–1918), when Ukrainian society existed under the domination of two imperial regimes, which determined all aspects of its life. That period is marked by the formation of economic, socio-cultural, and ideological and political preconditions for the emergence of Ukraine as a global project.

Practically, in the Ukrainian territories as a part of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, there were two models of imperial integration. Both had a modernising character, but different vectors of change. At the same time, the transformation processes in those imperial enclaves, each in turn, contributed to the crystallisation of the Ukrainian nation and the practical implementation of the Ukrainian (state) project in early 1918.

In the 19th century, Ukrainian territories entered the orbit of the European world economy. Modernisation processes in the economy of Dnieper Ukraine were associated with the industrial revolution, which began in the sugar industry, the emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs-modernisers. The railway network created a sense of global unity, as well as space for economic, social, cultural, personal communications. The gaining momentum of the imperial economy with its banking system and foreign investment resulted in the emergence of such phenomena as industrial Donbass and the transformation of Ukrainian farmers into agents of world trade.

From the second half of the 19th century, Ukrainian society in the Russian imperial enclave experienced a real social revolution. The development of entrepreneurship led

to rapid urbanisation, the influx of population into cities, which resulted in the specialisation of labour, a change in relations between the sexes. Standardisation of science, successes of exact and fundamental branches of knowledge, exchange of new technologies promoted development of transport and communication infrastructures. As a result of global change, education has become widespread and accessible. The ethics of industrialism, competition, and human self-development was formed in the minds of the population.

The political component of Ukraine as a global project of the 19th century was created from various socio-political currents, cultural, literary, national movements, ideologies, and parties. The spontaneous formation of the political experience of the Ukrainian people was facilitated by wars – from local to world (the war of 1812, the Crimean campaign of 1853–1856, the First World War of 1914–1918, when Galicia was the main theatre of action) – and uprisings, peasant demonstrations (Decembrists in 1825, Polish in 1831, 1863).

The revolutions of the 19th century – the European democratic in 1848 and anti-imperial agrarian of 1905–1907 – in the imperial enclaves of the Habsburgs and Romanovs, served to form the political consciousness of Ukrainians. Political programmes of Ukrainians were created by the efforts of several generations of intellectuals, public and political figures: aristocratic autonomy, federalism of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood members, ‘soft patriotism’ of M. Drahomanov, independence of M. Mikhnovskyi, integral nationalism of D. Dontsov, national communism as a trend in the communist movement in Ukraine in 1917–1920.

Activities of deedful Ukrainians focused on the implementation of Ukraine's political project are represented by cultural and educational groups (the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, editors of *Osnovy* and *Kyivskaya Staryna* magazines), civic and popular movements in the Ukrainian East and West, and the emergence of political parties. Through their efforts, against the background of the political crisis of 1917, the UPR was formed as a realisation of a global national project.

Thus, integration processes in the economy, social shifts associated with the processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, the formation of industrial society, the class of Ukrainian entrepreneurship in sub-Russian Ukraine, were adjusted to the processes of liberalisation of Ukrainian political life in the Habsburg imperial enclave, intensification of political movements and formation the first political projects (radical formations, parties, public organisations). This contributed to the gradual formation in the minds of active Ukrainians first of the idea of ethnic and linguistic, and later – political and economic unity of the Ukrainian East and West.

The complex and ambiguous situation of Ukrainian lands in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires is traditionally characterised by the generalising concept of 'backwardness'. However, from the perspective of the methodology of 'connectedness' and 'entanglement' (from the arsenal of modern global history), the concept of 'backwardness' is read quite differently. It is certainly degrading in the socio-political aspect, often correlated with discussions about the colonial status of the Ukrainian economy, the provincial culture in Eastern Ukraine, and the absence of elites in the West.

At the same time, the concept of 'backwardness' is perceived not only emotionally but also scientifically as a research tool. In current historiography, the term 'backwardness' changes its original meaning as 'lack' or 'underdevelopment'. Now it is being resemanticised, the concept is filled with new meanings and socio-political connotations.

First, the idea of backwardness in history is actualised by the rejection of the idea of linear development, progress. In modern research, the past appears as a multidimensional, multi-layered process with different temporalities, a sense of time and space. Secondly, the new meanings of the concept of 'backwardness' signal the crisis of Eurocentrism as an ideology that emerged at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. Under the influence of anti-colonial criticism in the late 1990s, 'backwardness' began to be perceived as a manifestation of multiculturalism, i.e. 'otherness', difference. The crisis of Eurocentrism is known to be connected with the ideas of the West's decline, the end of the dominance of its development models on the planet. The diversity and at the same time the unity of the globalized world transformed the idea of otherisation/otherness (other/alien) into a serial series of plurality, numerous varieties (othernesses).

From the perspective of global history, the world is now perceived in the plural – as a set of differences. The theory of the plurality of modernities/contemporaneities is a marker of global historical analysis. In short, the concept of backwardness as a variant of plurality is fully correlated with the processes of modernisation of the economy of Ukrainian territories during the 19th century

because it was the result of relationships and interactions in the imperial economy, in the system of industrial and investment relations.

Usually, the idea of backwardness, which is present in the Ukrainian national consciousness, historiography, and journalism, is associated with the idea of statelessness. In particular, V. Lypynskyi explained the 'disease of statelessness' of Ukrainians by objective (natural-geographical) and subjective (human – faith, will, intelligence) factors.

Back in the early 20th century, he identified such directions for Ukrainians to overcome backwardness/statelessness. First, the 'harmful effects of our geographical location on the broad Asian-European path' and the state of being 'without natural borders', in his opinion, can be compensated by the organisation of a powerful military, material, and state power. Secondly, the 'harmful effects of the fertility of our land and the favourableness of our climate can be overcome by intensifying labour, which 'will teach us endurance, wean us from laziness, material envy, hatred and greed, and give immense material strength to our state'. Third, the 'harmful political consequences' of ethnic 'heterogeneity and dissimilarity' can be eliminated by recognising the need for political and territorial unity 'for our common life on common ground'. By the way, the author perceived such dissimilarity and heterogeneity as a huge wealth, and various bright personalities should at that contribute to the creation of a 'new, original, and beautiful Ukrainian culture'. It is noteworthy that V. Lypynskyi considered 'strong authoritative local political power' and the influence of 'state-national ideology built on

the principles of territorialism and patriotism' to be the safeguards of the 'degeneration of the nation'⁴⁰.

In the context of studying the problem of backwardness, the opinion of Maria Todorova, a researcher of this problem on the materials of the history of the Balkan countries, seems appropriate. She reflected on the speed of perception of the new by different social formations, religious, age groups, etc⁴¹.

In that way, V. Lypynskyi's observations that the peculiarities of the national character of Ukrainians, their emotionality, sensitivity are a great creative force that will allow to do in a short time what others needed a lot of effort and time to accomplish acquire global meaning: 'Our emotionality, politically destructive overly sensual temperament can become an invaluable creative force when we make up for its harmful political consequences with an organised and sustainable upbringing from an early age of our people that lack the necessary intelligence and will'. V. Lypynskyi's idea is as follows: 'Because this emotionality of ours (which cannot be acquired in any school), with reason, logic, memory, and will, that can be increased and brought up by the appropriate school, will allow us with our light zeal, violent creative imagination, and great passion to do in a short time what other nations, with their cold and insensitive temperament, would need much more effort and much more time to accomplish'⁴².

Ideas of the Ukrainian thinker of the early 20th century sound very modern because the fusion of reason and will,

40 *Липинський В.* Листи до братів-хліборобів / Ред. Я. Пеленський. Кн. 1. Київ; Філадельфія, 1995. С. 428–429.

41 *Todorova M.*, *Imagining the Balkans*. N. Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997.

42 Там само. С. 429.

and especially emotionality and sensuality as an innate/mental feature of the national character of Ukrainians is a prerequisite for overcoming the backwardness of Ukraine due to its imperial sabalternisation in the 18th–19th centuries. In a word, to do in a short time what other nations and peoples needed a lot of time and effort to accomplish. It was the emotionality and sensual temperament of Ukrainians that determined the speed of their perception of the new, rethinking of the previously acquired experience of other countries and their own movement forward.

As we can see, in the discourse of the new global history, the concept of backwardness takes on completely different meanings. First, it loses its negative connotations, that is, it should not generate in modern historiography a feeling of resentment, humiliation, or inferiority. Secondly, in a globalized world, backwardness is perceived as a historical fact – a manifestation of identity, a variant of the norm, or the direction of multi-vector past and present.

To the arsenal of modern global history, in line with the methodology of ‘connectedness’ and ‘entanglement’, there belongs the concept of cultural transfer. A look at the Ukrainian national revival of the 19th century as a cultural transfer expands the horizon of the study and takes this phenomenon beyond purely national history. It is believed that any revival (including the Renaissance) is the result of the interaction of numerous connections, spiritual and intellectual influences, and cultural traditions. Thus, the Ukrainian national revival was the result of the intertwining of different ideological currents, cultural traditions, socio-political movements: European enlightenment of the 18th century, French romanticism, German philosophy,

European sociological and political thought, Polish and other Slavic liberation movements, linguistic, literary traditions, and cultural and social practices.

The Ukrainian national revival can be seen as a cultural transfer of ideas, people, and socio-political movements. It is known that the ideology of active Ukrainianness, political ideas, and forms of cultural, social, scientific, literary activity, created by intellectuals and public figures in Dnieper Ukraine, were deliberately exported to Western Ukraine, where under certain political freedom and liberalisation of thought in the late 19th century, there was a real 'Ukrainian Piedmont'.

In the categories of connectedness and entanglement, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic traditions, the identities of Ukrainians during the national revival of the 19th century were formed, taking the form of two models at that. The first is numerous loyalties (ideology of aristocratic autonomy, federalism, All-Slavic unity as the ideal of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, local patriotism). Thus, at the individual level, in particular in the mind of P. Kulish, Ukrainophile, Russophile, Turkophile, and Polish loyalties intersected. Another model is exclusive identity (independence, integral nationalism). On a personal level, T. Shevchenko was the bearer of an exclusive Ukrainian identity.

It is obvious that within the framework of the 'Ukrainian 19th century', economic, social, and political processes took place in plurality: industrial and democratic revolutions, wars, national movements (Freemasonry, those loving peasants, patriots, populists, Muscovites), political parties of a wide range from radical democratic, moderate, 'negotiable' to the conservative right ones. This

means that in the complex and multifaceted history of the 19th century, it is worth looking for the origins of global processes of the 20th century.

Ukrainian 20th Century

From the point of view of the modern historian of the 20th century, this is really the 'historian's time'. For different generations of researchers, it represents a whole scale of points of contact between the past and the present, history and politics. Where is the edge here, when the present is perceived as the recent past, and the near future appears as the current life?

The last three to four centuries, full of shocking events: ups and downs, the collapse of ideas and structures, social and economic transformations, revolutions, wars, old and new regimes, have a pulsating character, are 'extended' or 'long', as the 'long seventeenth century' or the 'long nineteenth century'. Historians are now talking about the 'long twentieth century'. In 2018, Edward Ross Dickinson, a professor at the University of California, published a textbook for colleges characteristically entitled 'The World in the Long Twentieth Century: An Interpretive History'. The author believes that the last century is 'the most wonderful and creative era in human history' and at the same time – the most destructive. Modern society over the past 150 years has undergone unprecedented transformations based on the technological achievements of the 19th century. It was during the 20th century that our world has really been shaped on a global scale.

The 'long twentieth century', in the understanding of E. Dickinson, covers the period from 1870 to 2010,

when a set of technologies reshaped and connected the planet. The author explores the formation of the modern world as an ‘interconnected model of global events’. The ‘long twentieth century’, in his opinion, was formed for a long time as a series of political and economic upheavals, technological advances, and changes in the environment.

Within its framework, E. Dickinson distinguishes three periods. The first is expansion, ‘the involvement of East and West technologies to increase productivity, which led to a number of economic booms, increasing population density, changing patterns of production and consumption (the second half of 19th – early 20th century)’. These are the global preconditions for the history of the ‘long twentieth century’: *biological transformation* of modernity (population explosion of 1800–2000; mass migrations of 1840–1940); *basics of modern global economy* (the global development project of 1850–1930; scientific and technological revolution of 1850–1900; technological changes of 1850–1930; free trade and emancipation of 1840–1890; ‘free trade’ and imperialism of 1840–1920); *localisation and globalization* (race, ethnicity, and nationalism of 1830–1940; religious innovations of 1800–1920; cultural globalization of 1890–1930).

The second period is the ‘great explosion’ of the early 20th century – 1950s, a ‘struggle for power in the “new” technological world with the involvement of ideological pressure (racial, class, religious, national issues)’. The ‘great explosion’ contains events such as the ‘global revolutionary moment’ of 1890–1923; war for world domination (the first phase is 1914–1923, the second – 1935–1950); the

peasant question of the 1920s and 1930s; decolonisation and the Cold War of 1945–1990.

The third period is ‘high modernity’ or ‘great acceleration’, i.e. the second half of the 20th century – 2010s. This time is characterised by such processes as ‘great acceleration’ and the ‘general welfare state’ of 1950–1975; the ‘counter-globalization’ of 1960–1980; the ‘great slowdown’ of 1975–1990; ecological moment of 1960–1990. The ‘acceleration’ resulted in the ‘gradual “maturation” of the new globalized system, in which radical trends, although continuing to play an important role (moreover, some of them were rooted in the systems of mass consciousness), did not spill out, but rather contributed to profound change of social order (as a consequence, there emerged the so-called postmodern society)⁴³.

It is noteworthy that K. Patel in his book *The New Deal: A Global History* (2016)⁴⁴ considers that period not as an isolated process but in the context of world trends that influenced it and were under its influence. He compares the American reaction to the international crisis of capitalism and democracy of the 1930s with the attitude to it in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and other parts of the world.

The author considers that the global history of the 20th century actually appears as a history of political systems and economic models and explains it by the fact that the last century is a history of the decline and revival of capitalism.

43 *Dickinson Edward Ross*, *The World in the Long Twentieth Century: An Interpretive History*: University of California Press; First edition (January 12, 2018).

44 *Patel Kiran Klaus*, *The New Deal: A Global History (America in the World)*, Princeton University Press; 1 edition, 2016.

If for other countries that process was decisive, the USSR was an exception. In general, the 'new course', according to K. Patel, created the institutional basis for American global hegemony in the postwar period, ensuring the path of the United States to world leadership.

Ukrainian history fits perfectly into the overall picture of the 'long twentieth century'. This is a population explosion, numerous internal and external migrations. Ukraine also found itself at the center of revolutionary change, entering the 'global revolutionary moment of 1890–1923'. It survived the agrarian anti-imperial revolution of 1905–1907, the February 1917 revolution, and the national-democratic revolution of 1917–1921.

It is obvious that the history of the 20th century appears in the plural. It is intertwined with numerous streams: catastrophes, wars, revolutions, modernisation movements, left and right spectra, a bright palette of loyalties. Over the past century, there have been changes in the forms of national statehood (the UPR, Ukrainian State, Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic – Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukraine), political regimes (totalitarian, democratic). The 'Ukrainian 20th century' is a history of global catastrophes: regular waves of political repression, famine, Holodomor, Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing, deportation. Ukraine found itself at the epicentre of two phases of the struggle for world domination, became a theatre of hostilities during the First and Second World Wars, and survived the civil, local, and Cold Wars.

The previous hundred years in Ukrainian history have been an era of various social transformations and technological upheavals, Stalinist modernisation,

Khrushchev's experiments, economic and political crises, scientific and technological progress and space, and the digital revolution. A sign of the era is the change of numerous loyalties of Ukrainians (national, ethnic, religious, political).

The core of the history of Ukraine in the 20th century is a wavy alternation ('pendulum effect') of periods of rise and fall as a subject of historical process, with multidirectional vectors (economic rise often coincided with spiritual regress, and the heyday of cultural and intellectual activity occurred in times of crisis in the economy, while the rise of political life and political activity usually coincided with problems in the socio-economic sphere). Thus, the totalitarian model, the 'thaw' under M. Khrushchev and P. Shelest, 'stagnation', 'perestroika', independence – these milestones in Ukrainian history in some way correlate with such moments of the 'long twentieth century' as, in particular, 'the struggle for power in the "new" technological world', 'the peasant question of 1920–1930', 'the great acceleration' of 1950–1975, 'the general welfare state' of 1950–1975, 'the great slowdown' of 1975–1990. In short, the history of Ukraine in the 20th century fits perfectly into the global context of political systems and economic models of the last century, preserving its identity and traditions and constructing new identities.

Ukraine in Global Age

From the second half of the 20th century, a new wave of globalization began. This period has different names: 'high modernity' or 'great acceleration' (E. Dickinson),

the time ‘rapid globalization’ (J. Osterhammel)⁴⁵. Since the 1990s, the global picture of the world has changed, the term ‘globalization’ becomes part of the structure of scientific and mass consciousness. It is assessed differently: some point to ‘the benefits of greater access to technology, information, services, and markets, positive results of productivity which keeps growing, increasing total per capita income, etc.’ and some ‘emphasise the dynamics of social economic disparities within Western societies, the destruction of the general welfare state, and especially the inability to reduce poverty in large parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America’⁴⁶.

The new wave of globalization is associated mainly with the economic sphere, the emergence of financial capital, which knows virtually no national borders⁴⁷. The Cold War in the ideological, political, and military spheres ended in the collapse of communism. New information technologies have not only transformed society and the economy but have connected the world closely. In the cultural sphere, globalization processes are associated with advertising, fashion, and pop art, especially music. In the wake of the new globalization, a phenomenon such as technoscience is emerging. Wolf Schäfer considers it a ‘hybrid of scientific technology and technological science’. The author derives his understanding from the concept

45 *Dickinson Edward Ross*, *The World in the Long Twentieth Century: An Interpretive History*: University of California Press, First edition (January 12, 2018); *Osterhammel Jürgen, Petersson Niels P.*, *Globalization: A Short History*, Princeton University Press, NY, 2005.

46 *Иггерс Г., Ван Э.* Глобальная история современной историо-графии. С. 392.

47 Там же. С. 28.

of ‘finalized science’⁴⁸. Transport and communication systems are radically transforming the national identities and behaviours of people around the world, especially among the younger generations.

However, globalization also has its downsides. New technologies, artificial intelligence, extensive social networks create conditions for global control over people and countries. In a globalized world, the risk of spreading infectious diseases is increasing to the level of pandemics, and the dangers and consequences of environmental catastrophes are significantly increasing.

The social nature of modern globalized society has its own structure. British economist Guy Standing distinguishes several groups: 1. elite (richest); 2. salariat (from the English salary - ‘wages’) – the upper middle class, which has full employment and a decent salary; 3. professionals – people of stable position due to their knowledge and skills; 4. ‘old’ working class; 5. precariat (from the English precarious – ‘unstable’ and the word ‘proletariat’) – a new working class⁴⁹.

The latter group was formed as a mixture of the proletariat and the middle class in the context of globalization. It is believed that this generation has no great future, the career of its representatives, who have only informal employment, can unfold purely horizontally, depending on social status, i.e. members of this generation will remain in the social group in which they were born. Precariat is perceived

48 *Schäfer Wolf*, *Global Civilization and Local Cultures A Crude Look at the Whole*, International Sociology, 2001, vol. 16(3), p. 311, 317.

49 Гай Стэндинг: Прекариат – новый опасный класс. Режим доступа: <https://garagemca.org/ru/publishing/the-precariat-the-new-dangerous-class-by-guy-standing>;

as a result of the negative impact of globalization on the world economy. Social elevators do not work due to high competition and equal opportunities. This is the generation of a globalized world where its representatives are closer to their European peers than to their own parents⁵⁰. It is characterised by inclusion in digital technologies, actively uses the fruits and consequences of the digital revolution in life, profession, daily routine. As we know, each social generation is formed around the outstanding events of its time (revolutions, wars, major events, etc.). This generation was formed in the conditions of digital capitalism and the Internet revolution.

The generations of the 1990s and 2000s were formed around the technological advances of the new wave of globalization and the digital revolution. The global revolution in traditional media has led to the availability of any information, as well as music and cinema, which has recently radically changed the strategies of TV channels and the entertainment industry in general. Representatives of these generations assert themselves in social networks, creating online communities, groups, and blogs. Millennials are characterised by self-employment, a flexible work schedule, a tendency to change areas of activity and professional interests. They have complex relationships with hierarchical structures and bureaucratic decision-making style.

In the 1990s, Ukraine has entered an era of 'rapid globalization'. This is the real 'historian's time', when the past and the present exist online. The main achievement

50 Середній клас поступається місцем новому прошарку – прекаріату. Режим доступу: <https://ucu.edu.ua/news/serednij-klas-postupajetsya-mistsem-novomu-prosharku-prekariatu-yaroslav-hrytsak/>

of this period is an independent state. Ukrainians have experienced such signs of the globalization era as large-scale migration, tourism, labour emigration, and international education programmes that influence national identities and human behaviour. As P. O'Brien noted, 'Cultures are being more visibly re-ordered by advertising, fashion, and the popular arts, especially music. The means and media of modern transportation and communications (now cheaper and more accessible than ever to the masses) are opening up discourses (usually in English) that are reshaping national identities and personal behaviour around the world, especially among younger generations⁵¹.'

The formation of the political system of modern Ukraine takes place in a mode of alternation of two forms: parliamentary-presidential and presidential-parliamentary republic (the same 'pendulum effect'). In the social sphere, which is closely intertwined with the economy, our country has experienced a number of acute socio-political crises (the Orange Revolution, the 'economic revolution of 2008–2009', the crisis of 2014, and the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war). In the cultural and spiritual sphere, Ukraine is experiencing such globalization influences as the revolution in the media, the gadget consciousness of the younger generation, the volunteer movement, and the religious revival.

Thus, global history in all its varieties – *transnational history*, *social theology*, *histoire croisée* – is a tool for modernising the consciousness of Ukrainian intellectuals in a globalized world. In practice, this means abandoning the dogmas of Eurocentrism, such as the universal laws

51 O'Brien Patrick, *Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history*, p. 34.

of history, supertheories, and ideologies, the recognition of the nation state as the basic unit of historical analysis of one's own past. Modern global history, overcoming colonial thinking, complexes of secondariness, second-ratedness, must emphasise the equivalence and value of all ethnic groups and histories. The methodology of global history opens new opportunities for the creation of meta-, national, and local narratives based on the plurality, coherence, and interaction of cultures, traditions, and historiographies.

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Колесник Ірина. Глобальна історія. Історія понять / Вступ Валерій Смолій, Андрій Кудряченко: Глобальна історія – сучасний напрям історичних досліджень. К.: Національна академія наук України; Інститут історії України НАН України, ДУ «Інститут всесвітньої історії НАН України». 2022. 344 с.

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Глобальна історія – це найновіший напрям сучасної історіографії. Від початку виникнення терміна в 1990-х рр. і до сьогодні навколо нього ведуться дебати, дискутується питання співвідношення «глобальної історії» з такими спорідненими поняттями, як «всесвітня», «універсальна», «загальна», «світова», «компаративна», «велика», «транснаціональна», «зв'язана», «заплутана» історія тощо. Традиційно глобальна історія вивчалася як історія держав, імперій, цивілізацій, значних ареалів, земних півкуль. Нині глобальна історія вступила в рефлексивну стадію, а релевантним методом визначення її предметного поля та методологічного інструментарію стала історія понять, що дає можливість подивитися на глобальну історію як на концепт та історичну ідеологію епохи, котра глобалізується; визначити її місце як категорії-референта у великому лінгвістичному сімействі, а також семантичний зв'язок із такими конструктами, як «відсталість», «імперський меридіан», «відродження – культурний трансфер». У книзі глобальну історію представлено трьома типами історієписання: транснаціональна історія, соціальна теологія, перехресна історія.

У добу глобалізації сприйняття глобальної історії відбувається з урахуванням національних традицій, що є актуальним як для академічного середовища істориків, філософів, соціологів, так і для масової свідомості та глобального мислення у цілому.

Kolesnyk Iryna. Globalgeschichte. Begriffsgeschichte / Einführung Valeriy Smoliy, Andriy Kudriachenko: Globalgeschichte ist eine moderne Richtung der historischen Forschung. K.: Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften der Ukraine; Institut für Geschichte der Ukraine der Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften der Ukraine, Institut für Weltgeschichte der Nationalen Akademie der Wissenschaften der Ukraine. 2022. 344 S.

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Globalgeschichte ist der neueste Trend in der modernen Geschichtsschreibung. Seit Beginn des Begriffs in den 1990er Jahren bis heute gibt es eine Debatte über das Verhältnis von „Globalgeschichte“ und verwandten Begriffen wie „global“, „universal“, „allgemein“, „länderübergreifende“, „vergleichend“, „großartige“, „verbundene“, „verwirrende“ Geschichte usw. Traditionell wurde Globalgeschichte als die Geschichte von Staaten, Imperien, Zivilisationen, großen Gebieten und Hemisphären untersucht. Heute ist die Globalgeschichte in ein Reflexionsstadium eingetreten, und die relevante Methode zur Definition ihres Themenfelds und ihrer methodischen Werkzeuge war die Begriffsgeschichte, die es uns ermöglicht, die Globalgeschichte als Konzept und historische Ideologie des Zeitalters der Globalisierung zu betrachten; seinen Platz als Referenzkategorie in einer großen Sprachfamilie zu definieren, sowie die semantische Verbindung mit solchen Konstrukten wie „Rückständigkeit“, „Kaisermeridian“, „Wiederbelebung – Kulturtransfer“. Das Buch präsentiert Globalgeschichte in drei Arten von Geschichtsschreibung: transnationale Geschichte, Sozialtheologie, Cross History.

Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung basiert die Wahrnehmung von Globalgeschichte auf nationalen Traditionen, was für das akademische Umfeld von Historikern, Philosophen, Soziologen und für das Massenbewusstsein und globale Denken im Allgemeinen relevant ist.

Kolesnyk Iryna. Histoire mondiale. Histoire des concepts / Introduction Valeriy Smoliy, Andriy Kudryachenko: L'histoire globale est une direction moderne de la recherche historique. K.: Académie nationale des sciences d'Ukraine; Institut d'histoire de l'Ukraine, Académie nationale des sciences d'Ukraine, Institut d'histoire mondiale de l'Académie nationale des sciences d'Ukraine. 2022. 344 p.

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L'histoire globale est la dernière tendance de l'historiographie moderne. Depuis le début du terme dans les années 1990 jusqu'à aujourd'hui, il a été débattu. Il y a un débat autour de la question de la relation de «l'histoire globale» avec des concepts connexes tels que histoire «globale», «universelle», «générale», «globale», «comparative», «grande», «transnationale», «connectée», «déroutante», etc. Traditionnellement, l'histoire mondiale a été étudiée comme l'histoire des États, des empires, des civilisations, des grandes régions et des hémisphères. Aujourd'hui, l'histoire mondiale est entrée dans une phase réflexive, et la méthode pertinente pour définir son domaine sujet et ses outils méthodologiques a été l'histoire des concepts, ce qui permet de considérer l'histoire mondiale comme un concept et une idéologie historique de l'ère de la mondialisation; définir sa place comme catégorie référente dans une grande famille linguistique, ainsi que la connexion sémantique avec des constructions telles que «arriération», «méridien impérial», «relance – transfert culturel». Le livre présente l'histoire globale en trois types d'historiographie: histoire transnationale, théologie sociale, histoire croisée. À l'ère de la mondialisation, la perception de l'histoire mondiale prend en compte les traditions nationales, ce qui est pertinent pour l'environnement académique des historiens, des philosophes, des sociologues, ainsi que pour la conscience de masse et la pensée globale en général.

Колесник Ирина. Глобальная история. История понятий / Введение Валерий Смолий, Андрей Кудряченко: Глобальная история – современное направление исторических исследований. К.: Национальная академия наук Украины; Институт истории Украины НАН Украины, ГУ «Институт всемирной истории НАН Украины». 2022. 344 с.

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Глобальная история – это новейшее направление в современной историографии. С момента появления данного термина в 1990-х годах и по сегодняшний день вокруг него ведутся споры. Дискутируются вопросы соотношения «глобальной истории» с такими родственными понятиями, как «всеобщая», «универсальная», «сравнительная», «всемирная», «транснациональная», «связанная», «запутанная» история и другими. Традиционно глобальная история изучалась как история государств, империй, цивилизаций, огромных ареалов, целых полушарий. Сегодня глобальная история вступает в рефлексивную стадию, а релевантным методом изучения её предметного поля и методологического инструментария становится история понятий. История понятий дает возможность посмотреть на глобальную историю как на концепт и как историческую идеологию эпохи глобализации. Она же определяет роль глобальной истории в качестве категории-референта в большом лингвистическом семействе, а также её семантические связи с такими конструктами, как «отсталость», «имперский меридиан», «возрождение – культурный трансфер». В книге глобальная история представлена тремя типами историописания: транснациональная история, социальная теология, перекрестная история.

В эпоху глобализации восприятие глобальной истории происходит с учетом национальных традиций, что является актуальным как для академического сообщества историков, философов, социологов, так и для массового сознания и глобального мышления в целом.

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